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Vaccination is one of the most effective ways to prevent an outbreak of an infectious disease. It results in 
immunity for the vaccinated individuals, but also reduces the infection pressure for unvaccinated people. 
In the past years, the Operations Research/Operations Management community has shown a growing 
interest in the logistical aspects of vaccination. 
In this dissertation, we structure the literature on vaccine logics. Using a supply chain perspective, we 
identify the following four components in the vaccine supply chain: product, production, allocation and 
distribution. For each of the components, we describe the decision problems and we identify future 
research directions. In the remainder of this dissertation, we analyze three decision problems in the field of 
vaccine allocation: the allocation of a limited vaccine stockpile to fight a sudden outbreak, the allocation 
of prepandemic vaccines in an age-structured population and the allocation of a limited budget over 
multiple vaccine types. We use mathematical optimization to find solutions to these complex allocation 
problems.
We contribute by providing insights into the structure of the solutions that could not be obtained 
numerically. Our results show that optimality and equity are often far apart. Policy makers therefore need 
strategies in which they balance between efficiency and equity. The simple models and analytical insights 
in this dissertation provide a valuable starting point for analyzing such strategies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Infectious diseases
Infectious diseases have heavily influenced the course of history. From the 14th until
the 19th century, there were several major outbreaks of the plague, causing millions
and millions of victims. Also the Spanish influenza in 1918 took the lives of over
twenty million people. Nowadays, in most countries infectious diseases no longer
cause such staggering death tolls and some diseases have even been eliminated. But
new threats may arise from the outbreak of a new influenza pandemic (e.g., H1N1),
another respiratory illness (e.g., SARS, MERS) or a viral disease (e.g., Ebola, Zika)
as we have seen in the last years. Therefore, research on the prevention of a pandemic
as well as on the actions to take if an outbreak occurs remains a high priority.
Infectious diseases can be transmitted directly (e.g., via air or body fluids) or
indirectly (e.g., via mosquitos or ticks). In this dissertation we mainly consider direct
transmission through air. This type of transmission has caused large unexpected
outbreaks in the past (e.g., Spanish influenza) and can potentially do so in the future.
Also the models for transmission via air do not require detailed assumptions on
the population structure. Airborne diseases can spread through a population very
quickly, because one infected individual can transmit the disease to many others.
Even before an individual becomes symptomatic and is aware of the infection, he or
she might already be infectious and able to transmit the disease. This can lead to
large outbreaks, also referred to as epidemics, in a relatively short time. When an
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epidemic has spread through populations across multiple countries or even continents,
we speak of a pandemic. The spread of an infectious disease in a population is
a complex nonlinear process, because of the population dynamics that affect the
transmission. Epidemic models are used to analyze and understand this process.
1.2 Epidemic models
Over the years, many models are proposed to describe the time course of an epidemic.
We refer to Keeling and Rohani (2008) and Diekmann et al. (2013) for detailed
overviews of the many ways to model infectious disease dynamics.
Deterministic models A seminal paper in the field of epidemiological modelling
is the work of Kermack and McKendrick (1927). The authors propose a mathemati-
cal model that describes how a disease spreads through a population and this model
has been widely used since. The model divides the considered population into dif-
ferent compartments, each containing all the individuals that are in the same state
of disease. The model is therefore referred to as a compartmental model. One of the
simplest versions of the compartmental model is the SIR model, consisting of three
compartments: susceptible (S), infected (I) and removed (R). This SIR model con-
sists of a set of deterministic differential equations that describe the transitions in the
population from one compartment to the other. Numerous extensions are proposed,
some of which are analyzed by Hethcote (2000). One of the main advantages of a
compartmental model is its simplicity: it is easy to understand and can be described
in a few equations. However, despite the simple model description, compartmental
models cannot be solved analytically due to their nonlinear dynamics.
Stochastic models To overcome the disadvantage of deterministic spread, there
are studies that incorporate stochasticity in their models. Allen (2008) provides an
overview of such stochastic epidemic models. These models make use of stochastic
differential equations or they are based on Markov Chains. Stochastic models dif-
fer from deterministic models mainly in their asymptotic dynamics. There can be
endemic equilibria in deterministic models, but in stochastic models any epidemic
will eventually die out (Allen 2008). In addition, in deterministic models there are
certain conditions under which an outbreak will always affect a large proportion of
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the population, but in stochastic models there is always a probability that the out-
break will remain minor (Diekmann et al. 2013). For large populations, the dynamics
of stochastic and deterministic models are approximately the same. Bortolussi and
Hillston (2013) have made this result rigourous using a fluid approximation.
Simulation models In order to model the individuals in a population in detail,
simulation models are developed. They thereby differ from the deterministic and
stochastic models described earlier. The earlier described models are metapopula-
tion models that subdivide the population into distinct subpopulations, while as-
suming that all individuals in a subpopulation are identical. Simulation models, and
more precisely microsimulation models, differentiate between individuals by applying
individual-based or agent-based modelling techniques. Examples of such models for
the spread of influenza include the model proposed by Ferguson et al. (2005) for the
population of Thailand and the work of Chao et al. (2010) for the United States.
Although these individual-based models can capture many realistic aspects and gen-
erate case-specific results, analytical metapopulation models are better for deriving
general insights.
Epidemic models were initially developed for descriptive purposes only, but they
have shown to be very useful for prediction and evaluation as well. In particular,
these models are often used to evaluate the effects of certain interventions on the
course of an epidemic.
1.3 Vaccination
There are multiple ways to intervene in the course of an epidemic in order to reduce
the number of infections. One can distinguish between pharmaceutical interventions
such as vaccines and antivirals, and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The latter
include social distancing measures like travel restrictions or school closures. In this
dissertation we focus on pharmaceutical interventions, in particular on vaccination,
which is one of the most effective ways to avoid a large epidemic.
Vaccination protects individuals from infection by inducing an immune response.
After effective vaccination, this immune response results in long-lasting immunity to
the infection (Keeling and Rohani 2008). We can distinguish between different types
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of vaccination. Pediatric vaccination relates to childhood vaccination programs in
which children are preventively vaccinated against diseases such as measles, mumps
and polio. Pediatric vaccination is a form of pre-pandemic vaccination: individuals
are vaccinated to avoid an outbreak. Reactive vaccination, on the other hand, takes
place in response to an outbreak or a bioterror attack and aims at controlling an
existing outbreak. In this dissertation we study both pre-pandemic and reactive
vaccination.
1.4 Resource allocation problems
Policy makers are often confronted with limited resources in fighting or avoiding the
outbreak of an infectious disease. They either have to deal with budget restrictions or
face limited vaccine stockpiles. This brings about resource allocation problems: How
should the available resources be deployed in order to achieve a desired outcome?
For example, how should vaccines be divided over the age groups in a population
or among multiple regions? In this dissertation, we formulate and analyze several of
these resource allocation problems.
To quantify the outcome of a certain intervention we make use of two important
performance measures: the reproduction ratio and the final size. These measures are
often used in infectious disease epidemiology to express the potential of an infectious
agent to cause an epidemic. The final size is the eventual number of people who
have become infected. The reproduction ratio, denoted by R, is the average number
of secondary cases produced by an average infectious individual in a completely
susceptible population. In deterministic models, an outbreak will die out if R <
1, but will grow explosively if R > 1 (Van den Driessche and Watmough 2002).
R is considered to be one of the most important parameters in infectious disease
epidemiology and has received considerable attention (cf., Diekmann et al. 2013).
The effectiveness of an allocation is often expressed as the capability of the allocation
to reduce the reproduction ratio or the final size.
Once a resource allocation problem is formulated, the goal is to find the allocation
that performs best with respect to the selected performance measure. The nonlin-
ear dynamics of infectious diseases significantly complicate the analysis of resource
allocation problems in epidemiology.
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1.5 Thesis outline
In this dissertation, we study decision problems concerning vaccine logistics. We
start by considering a broad range of decision problems to map this field. We than
focus on a specific subfield within vaccine logistics: the allocation of scarce resources
to fight outbreaks of infectious diseases. In particular, we look at vaccine allocation
problems. We describe the outbreak using the SIR model and we use an analytical
approach to derive and analyze the solution. The outline of this dissertation is as
follows.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on the logistic decision problems that play
a role in vaccination. We combine the priorities areas defined by the World Health
Organization (WHO) with a supply chain perspective and propose a classification
for the literature on vaccine logistics. Using this classification we structure this rel-
atively new field and highlight promising research directions. With a view to this,
we distinguish between the following four components: (1) product, (2) production,
(3) allocation and (4) distribution. We find that the vaccine supply chain has some
unique aspects, including asymmetry between the various parties and important dif-
ferences between developing and developed countries.
In Chapters 3 - 5 we analyze three decision problems in the subfield of vaccine
allocation. The nonlinear dynamics of epidemics render vaccine allocation problems
difficult to optimize. Therefore, many studies in literature simplify their analysis
by comparing a few allocation schemes (e.g., Mylius et al. 2008, Tuite et al. 2010),
by enumerating all possibilities (e.g., Arino et al. 2008, Medlock and Galvani 2009,
Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015) or by developing heuristics (e.g., Teytel-
man and Larson 2013). In contrast, in this dissertation we gain insights into vaccine
allocation problems by looking at them from the perspective of mathematical opti-
mization. This enables us to formulate structured approaches to finding the optimal
allocation: the best possible allocation according to some well-defined criterion.
In Chapter 3, we study a decision maker that has a limited vaccine stockpile
available to divide among multiple populations in order to minimize the final size.
Public health organizations such as the National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands or the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) in the United States face this decision problem when confronted
with a sudden outbreak. To account for the suddenness of the outbreak, we mainly
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focus on vaccination during an outbreak instead of before. We use the seminal SIR
model to derive an expression for the final size. Even though the final size can
only be expressed implicitly, we are able to prove a convex-concave structure in the
vaccination fraction and the existence of a unique vaccination fraction that maximizes
the number of people who escape infection per dose of vaccine. Our results provide
new insights into vaccine allocation to multiple non-interacting or weakly interacting
populations, such as regions that are geographically distant. These insights enable
us to explain puzzling outcomes that were observed before in literature. We show
that allocations that minimize the final size are rarely equitable, while equitable
allocations may be significantly non-optimal.
In Chapter 4, we relax the assumptions of a limited vaccine stockpile and weakly
or non-interacting populations. Instead, we consider a heterogeneous interacting
population and are interested in the following optimization problem: minimize the
required amount of vaccines to obtain an effective reproduction ratio of exactly one.
This optimization problem occurs when decision makers want to preventively vacci-
nate a population in an efficient way. We prove that this optimization problem is
equivalent to the problem of maximizing the proportion of susceptible people who
escape infection during an epidemic. In doing so, we establish a clear connection
between two key concepts in the literature of vaccination while those concepts have
mostly been considered separately in the past. We explicitly solve the case of two
populations and propose a greedy heuristic that optimally solves the problem in case
of separable mixing. For the general case, we propose an efficient solution method
and illustrate it in a case study for pre-pandemic vaccination in the initial phase of
an influenza pandemic. This case study shows that the optimal allocation requires
a much smaller vaccine stockpile to protect the population compared to allocations
proposed previously.
Whereas Chapters 3 and 4 consider a single vaccination moment during or before
an outbreak, respectively, Chapter 5 allows for multiple vaccination moments. More
precisely, the chapter focuses on the budget allocation problem over two vaccine types:
an early aspecific vaccine and a later specific vaccine. We compare the two vaccine
types and surprisingly show that the decision maker should not exclusively consider
pure strategies, i.e., strategies which spend the entire budget on one of the types.
Instead, an appropriate investment should be made in both vaccine types to benefit
from the early response and from the good vaccine. Numerical results show that such
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hybrid strategies can reduce the number of infections by more than 50% compared
to pure strategies. We note that both Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 give counterintuitive
results that arise because of the nonlinear dynamics of the SIR model and that are
atypical for regular allocation problems.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarize the main findings of this dissertation and
derive conclusions.
1.6 Contribution
The chapters of this dissertation can be read individually. As a result, there is some
overlap in the introduction and problem descriptions of the individual chapters. The
chapters are based on papers that are either published in or submitted to scientific
journals. These papers are the result of a cooperation between various authors. The
references to these publications are given below.
Chapter 2 The literature study for this chapter was conducted by the first author
under supervision of dr. W. van Jaarsveld and prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker. It is
based on:
Duijzer, Lotty E, Willem van Jaarsveld, Rommert Dekker. 2017b. Literature
review - the vaccine supply chain. Tech. rep., Econometric Institute, Eras-
mus School of Economics. URL https://repub.eur.nl/pub/99513. Report
number: EI 2017-01.
Chapter 3 The research for this chapter was conducted by the first author in close
cooperation with dr. W. van Jaarsveld. Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker supervised the
process and prof.dr. J. Wallinga contributed in defining the problem. It is
based on:
Duijzer, Lotty E, Willem van Jaarsveld, Jacco Wallinga, Rommert Dekker.
2015a. Dose-optimal vaccine allocation over multiple populations. Tech. rep.,
Econometric Institute, Erasmus School of Economics. URL https://repub.
eur.nl/pub/79212. Report number: EI 2015-29.
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Chapter 4 This chapter was primarily written by the first author under supervision
of dr. W. van Jaarsveld and prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker. Prof.dr. J. Wallinga
contributed in defining the problem and in the review process. It is based on:
Duijzer, Lotty E, Willem van Jaarsveld, Jacco Wallinga, Rommert Dekker.
2016. The most efficient critical vaccination coverage and its equivalence with
maximizing the herd effect. Mathematical Biosciences 282 68–81.
Chapter 5 This chapter was primarily written by the first author under supervision
of dr. W. van Jaarsveld and prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker. It is based on:
Duijzer, Lotty E, Willem van Jaarsveld, Rommert Dekker. 2017a. The benefits
of combining early aspecific vaccination with later specific vaccination. Tech.
rep., Econometric Institute, Erasmus School of Economics. URL https://
repub.eur.nl/pub/99515. Report number: EI 2017-03.
Summary in Dutch This chapter was written entirely by the first author. It is
based on:
Duijzer, Lotty E, Willem van Jaarsveld, Jacco Wallinga, Rommert Dekker.
2015b. Vaccinatieallocatie en de kracht van optimalisatie. STAtOR 3 4–8.
Chapter 2
Literature Review -
optimization in the vaccine
supply chain1
2.1 Introduction
Every year millions of people are vaccinated preventively: they receive the annual
influenza shot, are included in childhood immunization programs or are vaccinated
against other infectious diseases. Preventive vaccination takes place before a disease
emerges and is meant to avoid an outbreak. In addition to preventive vaccination
there is also reactive vaccination, which can take place during an outbreak of an infec-
tious disease or in response to a bioterror attack. Although vaccination is a medical
intervention, successful vaccination campaigns are impossible without good logistics.
The growing literature on vaccine logistics demonstrates that the importance of this
is increasingly recognized.
In this chapter, we structure the literature on vaccine logistics, using the priority
areas defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) (World Health Organiza-
tion & PATH 2011). These priority areas allow us to evaluate the current state of
1This chapter is based on Duijzer et al. (2017b).
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literature on the vaccine supply chain and identify promising directions that could
be further explored in order to create a flexible and robust vaccine supply chain:
• Products and packaging
• Immunization supply system efficiency
• Environmental impact of immunization supply systems
• Immunization information systems
• Human resources
We focus on the first three priorities of the WHO, as these are most related to Oper-
ations Research/Operations Management (OR/OM). The WHO clarifies these three
priorities as follows: vaccine products and their packaging should be designed with
characteristics that best suit the needs and constraints of countries; immunization
supply systems should be designed to maximize effectiveness, agility, and integration
with other supply systems, and to support continuous system improvement through
learning, innovation, and leveraging synergies with other sectors; and the environmen-
tal impact of energy, materials, and processes used in immunization supply systems
from the international to local levels should be assessed and minimized. The last
two priorities, ‘Immunization information systems’ and ‘Human resources’, are not
explicitly considered in this review because they are more general and not specific to
vaccines.
The OR/OM community is increasingly interested in vaccine logistics, which is
indicated by the fact that around 90% of the papers discussed in this review dates
from 2005 and more than half, in fact, from 2011 (cf., Appendix 2.B). Despite
the growing interest, the literature on vaccine logistics is somewhat scattered. E.g.,
most papers focus on a particular aspect of logistics (e.g., allocation or production)
which results in separate clusters of papers with few cross citations. Moreover, there
is limited attention in these papers to the broader perspective of vaccine logistics,
making the papers difficult to place in the correct context. This larger context
is important, because improving a single aspect of logistics without aligning with
others will only lead to minor overall improvements (Privett and Gonsalvez 2014).
Current literature falls short in presenting a broad overview of vaccine logistics and
the vaccine supply chain, which makes it difficult to see where opportunities lie for
the OR/OM community.
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We contribute to structuring the literature on vaccine logistics by integrating the
WHO priorities with an OR/OM supply chain perspective. We propose to distinguish
between the following four components in the vaccine supply chain:
1. Product - What kind of vaccine should be used?
A vaccine is administered to develop immunity against a certain disease. Before
vaccination can take place, policy makers must decide which disease they are
targeting and which vaccine will be used. There might be multiple vaccines
available for the same disease or the characteristics of the disease might not
be known at the time of production. This leads to the problem of deciding on
the composition of the vaccine. For the annual influenza shot, for example, the
composition decision is related to the strains of the influenza virus that should
be included. Questions on what vaccines to use also play a role in designing a
vaccination program for multiple diseases. In designing such programs, policy
makers must decide not only which diseases to include and which vaccines to
use, but also when these vaccinations are scheduled in the program. Finally, for
vaccines it is of high importance to determine the right package of the product,
because vaccines are sensitive to changes in temperature.
2. Production - How many doses should be produced?
Once a vaccine has been selected, it has to be produced. The production of
vaccines is characterized by a high level of uncertainty in production yield and
long production times. This potentially leads to inefficiencies on the vaccine
market. Coordination on this market can improve the match between demand
and supply.
3. Allocation - Who should be vaccinated?
The available doses of vaccine are often insufficient to vaccinate the entire
population, especially in case of sudden outbreaks. This creates an allocation
problem: who should be vaccinated? Within a population, one can distinguish
between high-risk and low-risk individuals, but also between high-transmission
and low-transmission groups. Careful analysis is needed to determine which
group(s) should be prioritized. Also, (re)allocation problems among different
regions and/or countries can arise when an epidemic spreads across borders.
4. Distribution - How to get the vaccines to the people?
Once vaccines are available and the allocation decision has been made, the ac-
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tual distribution takes place. The doses of vaccine must be located somewhere,
leading to inventory control decisions. In the event of static distribution points,
logistical questions related to the positioning and layout of these points come
in play. For mobile teams that deliver medical support to various locations,
routing and scheduling problems occur.
Throughout the chapter we also use alternative perspectives next to the supply
chain perspective. One of those alternative perspectives looks at the main challenges
for vaccine logistics. By analyzing the literature, we identify three main challenges:
(1) increasing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the supply chain for planned
vaccination (2) preparing for sudden outbreaks and (3) preparing for bioterror at-
tacks. Next to that, we also use a disease-specific perspective and investigate which
decision problems play a role for which disease(s). Finally, we compare the decision
problems that play a role in developing countries with those in developed countries.
In Table 2.1, we derive the relation between types of outbreaks, diseases and com-
ponents of the supply chain. An ‘x’ in the table indicates that there are studies in
this review that consider the combination of disease and supply chain component.
Based on our bibliometric analysis in Chapter 2.3, we treat the studies on childhood
vaccination separately. Within our supply chain framework we discuss the differences
in decision problems for existing/expected outbreaks versus sudden outbreaks and
developed countries versus developing countries.
The supply chain perspective that we use enables us to compare the vaccine
supply chain to other supply chains. We observe that the vaccine supply chain has
several unique characteristics, which leads to some general lessons for supply chains.
Other aspects of the vaccine supply chain are also apparent in general supply chains
(cf., Chopra and Meindl 2007). Our analysis and structuring of the literature has
led to the framework in Figure 2.1, which is discussed in Section 2.8. This framework
compares the vaccine supply chain to other supply chains. Using this framework we
integrate the papers discussed and synthesize their contributions. We see that the
components ‘Production’ and ‘Distribution’ are comparable to other supply chains,
‘Allocation’ is unique to the vaccine supply chain and ‘Product’ is somewhat in
between. Decisions on which product to use play a role in every supply chain, but
the composition decisions that are important in vaccination are unique.
Based on this framework we derive promising research directions. With the WHO
priorities in mind, we identify the direction in which the vaccine supply chain should
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Product Production Allocation Distribution
Childhood vaccination x
Existing/expected
outbreaks
seasonal influenza x x x x
HIV/AIDS x x x x
malaria x x x
tuberculosis x x x
unspecified x x x
Sudden outbreaks
pandemic influenza x
unspecified x x
Bioterror attacks
anthrax x
smallpox x
unspecified x x
Table 2.1: Classification of studies based on type of vaccination and position in the
supply chain.
What type of product to use? How many products to 
produce and when?
Who should get the products? How to get the products to the 
people?
Right product (decision) Right product (realization),
Right time
Right place (decision) Right place (realization),
Right time
Si
m
ila
ri
tie
s
- Product development 
(R&D)
- Long production time
- Uncertain demand
- Pull process: initiated by 
the customer (i.e., public 
health organisation) 
- Uncertain yields
- Inventory control
- Facility location
- Routing
- Supply chain design
- Perishable product
- Temperature controlled chain
Pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
iti
es
- Asymmetry: product is 
determined by public health 
organisations, not by the 
supplier
- Public health organisations 
are non-profit, whereas 
supplier is full profit
- Product changes very 
frequently (yearly for 
annual influenza vaccine)
- Product decision is made 
under time pressure and 
high demand uncertainty
- Demand externalities due 
to disease dynamics and the 
protective power of 
vaccinations for non-
vaccinated people 
- Complex decision making: 
political interests, equity 
considerations
- End customer (i.e., 
`patient’)  does not pay for 
the product in most cases
- Push process: initiated and 
performed in anticipation of 
end customer need
- Asymmetry: end customer 
has no power in this phase
- Mass distribution under time 
pressure
Product Production Allocation Distribution
Figure 2.1: Framework - Classification of the vaccine supply chain and overview of
its particularities.
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develop and what is still needed to achieve this development. We emphasize the im-
portance of the supply chain perspective and the integration of the different stages in
the supply chain. We also observe in Table 2.1 that, in particular for the higher levels
of the supply chain (i.e., product and production), there are rarely any studies on
sudden outbreaks. Another topic that could be further elaborated is the asymmetry
in the vaccine supply chain: multiple parties are involved that each have their own
interest.
Within our classification of the vaccine supply chain, we structure and discuss
147 papers, 65 of which are from top OR/OM journals. We contribute by providing
the first review that connects the different logistical components of vaccination in
order to develop an integrated view of the vaccine supply chain. We are aware of two
reviews on related topics, but both have a rather different scope from ours. Dasaklis
et al. (2012) write an extensive review on epidemic control. Both pharmaceutical
and non-pharmaceutical interventions are taken into account. As the focus is on
unexpected outbreaks with a natural cause or due to a bioterror attack, logistical
aspects related to seasonal influenza or other expected outbreaks are not taken into
account. In contrast, we restrict ourselves to vaccination, which is a special case of
pharmaceutical interventions, and we consider all kinds of outbreaks (both expected
and unexpected). Lemmens et al. (2016) review general models on supply chain
network design (SCND) and apply their findings to the vaccine supply chain of the
rotavirus vaccine. They primarily consider the distribution phase and, to a lesser
extent, the production phase. The authors investigate whether the current literature
on SCND is able to deal with the characteristics of the rotavirus vaccine supply chain
and they indicate a number of points where there are shortcomings.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We start in Section 2.2 with
a short discussion on the search strategy and the characteristics of the included pub-
lications. In Section 2.3, we perform a bibliometric analysis to cluster and visualize
the publications based on co-citations. In the remaining sections, we discuss the four
components of the supply chain: Product in Section 2.4, Production in Section 2.5,
Allocation in Section 2.6 and Distribution in Section 2.7. We discuss our findings
and present future research directions in Section 2.8 and close with conclusions in
Section 2.9.
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2.2 Search strategy
The following search strategy is used in our review. We have searched the journal
databases of the top 20 journals in the category ‘Operations Research and Manage-
ment Science’ of Thomson Reuters InCites Journal Citation Reports. The journals
are ranked based on Article Influence Score and the ranking is presented in Ap-
pendix 2.A. These journal databases have been searched using the keywords ‘vacci-
nation’ and ‘vaccine’. These words have a rather unique meaning. A thesaurus does
not provide words with a similar meaning. The search resulted in 285 unique publi-
cations in total. The publications that were not scientific articles were disregarded.
This applied to 45 publications, for example editorial statements, descriptions of
award winners and book reviews. Out of the 240 remaining publications, 96 were
disregarded because of the lack of any health care related terminology in either title,
abstract or keywords. These publications for example cited papers with one of the
keywords in the title. We were left with 144 papers, which have been studied in more
detail. After careful reading, another 79 publications were disregarded because the
topics did not match the scope of this literature review, in most of those cases vacci-
nation was mentioned just once as an example. This review discusses the remaining
65 publications in the top OR/OM journals, that deal with topics related to vaccina-
tion. We also review supporting literature: e.g., from the epidemiological or health
economics community and other relevant literature that we found through citation
analysis. This resulted in including over 40 publications from various fields, includ-
ing Immunology, Mathematical & Computational Biology and Medicine. For these
streams of literature we have been more pragmatic and the list of included papers is
not exhaustive. We mainly included studies that use a quantitative approach.
2.3 Bibliometric analysis
Before we discuss the papers on vaccine supply chains in detail, we perform a bib-
liometric analysis of the papers included in this review. The contribution of this
bibliometric analysis is twofold: (1) it supports the classification of the literature
that we use in the remainder of the chapter and (2) it indicates some subfields. We
use the database of the Web of ScienceTM Core Collection to gather information
(search date March 20, 2017). This chapter reviews 65 studies of which 59 are found
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in this database and are hence included in the bibliometric analysis. The six papers
that are not included are listed in Appendix 2.C. We use VOSViewer (cf., Van Eck
and Waltman (2007) and www.vosviewer.com), a software tool well-established in the
field of bibliometric analysis. This tool is used to structure and visualize the papers
based on co-citations. VOSViewer constructs a map in which the publications are
represented by labelled nodes. The map contains only the most important publica-
tions, for others the labels are omitted to avoid overlapping labels. The distances
between the nodes are based on bibliographic coupling, i.e., the number of references
that publications share. Hence, the closer two publications are in the map, the more
shared references they have. The weight of a publication is measured as the total bib-
liographic coupling with all other publications. Node size and font size of the labels
are used to express this weight. Next to the construction of the map, VOSviewer also
supports clustering of the publications using a clustering algorithm. This algorithm
assigns weights to each combination of publications dependent on the bibliographic
coupling. The optimal clustering is determined by minimizing a weighted distance
function, where the distance between publications depends on whether they are in
the same cluster or not. In the map, different colors are used to distinguish between
the publications in the different clusters.
The map in Figure 2.2 contains five clusters. If we analyze these clusters in more
detail, we observe that the publications in each cluster are related by topic. Roughly,
the clusters can be described as follows.
The yellow cluster in the top left corner captures part of the papers in the compo-
nent ‘Product’, more precisely on childhood vaccination programmes. If we consider
the purple cluster in the right upper corner, we conclude that there is not really a
central theme that connects the publications in this cluster. We do see that most
of them are related to the distribution phase of the vaccine supply chain, ranging
from supply chain design to inventory decisions. The green cluster in the bottom
right corner consist of papers that discuss allocation problems for unexpected out-
breaks, either pandemics or bioterror attacks. The red and blue cluster are similar
and are both largely formed by publications in the INFORMS journals on influenza
vaccine composition and production. If we recall the three important challenges in
vaccination, we observe that the yellow, red and blue cluster focus on increasing the
efficiency of supply for planned vaccination. The remaining two clusters are related
to papers on preparing for sudden outbreaks or bioterror attacks. We thus conclude
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Figure 2.2: Mapping of the publications in this review, with node and font size
representing the weight of a publication. The different colors represent the clusters.
that Figure 2.2 roughly confirms the challenges that we identify in vaccine logistics
and our structuring of the different components of the supply chain. The way we
subdivide the publications over these components qualitatively coincides with the
clusters in the mapping. We also see some small subfields with a specific focus, such
as bioterror response and childhood vaccination programmes. We have included these
subfields in the broader components of the supply chain.
2.4 Product
The first decision that has to be made in the vaccine supply chain is the choice for
the right product: Which vaccine should be used? For some diseases there is not
yet a vaccine available (e.g., HIV/AIDS) or every year a new vaccine needs to be
developed (i.e., seasonal influenza). Decision problems arise regarding the design
of such vaccines. For other diseases, including the ones in childhood vaccination
programs, there are often multiple suitable vaccines available. Decision makers have
to decide which vaccines to use and when to schedule them in the program.
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The right vaccine is a vaccine that is designed with characteristics that best suit
the needs and constraints of countries (World Health Organization & PATH 2011).
First and foremost, a vaccine should have the desired characteristics in terms of
immunization. But also other aspects of the used vaccine can have a large influence
on the supply chain, such as the volume and the temperature at which it must be
stored. These characteristics particularly play a role in developing countries, where
(cold) storage capacity is limited. Following the terminology of the WHO priorities,
we refer to these characteristics as the ‘packaging’ of the vaccine.
In this section, we study the decision problems related to designing the right
product. In Section 2.4.1, we focus on vaccine composition, i.e., on designing a vaccine
such that it is able to immunize against the targeted disease. In Section 2.4.2, we
consider the case that there are multiple vaccines available, but the decision maker
has to select which vaccines to use. Finally, in Section 2.4.3 we study the decision
problems related to packaging of vaccines.
2.4.1 Vaccine composition
The main goal of a vaccine is to induce immunity. To design a vaccine that achieves
this goal, it is important to know the characteristics of the disease you are im-
munizing against. For ongoing outbreaks (e.g., AIDS, malaria) one can study the
characteristics of the disease that is causing the outbreak. However, this is not the
case for sudden outbreaks (e.g., of pandemic influenza) or outbreaks that are caused
by bioterror attacks. Outbreaks of seasonal influenza bring about an extra challenge:
Even though we know that these outbreak occur yearly, the virus strains that cause
these outbreaks change every year. This leads to the following categorization of dis-
eases: (1) diseases with unknown characteristics and a certain outbreak (seasonal
influenza), (2) pandemic influenza and other sudden outbreaks and (3) diseases with
known characteristics for which a vaccine is still under development (e.g., AIDS).
Note that there is also a fourth category, namely the diseases with known character-
istics and an available vaccine. We do not consider those diseases here, because the
decision problem regarding the vaccine composition does not play a role for those
diseases.
We start by considering the first group of diseases: diseases with unknown char-
acteristics but that are known to appear in the coming future. Seasonal influenza is
the most studied example for this group. Every year there is an outbreak of seasonal
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influenza, but policy makers do not know beforehand which influenza virus strain
will be dominant in the coming season. There exist multiple strains of the influenza
virus and mutations might lead to new strains. In designing the annual influenza vac-
cine, policy makers therefore have to decide based on forecasts which virus strains to
include in the vaccine. Due to long production times for vaccines, this decision has
to be made under high uncertainty with little information about the characteristics
of the coming influenza season. This results in the trade-off between deciding early
based on limited information or deferring the decision to learn more. Every year the
World Health Organization (WHO) advises on which virus strains to include in the
influenza vaccine (Gerdil 2003, Silva et al. 2015). This combination of included virus
strains is called the vaccine composition. At the decision moment, the most preva-
lent strains in the coming influenza season are still unknown, although surveillance
data may be used to make predictions. Wu et al. (2005) discuss the ‘follow policy’,
where the forecasted epidemic strain is included in the annual vaccine. The authors
investigate whether this policy can be improved by including the antigenic history of
the vaccinees, which consists of the strains to which the individual has been exposed
in the past. A dynamic program is formulated to determine the optimal vaccine
composition based on the antigenic history in sequential time periods. The results
show that the follow policy is only slightly suboptimal and is therefore recommended
to be continued. To gather more information about the coming influenza season, it
could be beneficial to defer the decision on the vaccine composition. Deferring the
decision reduces uncertainty and could lead to better decisions on which strains to
include in the vaccine. However, there is also a deadline before which the vaccines
should be produced. Waiting too long thus reduces the available time for produc-
tion, potentially leading to higher production costs. Kornish and Keeney (2008)
study this trade-off and formulate a commit-or-defer model. Conditions on the op-
timal decision are derived also using dynamic programming. Their results can be
used to evaluate what-if questions related to changes in vaccine production rates,
effectiveness of the vaccines, dominant strains that cause the influenza outbreak and
its expected severity. Cho (2010) extends the work of Kornish and Keeney (2008) by
including production yield uncertainties. Decision makers have to decide on retaining
the current vaccine or shifting to updated compositions. The latter may have more
production yield uncertainty. The objective is to maximize expected social welfare
which is comprised of social benefits and social costs. The costs include the pro-
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duction costs, which are related to production yield uncertainties. A discrete-time
decision model is proposed with three possible decisions at every time: select the
current vaccine strain, update to the most prevalent new strain or postpone decision
making to the next period. The main contribution of their work is that they include
the effects of the composition decision on the next step in the supply chain: the pro-
duction of vaccines. Özaltın et al. (2011) also take the uncertain yields into account
and allow for choosing among multiple possible strains for the vaccine, not only the
most prevalent one. A multi-stage stochastic mixed integer model is formulated to
integrate the composition decision and the timing of this decision. The results show
that selecting a less prevalent strain might be beneficial, if this strain has higher
production yields for example.
We now consider the second group of diseases: unknown diseases that might
suddenly result in an outbreak. Designing vaccines for those diseases suffers from two
types of uncertainty. It is not certain what type of disease will cause the outbreak
nor do we know when there will be an outbreak, if at all. The current policy for
sudden outbreaks is therefore often to design a vaccine only after an outbreak has
emerged. This is for example the case for pandemic influenza (Özaltın et al. 2011).
However, acting only when the outbreak has emerged might result in many infections,
due the long production times of a vaccine. Decision makers can therefore decide
to stockpile vaccines in order to prepare for a pandemic. Several researchers in
the medical/epidemiological community have discussed the development of a ‘pre-
pandemic’ vaccine for influenza (e.g., Jennings et al. 2008, Stöhr 2010, Scorza et al.
2016). Such a vaccine is tailored to the vaccine strain(s) that is (are) most likely to
cause the next influenza pandemic.
Finally, there are known infectious diseases for which there is not yet a vaccine
available, such as HIV/AIDS. Developing new vaccines requires medical and epidemi-
ological expertise, but also OR techniques might be helpful. We discuss a number of
studies that consider the development of new vaccine. Ding and Eliashberg (2002)
study the pipeline problem for new development of products. This problem con-
cerns a company that has to decide in which products to invest, while it is still
uncertain whether the development will be successful. The authors motivate their
problem with describing potential approaches for developing an HIV vaccine. The
model assists policy makers in deciding in which of these approaches they should
invest. Maher and Murray (2016) consider a specific technique to develop an HIV
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vaccine, namely gene sequencing. Gene sequencing can be used to identify struc-
tures in the HIV virus that could potentially be used for vaccine development. A
vaccine should target those antibodies that are responsible for the early stages of
HIV. The authors use integer programming to characterize the key antibodies that
determine the differences between initial and chronic sequences of the virus. Porco
and Blower (1998) state that one of the complicating factors for the development
of a HIV vaccine is the fact that there are multiple subtypes that are genetically
different from each other. Even though there is no vaccine available for HIV, Porco
and Blower (1998) consider HIV vaccination and formulate a simulation model to
control two subtypes of HIV. A prophylactic vaccine is considered that is effective
for one subtype and results in vaccine-induced cross immunity for the other. Focus-
ing on multiple subtypes is particularly important for developing countries in which
more than one subtype is present. Dependent on the characteristics of the vaccine
the authors determine whether mass vaccination leads to eradication of both HIV
subtypes or to the existence of one or two of the subtypes.
2.4.2 Vaccine selection
In case there is already a vaccine, or multiple vaccines, available for a certain disease,
policy makers have to determine which vaccine to use. A significant proportion of an-
nual vaccinations takes place within childhood vaccination programs. Public health
facilities and governments can buy the required vaccines for childhood vaccination
programmes on the pediatric vaccine market. Robbins and Jacobson (2011) study
the pediatric vaccine market from the perspective of the federal government which
can negotiate prices and quantities with vaccine producers. The authors formulate
a MINLP formulation which minimizes the costs of immunizing a full birth cohort
while guaranteeing a sufficient profit for producers to stimulate research and devel-
opment. Robbins et al. (2014) differentiate between the multiple vaccines offered
on the market, where each vaccine contains one or more antigens. They study the
problem where every customer (i.e., public health facility) wants to purchase at least
one of each antigen while minimizing cost. This leads to a set covering game and
conditions for the existence of equilibria are discussed. Robbins and Lunday (2016)
extend Robbins et al. (2014) and formulate a bilevel mathematical program with the
upper level consisting of the manufacturer and the customer on the lower level. The
manufacturer wants to maximize profit and faces a pricing problem for the produced
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vaccines. The customer can choose among a set of available vaccines each of which
immunizes against one or more diseases. The objective of the customer is to mini-
mize cost while selecting a number of vaccines that together immunize against a set
of diseases. The authors propose three heuristics to solve the problem.
Once decision makers have decided which vaccines to use, they have to design
a vaccination program, which involves solving combinatorial problems. A classical
example of such large combinatorial problems appears in the design of childhood vac-
cination programs. These programs aim at immunizing a child against a number of
infectious diseases by scheduling multiple vaccination moments during a certain pe-
riod of time. Since there are different vaccines available which immunize each against
a certain combination of diseases, constructing an effective and affordable childhood
vaccination program is a challenging scheduling problem. To avoid that children
need numerous injections, multiple vaccines can be combined into a single injection,
a so-called ‘combination vaccine’. Combination vaccines are not only beneficial, they
also have potential negative side effects. An injection with multiple vaccines might
overwhelm the immune system and can result in overdoses of vaccine antigen. Hall
et al. (2008) express the adverse effects of extraimmunization in terms of costs and
aim to minimize the total costs of the childhood vaccination program. To solve the
resulting combinatorial problem a solution method based on dynamic programming
is proposed as well as heuristics. Once a vaccination program has been designed,
not all children will adhere to this program. Due to parental misunderstanding or
logistical difficulties, vaccinations may be delayed or even missed. In those cases a
catch-up vaccination schedule must be constructed. Engineer et al. (2009) propose
a dynamic programming algorithm to construct catch-up schedules within a short
amount of time. Based on this algorithm Smalley et al. (2011) provide a decision
tool that constructs the best catch-up schedule given the vaccination history and age
of a child.
While combination vaccines are preferred in high-income countries, they are of-
ten not affordable in low-income countries. Proano et al. (2012) study the ‘antigen-
bundling pricing’ problem which determines for a set of producers which combination
vaccines to produce, how many to supply to each market and for what price, in order
to maximize total profit and consumer surplus. The authors propose a constructive
heuristic to solve the problem. Based on their solutions they conclude that organisa-
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tions such as the WHO could serve as an intermediary to encourage the introduction
of affordable vaccines for developing countries.
2.4.3 Packaging
The WHO emphasizes the importance of designing vaccine packages with the right
characteristics. Vaccines are packaged in vials, which are small glass or plastic bottles
that can contain liquid medicine, such as vaccine. The number of doses per vial highly
influences the required storage capacity and the wastage of vaccine. Determining the
vial size is particularly challenging in developing countries when people are vaccinated
in small communities. In those settings it is extremely difficult to predict the number
of people who will show up for an immunization session. Consequently, determining
the number of needed doses is complicated, which often results in partially used
vials and lost doses. In the epidemiological community there are several studies
that evaluate the effects of changing the vaccine vial size on the supply chain. Lee
et al. (2010) develop a general spreadsheet model to evaluate the effects of changing
vial sizes on the costs in the supply chain (inventory costs, disposal costs, costs
of administering vaccines and costs of doses wasted). They show that the optimal
vial size depends on the patient demand. If the demand is high, greater vials are
preferred and the reduced wastage costs outweigh the increased medial waste and
storage requirements. When demand is low, smaller vial sizes are preferred. Lee et al.
(2011) and Assi et al. (2011) use discrete event simulation models for respectively
Niger and Thailand’s Tang province to analyze the best vial size for measles vaccine.
They conclude that it is not beneficial to replace the currently used 10-dose size with
smaller vial sizes, even though the waste of vaccines could be reduced. Dhamodharan
and Proano (2012) apply optimization techniques to this problem and determine the
optimal vial size. They use a Monte Carlo Simulation model to account for stochastic
demand and solve an integer programming problem to find optimal ordering policies
and the best vial size. Their model can generally be applied by decision makers.
Next to the vial size, also the storage conditions of vaccines heavily influence the
supply chain. In developing countries cold storage capacity is scarce and electricity to
provide refrigeration is often unreliable. Lee et al. (2012) therefore study the effects
of making vaccines thermostable, meaning that cold storage is no longer required.
They construct a large discrete event simulation model for the Niger vaccine supply
chain. Their result show that even making a single vaccine thermostable reduces the
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pressure in the bottlenecks in the supply chain and thereby improves the availability
for other vaccines as well.
2.4.4 Discussion
In this section, we analyzed the decision problems related to vaccine composition,
selection and packaging. We observe that many studies in the OR/OM community
focus on expected outbreaks in developed countries. Studies on the composition of
a vaccine all consider seasonal influenza, which is a yearly recurrent outbreak. It
would be interesting to study how the derived methods and results could be applied
to vaccines for pandemic influenza, especially given the discussion on developing a
pandemic vaccine.
Also the works on childhood immunization programmes consider developed coun-
tries, with one exception being Proano et al. (2012). In general, in developed countries
one can expect that a designed program can be executed as planned. In case children
miss certain vaccinations, a catch-up schedule can be constructed (Engineer et al.
2009, Smalley et al. 2011). However, in developing countries childhood vaccination
programmes face many more operational limitations. For example, in rural areas
medical staff visits villages occasionally, which implies that all medical procedures
are performed at the same time in a village. The WHO emphasizes that a growing
number of vaccines will be available for low-income countries in the coming years.
It is therefore of interest to determine how these new vaccines should be integrated
in existing childhood vaccination schedules and which catch-up schedules should be
used.
Although the current studies on vaccine composition use advanced OR techniques
such as dynamic programming or stochastic programming, they are somewhat be-
hind in using models for disease progression to evaluate the effects of a vaccine. They
assume that the number of cases is known (Kornish and Keeney 2008) or use very
general functions to express the social benefits of vaccination (Cho 2010). More ad-
vanced models for disease progression are available in the epidemiological literature,
but also in the OR/OM community (e.g., Larson 2007, Teytelman and Larson 2012,
Aleman et al. 2011). Further research should try to incorporate these disease pro-
gression models into the vaccine composition decision, because evaluating the time
course of an epidemic is essential to properly quantify the impact of vaccination.
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To develop new vaccines researchers are applying new technologies, such as ge-
nomics (Seib et al. 2009, Liao et al. 2017). The technological developments might
change current decision problems or bring about new problems. For example, with
the large amount of genomic data that becomes available, analytical approaches are
likely to become much more important. Maher and Murray (2016) demonstrate
the valuable contribution of applying OR techniques in analyzing sequence data for
vaccine development and further research opportunities in this direction should be
investigated.
In Section 2.4.3, we emphasized the importance of designing packages with the
desired characteristics. In the epidemiological community there are some studies on
determining a good vial size and evaluating the effects of the used vial size on the
supply chain. However, the results of these studies are often very case specific. The
OR/OM community can contribute to these decision problems with their general
models and supply chain perspective. Another important characteristic of vaccines
is their required storage temperature. Liquid vaccines typically need to be stored at a
temperature of 2-8 degrees Celsius and the storage of vaccines is therefore sometimes
referred to as the ‘cold chain’. Recent research shows that new approaches and tech-
nologies are being developed to allow vaccines to be stored at higher temperatures
(e.g., Chen and Kristensen 2009, Wang et al. 2013). Future research could evalu-
ate the effects of making vaccines thermostable on the entire supply chain. Another
interesting research direction is the coordination of the discussion between manufac-
turers and public health decision makers on determining the desired characteristics
of a vaccine. These two parties have their own interest and coordination might be
needed. Solutions have been proposed for related coordination problems on vac-
cine production (see Section 2.5.2) and further research could extend these solution
methods to the packaging of vaccines.
2.5 Production
The production of vaccine is characterized by various types of uncertainty. In the
production phase there are multiple stake holders involved: for-profit manufacturers
and non-profit governments, public health organizations et cetera. Every stakeholder
has their own interest and is affected by the uncertainties in different ways. The pro-
duction process itself has a long production time and suffers from yield uncertainty.
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But also the demand of vaccines is highly uncertain. For seasonal influenza, for
example, the immunization season is short and there are frequent changes in the
vaccine composition. In Section 2.5.1, we discuss these uncertainties and how they
can be reduced. Especially the uncertain yields are one of the main causes for the
undersupply on the vaccine market (Chick et al. 2008, Deo and Corbett 2009). As
vaccines are public goods with positive externalities, governments and other non-
profit organizations may want to influence the vaccine market to achieve a social
optimum. We distinguish between two ways to achieve this: via market coordination
or through funding. Market coordination is discussed in Section 2.5.2 and mainly
plays a role in developing countries. In Section 2.5.3, we discuss funding, which is
also of importance for developing countries.
2.5.1 Production uncertainties
There are various types of uncertainty that appear in vaccine production and that are
important for vaccine manufacturers. The most eminent are the natural uncertainties
that are related to the production process. For example, influenza vaccines are grown
in embryonated eggs, which is a process that is characterized by uncertain production
yields. An additional complicating factor for influenza vaccines is that they last for
only one season, in contrast to other vaccines. They can therefore be seen as one-
time newsvendor products, whereas other vaccines are closer to perishable products
(Chick et al. 2008). Also malaria vaccines are produced through natural production
processes that suffer from yield uncertainties. The most effective malaria treatment
nowadays uses medication that is produced using artemisia leaves. The market of
this agricultural product is characterized by high volatility in supply and price, which
directly influences the market for malaria medication (Kazaz et al. 2016).
The safety and quality regulations for vaccines also contribute to the yield un-
certainty. After vaccine is produced, it is stored in a tank and a number of tests
need to be performed. Only vaccines that pass the tests, can be sold. For vaccine
manufacturers this brings about a decision problem: they have to decide on the tim-
ing of bottling vaccines. This can be done before test results are available, partially
before and after or only after the results are known. Quick bottling reduces the
required tank capacity, but also limits the possibilities of rework and hence possibly
leads to lost sales. Teunter and Flapper (2006) compare four bottling alternatives
and present closed form expressions for important performance criteria for each of
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the alternatives. The results show for which types of vaccines postponing bottling is
beneficial.
Not only the production yield itself is uncertain, also the vaccine demand fluctu-
ates. On the one hand there is the demand from the governments or public health
organizations. This demand can be regulated via tenders. Vaccine producers can bid
on a tender and learn only a few months before delivery whether or not the tender
was won. Due to the long production times of vaccines, the production has to be
started well before knowing the outcome of the tender. Shortening lead times allows
the company to start production at a later time when the estimated probability of
winning the tender is higher. De Treville et al. (2014) study the GlaxoSmithKline
vaccine supply chain. They show that investing in lead time reduction is beneficial
and accordingly managers have extensively explored ways to achieve this. On the
other hand there is the demand of individuals that can decide themselves whether or
not to get vaccinated. In developed countries this demand is dependent on the per-
ceived risk of getting infected and the perceived safety of the vaccine. Public health
organizations and governments have to take this individual demand into account
when deciding how many vaccines to order.
The vaccine manufacturer has several options to reduce the uncertainty resulting
from the randomness in both production yield and demand. Begen et al. (2016)
analyze the effects and potential benefits of reducing supply or demand uncertainty.
Results show that supply uncertainty reduction effort is more efficient. Supply un-
certainty can be reduced by influencing the uncertain yields. Federgruen and Yang
(2009) investigate suppliers that influence their uncertain yields and they use the
vaccine supply chain as an illustration throughout their paper. They analyze the
equilibrium of the total market. Kazaz et al. (2016) determine how uncertainty can
be reduced in the production process of malaria vaccines, a process in which artemisia
leaves are used. They develop a model for the artemisia supply chain to study the
consequences of several interventions to reduce the volatility in the market. They
show for example that improving the average yield or offering a support price has
significant impact.
Another way to manage the supply chain uncertainties is to adjust the pricing
and selling strategy. Cho and Tang (2013) study three selling strategies: advance,
regular and dynamic selling. In the first two strategies, selling and price setting takes
place respectively before or after demand and supply are realized. The authors show
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that the dynamic strategy, which combines advance and regular selling, is preferred
by the manufacturer. Eskandarzadeh et al. (2016) extend this work to controlling the
risk of the producer in the case that the price is set before the yield is realized. The
authors study a production planning problem for a risk averse producer and propose a
solution algorithm. They illustrate their solution approach for an influenza producer
and determine the optimal price and production quantities for different risk profiles.
The production uncertainty faced by the vaccine manufacturer also affects the
public health decision maker. Federgruen and Yang (2008) studies such a decision
maker who has to satisfy the uncertain demand for a single season from several
suppliers. The planning problem that he faces relates to determining how much to
order from which supplier, taking into account the uncertain yield of the suppliers.
Goal is cost minimization while guaranteeing that the uncertain demand is satisfied
with a certain probability. The authors motivate their model by the case of influenza
vaccine delivery, where an unexpected drop-out of one of the two suppliers in 2004
led to a significant reduction in the US vaccine stockpile.
2.5.2 Market coordination
Vaccines are public goods with positive externalities. Governments and public health
organizations therefore want to achieve high immunization levels. But due to supply
and production uncertainties, the amount of vaccines produced may be below so-
cially optimal levels. Via contracts and subsidies governments can try to coordinate
the vaccine market. Tools such as mechanism design and game theory are useful in
studying this coordination problem. Chick et al. (2008) show that a lack of coordina-
tion on the vaccine market for annual influenza leads to high production risks for the
manufacturers of vaccines. Without government intervention the vaccine coverage is
below the socially optimal level. Different types of contracts are studied in order to
align the incentives of both governments and manufacturers. The authors show that
a cost-sharing contract, in which the risks for yield uncertainty are shared, is able to
globally optimize vaccine supply. Arifogˇlu et al. (2012) extend Chick et al. (2008) to
include rational consumer behavior. Vaccination brings about a positive externality
effect because it reduces the infection risk for individuals that are close contacts of
the vaccinee. In addition, negative externality effects can occur: self-interested indi-
viduals ignore that vaccinating high-risk individuals is more beneficial when supply
is limited. The positive externalities can lead to free-riding, when individuals do not
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get vaccinated because they expect to benefit from the vaccination of others (Ibuka
et al. 2014). The vaccine market suffers from inefficiencies because of these disre-
garded externality effects on the demand side and the yield uncertainty on the supply
side. Arifogˇlu et al. (2012) model the vaccine market as a game between the manu-
facturer and the individuals and study the effect of government interventions either
on the supply or on the demand side. Adida et al. (2013) extend the coordination
of the vaccine market to contracts that affect both the supply and the demand side.
They show that a fixed two-part subsidy is not able to align the quantity and pricing
decisions simultaneously. A two-part menu is proposed with subsidies depending on
the vaccination coverage. The analysis shows that this subsidy menu can result in a
socially optimal level of vaccine coverage.
The need for coordination on the vaccine market is the result of asymmetry: what
is beneficial for the supplier, is often not beneficial for the public health organization
and vice versa. This also applies to the timing of production. The supplier has little
incentive to start production early, because the public health organization benefits
the most from on time delivery. Late delivery can result in a vaccine shortage, even
though supply is sufficient. Dai et al. (2016) show that existing supply contracts fail
in coordinating the supply chain in this respect. A new contract is proposed that
both coordinates the supply chain and allows for flexible profit division. In addition
to the asymmetry in interests, there is also asymmetry in information. Chick et al.
(2017) contributes to this stream of literature by explicitly taking this asymmetric
information into account. They consider a government who wants to minimize ex-
pected social costs and a for-profit manufacturer who has private information about
his productivity. The study shows that the manufacturer can command information
rent from the government, due to the asymmetric information. A menu of contracts
is proposed that minimizes the overall costs of the government.
2.5.3 Funding
Beside market coordination also funding or sponsoring plays an important role in
influencing the vaccine market. There are sometimes donors who are willing to
subsidize the vaccine production process in order to increase access to health care
in developing countries. Taylor and Xiao (2014) consider malaria vaccinations and
study donor subsidies that are either used for increasing the sales or lowering the pro-
duction costs. The latter can be done via a purchase subsidy. A model is formulated
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where the donor wants to maximize the average sales to customers under a budget
constraint. The optimal size and type of subsidies dependent on the perishability of
the product are determined. The results show that for products with a long shelf life
a donor should only subsidize purchases. Levi et al. (2016) complement this work
on subsidizing malaria medication by studying the setting of a central planner who
aims to increase the market consumption. The authors study the effectiveness of
a uniform copayment and derive conditions when this is optimal. The two papers
together show that policy makers should not only consider subsidizing the manufac-
turer. Instead, allocating uniform subsidies to individual firms can (more) efficiently
increase market consumption.
Vaccines are examples of public interest goods. Demirci and Erkip (2017) study
the supply chain for public interest goods in which a central authority wants to
maximize utility in society. They develop a model that determines how much the
central authority should invest in demand-increasing strategies and how much in
rebates that increase the revenue per unit sold. A bilevel program is formulated that
also takes into account the manufacturers profit. Results show that applying the
model outcomes can considerably increase utility. Berenguer et al. (2016) consider
subsidy programs that either target at a not-for-profit firm or at a for-profit firm.
Their results show that a limited budget available for subsidies is best spent when a
not-for-profit firm is subsidized.
Despite the funding for vaccines, many developing countries are often confronted
with stockouts. Gallien et al. (2016) develop a discrete event simulation model based
on historical data to study the relation between drug availability and the fund dis-
bursement policy of the global health organisation ‘The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria’. They find that adjusting the disbursement amounts to
make them compatible with the duration of monitoring periods has a higher poten-
tial to reduce expected stockouts than using regional buffer stocks or bridge financing
(i.e., providing funds for the period between grant approval and disbursement).
2.5.4 Discussion
The vaccine supply chain is characterized by asymmetry in multiple dimensions: the
manufacturer does not fully design its own product and the end user is typically
not the one paying for the product. Furthermore, the buyers of vaccines are of-
ten non-profit organisations whereas suppliers are for-profit companies (Herlin and
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Pazirandeh 2012). The supply chain asymmetries have inspired research on market
coordination mechanisms. It may be interesting to explore the implications of this
research for other supply chains with similar asymmetries.
Most papers on production study seasonal influenza vaccines, for which the pro-
duction time is uncertain due to biological processes and quality and safety tests
(Gerdil 2003). Recently, new technologies are being developed to reduce the pro-
duction uncertainties of vaccines. One of these technologies is the development of
cell based instead of egg-based production processes for vaccines, in which vaccines
are developed from animal cells (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2016a).
One of the main advantages of cell-based production over egg-based production is
that one can start the production process more rapidly. These new developments
will affect the decision problems related to influenza vaccine composition and vaccine
production. Further research should therefore incorporate these new developments
to aid decision makers in preparing for the changes that new technologies will bring
about.
When considering the classification in Table 2.1 it is interesting to observe that
there are no studies in the OR/OM literature regarding the production of vaccines
for sudden outbreaks. Although the timing of production is perhaps less of a question
for sudden outbreaks (production should start immediately), it is important to think
about a production plan (where, how much). Such a plan can be executed in case of
a sudden outbreak and is part of a broader pandemic preparedness plan. Time plays
a very crucial role in that case: it is important to react quickly to a sudden outbreak,
but the production lead times are uncertain and the demand might drop over time if
vaccines arrive too late. Hence, decisions have to be made under time pressure. The
OR/OM community can aid decision makers in these complex decisions by designing
production plans for sudden outbreaks.
In addition, it is important for decision makers to think about how much they
are willing to invest in production for vaccines for sudden outbreaks. In case of
an emergency there are two responses possible: (1) use the existing stockpile and
(2) start production for more vaccines. We see these two aspects also in some US
pandemic response plans (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2005,
Homeland Security Council 2006). But apart from our analysis in Chapter 5 there is
little to no research about this budget allocation plan.
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The role of funding in vaccination is discussed in Section 2.5.3. Gallien et al.
(2016) interestingly show that the way funding is organized can have a large influence
on the supply chain. Their work might provide a good starting point for future
research in this direction. Also with the development of new and more costly vaccines,
it becomes more and more important to investigate who should pay for these vaccines
(Seib et al. 2017).
2.6 Allocation
Before the vaccines can actually be distributed, decision makers have to decide how
the available vaccines will be allocated. This allocation decision is made by govern-
ments or public health organizations. Vaccines are scarce, which particularly holds
in case of unexpected outbreaks. Therefore decision makers face a complex resource
allocation problem in which they have to determine who is entitled to be vaccinated
and who is not. The vaccine allocation problem thus has an important ethical di-
mension, unlike other resource allocation problems. One of the most crucial ethical
issues in vaccine allocation is the fact that equity and efficiency are often competing
objectives. An allocation that significantly reduces the total number of infections,
might be very unequitable (cf., Keeling and Shattock 2012, Teytelman and Larson
2013). The OR/OM community does not resolve these ethical issues, but provides
support in the decision making process. The final decision is made by public health
organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the US who
have detailed ethical guidelines (e.g., Kinlaw and Levine 2007). We are aware of
the ethical dimensions in vaccine allocation, but restrict attention to the logistical
challenges in the remainder of this section.
In some situations there are multiple decision makers that together have to deter-
mine the allocation. These decision makers can for example correspond to multiple
countries or regions. They can either decide to act selfishly and keep their own vac-
cine stockpile or they can decide to allocate some vaccines to other populations in
order to reduce transmission across borders. Besides the decision of the individual
decision maker, we can also study the coordination between them. In Section 2.6.1,
we discuss this case of coordination between multiple decision makers. In other sit-
uations there is just one decision maker, for example a government or global health
organization. In that case, the vaccine allocation decision boils down to determining
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which subpopulations (e.g., regions or age groups) should be prioritized (see Sec-
tion 2.6.2). Often different allocation schemes are primarily compared in terms of
disease related characteristics, such as the number of infected individuals. In Sec-
tion 2.6.3, we discuss another way of analyzing vaccine allocations, namely by using
cost-effectiveness analysis.
Most studies on vaccine allocation consider allocations to fight natural outbreaks
of infectious diseases. In contrast, in Section 2.6.4 we review a class of papers that
considers allocating limited resources in case of a bioterror attack. Preparing for an
attack is complex, because a lot of uncertainty is involved regarding the location of
the attack, the number of victims et cetera.
2.6.1 Multiple decision makers
In some situations there are multiple decision makers involved in deciding on the
allocation of vaccines or other scarce health resources. These decision makers can
either be on the same hierarchical level, such that they must come to a decision
together. Or they are on different hierarchical levels and their decisions are made
consecutively. The allocation of funds for HIV prevention is an example of a multilevel
decision problem. The allocation over multiple regions is decided globally, but the
regions themselves decide on the allocation over the several risk-groups within their
region. Lasry et al. (2007) study this multilevel decision problem and compare an
equity-based heuristic with the optimal allocation. The equitable allocation allocates
proportionally with respect to numbers of infected cases. Since there is currently no
vaccine available for HIV, the funds are spent on general interventions that reduce
transmission. The objective in the optimal allocation is to minimize the number of
new infections. The analysis shows that if optimization can only be applied to one
level, better results are obtained if the lower level is optimized instead of the upper
level.
In case the decision makers are all on the same hierarchical level, coordination
might be needed. Sun et al. (2009) use game theory to coordinate the allocation of
vaccine stockpiles among different countries. Prior to an outbreak every country is
assumed to have its own vaccine stockpile. During an outbreak countries face the
question of whether or not they are willing to give up parts of their stockpile to help
other countries in containing the epidemic. A Reed-Frost model is used to describe
the spread of an epidemic and only the initial stage of epidemic growth is considered.
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The authors study Nash equilibria and compare the situation with and without a
central planner, such as the WHO. In addition to Sun et al. (2009), Mamani et al.
(2013) evaluate the entire time course of the epidemic. The amount of vaccines
ordered and distributed in one country can influence the evolution of an outbreak
in another country due to transmission across the borders. They study multiple
countries that each want to minimize total costs related to the number of infections
and allocated vaccines. A contract is proposed to achieve system optimality. The
results show that a lack of coordination leads to a shortage of vaccines in some regions
and an excess in others.
2.6.2 Central coordination
In case of a single decision maker, allocation decisions are related to prioritizing be-
tween multiple subgroups. These subgroups correspond for example to geographical
regions or age groups. Policy makers have to decide which subgroups to vaccinate.
The main difference between distinguishing between regions or age groups is the
role of interaction between the subgroups. Interaction between geographical regions
plays a much smaller role in the transmission of an infectious disease than interaction
between age groups.
Regions Outside the OR/OM literature there are many papers that consider vac-
cine allocation over multiple regions (e.g., Wu et al. 2007, Araz et al. 2012, Keeling
and Shattock 2012, Matrajt et al. 2013). These papers make little use of OR tools
such as optimization, but usually use approaches like scenario analysis or enumera-
tion. Some of them cluster the population in smaller groups, such as communities
or households (e.g., Becker and Starczak 1997, Ball and Lyne 2002, Ball et al. 2004,
Ball and Lyne 2006, Tanner et al. 2008).
Within the OR/OM community there is more emphasize on developing models
and solution methods. Tanner and Ntaimo (2010) present a technological extension
to Tanner et al. (2008) to solve stochastic problems with joint chance constraints.
They add new optimality cuts to the problem and apply branch-and-cut. They show
that the new method significantly reduces computation time and is also able to de-
rive solutions for larger instances of the vaccine allocation problem. Other techniques
used in the OR/OM community for solving vaccine allocation problems are simula-
tion or stochastic programming. For example, Uribe-Sánchez et al. (2011) construct
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a simulation model and determine the resource allocation that limits the impact of
ongoing epidemics and the potential impact of new outbreaks in multiple regions.
Teytelman and Larson (2013) develop several heuristics to allocate a limited vaccine
stockpile over the states of the US in order to fight an influenza outbreak. They
evaluate their heuristics by using Monte Carlo Simulation. Their results show that
their telescope-to-the-future algorithm, which takes into account regional differences,
is best at reducing infections. Yarmand et al. (2014) study a two-stage stochastic pro-
gramming decision framework for vaccine allocation over multiple locations. In the
first stage, a predefined amount of vaccines is allocated to every location. The second
stage decision is based on the outcome of the first stage allocation: the epidemic is
either contained or not. The authors show that their problem can be reformulated
as a news vendor type of model.
The papers discussed so far did not assume a special structure on the connection
between the different regions. In contrast to these papers, there are also some studies
that consider network models, where a graph is used to represent regions (or indi-
viduals) and their connections. Ventresca and Aleman (2014a) consider a network
structure and investigate the optimal removal of nodes. When the network represents
a population, node removal can be interpreted as either vaccination or quarantining.
More theoretical work on link or node removal can be found in Arulselvan et al.
(2009), Ventresca (2012), Ventresca and Aleman (2014b), Nandi and Medal (2016).
Age groups Dividing the population based on geographical criteria, results in
physical distance between the groups. This distance enables to consider limited or
no interaction between the groups. Ignoring interaction is not possible when the
population is grouped based on age or disease specific characteristics, because it is
exactly the interaction between these groups that significantly contributes to the
spread of a disease. Many studies in the medical/epidemiological literature consider
vaccine allocation over different age-groups (e.g., Patel et al. 2005, Mylius et al.
2008, Medlock and Galvani 2009, Wallinga et al. 2010, Goldstein et al. 2009). Others
differentiate between vulnerable groups and more active groups, who contribute to
the spread of the disease (e.g., Dushoff et al. 2007, Matrajt and Longini Jr 2010,
Goldstein et al. 2012, Lee et al. 2015b).
In some situations it is not the vaccine stockpile that is limiting the vaccine
coverage, but the participation of the population in vaccination programmes. Yamin
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and Gavious (2013) study how the level of influenza coverage can be increased using
a game model with a central planner who can give a financial incentive given to
encourage people to get vaccinated. Results indicate that the incentives should be
higher for non-elderly as well as in years when the seasonal influenza is less contagious.
The more vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, will benefit from the increased
coverage in the groups that contribute significantly to transmission.
2.6.3 Cost-effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a way to compare vaccine allocations differently than
in terms of infected cases or other health care related performance criteria. This
approach assigns costs to both the intervention and the achieved health benefit and
determines which interventions are cost effective (i.e., the benefits are higher than the
cost). Cost-effectiveness of vaccination programmes is widely studied in communities
outside the OR/OM community. In the health economics literature and the epidemi-
ological literature this approach is often used (e.g., Siddiqui and Edmunds 2008, Jit
et al. 2008, 2014). Also within the OR/OM community there are some studies that
use cost-effectiveness analysis. These studies make use of epidemic models to deter-
mine the effect of certain interventions on the time course of an epidemic, on the
number of infected cases et cetera. Some studies aim at comparing a predefined set
of interventions and determine which are cost-effective (Frerichs and Prawda 1975,
Edwards et al. 1998, Rauner 2002, Hutton et al. 2011), others try to find the optimal
actions under budget constraints (Dimitrov et al. 2013). The latter paper makes use
of Markov Decision Processes and not only advises what vaccination strategy to use,
but also presents detailed geographic intervention plans and informs where to locate
the supply centers.
Instead of explicitly performing a cost-effectiveness analysis, there are also stud-
ies that take into account the costs for the considered interventions or other so-
cioeconomic measures differently. Parker (1983) uses a multiobjective approach and
includes socioeconomic measurements such as infant mortality rate, calorie intake
levels, and degree of standard housing and potable water. Reveller et al. (1969) fo-
cus on cost minimization while achieving a certain reduction in disease incidence.
The authors propose a linear approximation of the transmission model for tubercu-
losis. Linear programming is used with the objective of minimizing the total costs
of the intervention strategy. Four schedules for the reduction of active tuberculosis
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cases are given and for each schedule the optimal intervention is determined. These
interventions consist both of vaccination and prophylaxis, where the latter refers to
medication that reduces the severity of (potential) infection. Denysiuk et al. (2015)
also study tuberculosis, but combine costs and disease related measures in a multi-
objective optimization problem. The goal is to minimize both costs for the active
infections as well as the costs of the control strategy. To determine the optimal
intervention, the authors apply optimal control theory using a transmission model
consisting of a set of differential equations.
The allocation phase of vaccination is studied for a broad range of diseases, which
is also apparent from the papers that apply cost-effectiveness analyses. Already in
the OR/OM community there are studies on hepatitis B (Hutton et al. 2011), HIV
(Edwards et al. 1998, Rauner 2002), malaria (Parker 1983, Dimitrov et al. 2013),
polio (Thompson et al. 2015), rabies (Frerichs and Prawda 1975) and tuberculosis
(Reveller et al. 1969, Denysiuk et al. 2015).
In most cases the goal of a vaccination program is to contain an outbreak as
much as possible. However, for some diseases policy makers even strive for complete
eradication. Tebbens and Thompson (2009) analyze different decision rules for the
allocation of resources for eradicable diseases. A model for two diseases is considered
and the effects of switching priorities from one disease to another are investigated
using cost-effectiveness analysis. The results show that a long-term strategy is more
cost-effective than regularly switching priorities to the most pressing disease. Thomp-
son et al. (2015) analyze the efforts that are needed to attain polio eradication. A
simple allocation model is used to choose among a set of possible allocations those
options that either minimize the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio or maximize net
benefit.
2.6.4 Bioterror or emergency response
In this section, we analyze the allocation of vaccines and other scarce health resources
in case of a bioterror attack or an unexpected emergency. Allocation decisions in this
case have to be made under high time pressure and suffer from uncertainty in many
dimensions (e.g., location of attack/outbreak, magnitude and severity of outbreak).
Bioterror attacks A bioterror attack is a form of terrorism in which terrorists
intentionally release infectious viruses or bacteria. Examples are the anthrax attacks
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in 2001 in the United States. After these attacks several studies were preformed
to develop response plans in case of a new anthrax attack. These studies develop
models that can predict the transmission of anthrax and that can be used to eval-
uate different response plans. Craft et al. (2005) propose an extensive model that
consists among others of a disease progression model, queueing models for antibiotics
distribution and a queueing model for hospitalization. This model is a simplification
of the model proposed by Wein et al. (2003) and is used to estimate the number of
infections and the number of deaths resulting from the attack. Chen et al. (2006)
compare an agent-based model and a population based simulation model for the eval-
uation of disease progression after a anthrax attack. The more complex agent-based
model is aligned with the simple population-based model such that the former can
be used to derive policy recommendations in more detail. With their model, Craft
et al. (2005) show that the fraction of deaths among infected people is more or less
constant per region. Based on these results Craft et al. (2005) report that policy
makers decided to focus on measures that can lower the proportion of deaths among
infections instead of focusing on lowering the actual number of deaths, also motivated
by the fact that it is very difficult to predict the magnitude of an attack. Next to
anthrax attacks, also smallpox attacks are considered in the literature. Miller et al.
(2006) propose a discrete event simulation to evaluate different intervention strate-
gies including vaccination and social distancing. They consider a case study for San
Antonio Texas and show that the most robust response plan contains a mixture of
public health interventions. A special case of a bioterror attack, namely on an air-
port, is considered by Berman et al. (2012). In that setting the authors study the
allocation of limited emergency resources. They use an approximation of a compart-
mental epidemic model to determine the number of cases dependent on the allocated
resources. Under certain assumptions the resource allocation problem of minimiz-
ing the number of cases is convex and they propose a greedy algorithm to find the
optimal allocation.
The studies discussed so far reason from the perspective of the government.
Berman and Gavious (2007) present an interesting addition and also take the per-
spective into account of the terrorist who plans to commit the attack. A two-player
game is formulated that models the interaction between a terrorist and the state and
incorporates the actions that both players can take. The state is able to locate facil-
ities that contain the resources to respond quickly in case of an attack. If necessary,
2.6 Allocation 39
available resources can be transported through the network via shortest paths. The
terrorist decides at which location to commit an attack. The authors formulate a
leader-follower game where the state acts first. Best strategies for both players as
well as system equilibria are derived. These equilibria are illustrated in a case study
of a terrorist attack in one of the metropolitan areas in the United States.
Emergencies Next to bioterror attacks, there are other emergency situations re-
lated to infections that require complex decision making. Wein (2009) discusses four
topics related to homeland security: response to a bioterror attack either with an-
thrax or on the food supply chain, the control of pandemic influenza and border
analyses to keep terrorists out of the country. The author discusses the contributions
made in these four areas and shows that applying OR methods in these fields helps to
quantify the effects of an attack and to derive policy implications. Fogli and Guida
(2013) design a decision support system for general emergency management using
knowledge-centered design. This approach iteratively updates the knowledge about
the domain and the users of the decision support system and adjusts the support
system accordingly. The authors illustrate their results with a case study for pan-
demic influenza, where important decisions are for example how to plan emergency
vaccination and how to distribute vaccines. In order to make it easier for planners to
use OR/OM models for emergency response, Herrmann (2008) develops simple and
accessible spreadsheet models. These models can aid decision makers in evaluating
multiple response plans.
2.6.5 Discussion
The allocation of vaccines differs slightly from the other components in the vaccine
supply chain. In contrast to the production and distribution of vaccines, allocation
is not a tangible process but a decision problem on a higher level. As can be seen in
Table 2.1 allocation is the only component of the supply chain that is studied for both
expected/existing outbreaks and sudden outbreaks. The allocation problem plays a
role in all three challenges for vaccination that were mentioned in the introduction:
(1) increasing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of supply for planned vaccination
(2) preparing for sudden outbreaks and (3) preparing for bioterror attacks. A possible
explanation for this is that the allocation problem is quite general and can be studied
for multiple situations and types of diseases with comparable models. Naturally,
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papers that study vaccine allocation assume that there is a stockpile available. For
sudden outbreaks or in response to a bioterror attack, this might be problematic (see
our discussion in Section 2.5.4). In those cases it could be interesting to study the
allocation of vaccines that become available in batches over time.
As mentioned in the previous sections the topic of vaccine allocation is extensively
studied in the epidemiological literature. Although there is already some work in the
OR/OM community on this topic, the epidemiological literature could benefit from
further applying OR tools. The high level modelling and use of optimization meth-
ods in the OR/OM community have potential to result in insights and understanding
of the complex allocation problems that could not be obtained with simulation or
numerical methods (cf., Chapter 3). Furthermore, with OR tools explicit solutions of
optimal allocations or efficient solutions approaches can be derived (cf., Chapter 4).
As data is scarce and model parameters are difficult to determine for disease trans-
mission models, these results are very valuable when performing sensitivity analyses.
The asymmetry in the vaccine supply chain also plays a role in the allocation
phase. Where decision makers specify the allocation, individuals can have multiple
reasons not to participate. Vaccine hesitancy or vaccine refusal is studied a lot in the
medical/epidemiological literature (Omer et al. 2009, Larson et al. 2014), but hardly
incorporated in the OR/OM papers on allocation. As the attitude towards vaccina-
tion might differ across (sub)populations, this might affect the allocation decision.
Future research is needed to incorporate this aspect.
The decision problems that we have discussed in Section 2.6.4 are closely related
to the decision problems in disaster management and humanitarian logistics (e.g.,
Altay and Green 2006, Tomasini et al. 2009, Kunz and Reiner 2012, Galindo and
Batta 2013, Leiras et al. 2014). This field focuses on organizing the supply of relief
items in case of a disaster, which includes setting up preparedness plans (e.g., Duran
et al. 2013) and coordination between multiple parties (e.g., Ergun et al. 2014). The
models and results in this field could also be useful for the allocation and distribution
of vaccines after unexpected outbreaks.
2.7 Distribution
In this section, we analyze the final component of the vaccine supply chain: the
distribution phase. In this phase, the vaccines are distributed from the manufacturer
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to the end user (i.e., the ‘patient’). The distribution of vaccines involves many
logistical questions on the operational level. First, it is important to determine how
this part of the chain must be organized. How many layers are needed in the chain
and where should hubs and storage locations be positioned? In Section 2.7.1, we
discuss these questions. In Section 2.7.2, we consider inventory control for vaccines:
When policy makers decide to keep vaccine stockpiles, they have to decide how large
these stockpiles should be and where they should be located. Finally, the vaccines
should be distributed to the end user. This can be done either through fixed locations,
so-called ‘points of dispensing’ (PODs), or via mobile facilities, respectively discussed
in Section 2.7.3 and 2.7.4. PODs bring about many logistical questions ranging from
facility location, to staffing levels and facility lay-out. When mobile facilities or
mobile medical teams are used, routing problems play a role.
2.7.1 Supply Chain Design
In the past years, the number of vaccines that is available for low and middle in-
come countries has increased considerably and this trend is expected to continue in
the coming years. Vaccine supply chains in those countries cannot keep up with
this increase unless investments in the logistic systems are made. Kaufmann et al.
(2011) present recommendations for strengthening the vaccine supply chains. They
distinguish between two segments in the vaccine supply chain in low and middle in-
come countries: (1) the process of sending vaccines to the receiving country and (2)
the distribution of vaccines from the entrance in the receiving country to inventory
points and finally to the health care provider. The first segment partly takes place in
developed countries, whereas the second segment is completely organized within the
developing countries. One of their main messages is to strengthen the coordination
between the two segments of the vaccine supply chain. Zaffran et al. (2013) and Priv-
ett and Gonsalvez (2014) discuss the main challenges for the vaccine supply chain in
developing countries. They both address the importance of coordination, motivated
personnel and information systems to improve decision making. Privett and Gon-
salvez (2014) emphasize that advanced improvement in a single aspect of the supply
chain without focusing on the coordination will only lead to minor overall improve-
ments. Marucheck et al. (2011) focus on product safety and security and illustrate
some risks for several supply chains, including the pharmaceutical supply chain. One
of the main risks is the long supply chain with many activities at different locations.
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Other problems are the risk of counterfeiting or the case of stockpiling medication
with the goal to sell at higher prices when shortages occur. The authors present four
focus areas for the OR/OM community to contribute to safety and security in supply
chains, including supplier relations and product life cycle management.
In Section 2.4.3, we have seen that the product characteristics of vaccines heavily
impact the supply chain. This is particularly true for the perishability of vaccine
and the fact that vaccines should be kept in a temperature controlled environment.
Masoumi et al. (2012) take the perishability into account when studying a supply
chain network model. The model incorporates multiple firms that are competing in
different markets, with the product flows on their supply chain networks as strategies.
The authors present an algorithm to find supply chain equilibria. Chung and Kwon
(2016) extend this work and derive insightful supply chain decision rules from the
necessary conditions for the equilibria. Pishvaee et al. (2014) propose a method to
design a sustainable medical supply chain taking into account the complete life cycle
of medical supplies and waste. Careful design of the medical waste supply chain is in
particular critical for supplies that have been used for infectious patients, where the
risk of further transmission is always imminent. Saif and Elhedhli (2016) also take
environmental considerations into account when studying the design of a cold supply
chain, i.e., a supply chain for goods that have to stay in a temperature controlled
environment such as vaccines. They illustrate their model for the vaccine supply
chain in Ontario and show that there is a trade-off between transportation costs and
inventory costs.
In the epidemiological literature there are many studies that analyze the design
of the vaccine supply chain and the multiple storage levels. Many of these studies use
a similar approach in which a simulation model is developed for a specific country,
for example using HERMES software (highly extensible resource for modeling supply
chains) (e.g., Haidari et al. 2013, Assi et al. 2012, 2013). A common conclusion is
that removing levels can reduce supply chain costs and increase vaccine availability
(e.g., Assi et al. 2013, Brown et al. 2014, Lee et al. 2015a).
To increase the efficiency of the vaccine supply chain, the WHO recommends to
integrate the supply chain with other health supply chains and possibly even with the
private sector (World Health Organization & PATH 2011). Yadav et al. (2014) study
the possibilities of integration. Although integration is expected to increase efficiency,
it also brings about some challenges as different products differ in supply and demand
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characteristics. Several case studies are discussed to illustrate examples of countries
where integration of the supply chain has been implemented. Lydon et al. (2015) even
go a step further and analyze the option of outsourcing some activities of the supply
chain to the private sector. Because there is limited information available on the
potential benefits of outsourcing, a case study from Western Cape Province in South
Africa is presented. In this case study, the storage and transport of vaccines was
outsourced to a third party. From this case the authors conclude that outsourcing can
be beneficial, although it is highly important to consult all stakeholders beforehand
and to carefully determine which parts of the supply chain should be outsourced and
to whom. These studies provide illustrations of successful integration from which
lessons can be learnt on best practices.
2.7.2 Inventory control
Inventories of vaccines are used to guarantee supply system efficiency and to deal
with uncertainties in demand and supply (see Section 2.5.1). For planned vacci-
nation (e.g., seasonal influenza vaccination or pediatric vaccination) inventories can
increase effectiveness. Jacobson et al. (2006) consider inventory control for pediatric
vaccines in the United States. The current stockpiles are sufficient to handle dis-
ruptions in production that last for around 6 months. However, when disruptions
last longer, the inventory level is inadequate. This potentially leads to underim-
munization and consequently to epidemic outbreaks. The risk of epidemics could
be reduced by making moderate investments in inventories. Shrestha et al. (2010)
develop a spreadsheet model for the inventory control of pediatric vaccines in the
United States. This model can be used to evaluate different stockpile sizes and the
potential shortages that might occur. Samii et al. (2012) connect allocation schemes
for influenza vaccines to inventory control policies. Three allocation schemes are com-
pared that all reserve a proportion of the available vaccines for the high-risk groups,
but differ in the way the unreserved proportion is allocated. Every allocation scheme
is related to an inventory control policy and the corresponding service levels and fill
rates are determined.
In case of sudden outbreaks, stockpiles of vaccines can increase agility and allow
to respond quickly. There are several studies that focus on inventories for disaster
response. Salmerón and Apte (2010) consider pre-disaster planning for a general type
of disaster. A two stage stochastic programming formulation is proposed to minimize
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the expected casualties. The first stage is related to building capacity, whereas the
second stage considers the logistics of the problem, related to transporting victims
and resources. The analysis reflects the importance of using stochastic models, be-
cause of the uncertainty in the location of the disaster. In addition to pre-disaster
planning, one can also study the situation during a disaster when resources might
need to be (re)distributed. Arora et al. (2010) consider this problem and include both
delivery from a central stockpile and lateral transshipments. The authors assume the
available stockpile to be limited and do not take into account newly produced and
supplied inventories. Rottkemper et al. (2011) consider a similar model, but assume
an unlimited inventory at the central depot. The paper studies the relocation of
inventories in case of an emergency in certain areas. In these areas, the demand
for relief goods then suddenly increases, but at the same time ongoing operations
in other areas must continue. The authors formulate an inventory relocation model
and solve it using a rolling horizon to incorporate uncertainties. To illustrate the
policy recommendations that can be generated, a case study for meningitis vaccine
in Burundi is used.
2.7.3 Points of Dispensing
In the final stage of the vaccine supply chain, the vaccines are distributed to the
end users (i.e., the ‘patients’). For vaccination in case of sudden outbreaks, there
are pandemic response plans that describe how to execute this stage. These plans
often include the setup of local clinics for the distribution of medication and vaccines,
so-called Points-of-Dispensing (PODs).
When designing PODs there are three important decision problems that play a
role: Where should they be located? How should their lay-out be? What are the
required staffing levels? Some studies focus on one of these decision problems. For
example, Ekici et al. (2014) look at facility location, Aaby et al. (2006) and Luangke-
sorn et al. (2012) restrict attention to the design and lay-out of clinics and McCoy
and Johnson (2014) evaluate clinic capacity. However, since the decision problems
on PODs are very much connected, there are also many studies that analyze them
together. Ramirez-Nafarrate et al. (2015) simultaneously study the location problem
and capacity planning for points of care. A mathematical program is formulated and
a solution approach is proposed based on a genetic algorithm. The results show that
simultaneously determining location, staffing and population assignment can reduce
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waiting times compared to sequential decision making. Lee et al. (2006, 2009, 2013)
develop the emergency response decision tool RealOpt c© for PODs that are used in
response to bioterrorist attacks or pandemics. This tool supports the decision making
with respect to locating the facilities, determining the required labor resources and
the floor plans of the facilities. RealOpt c© is a generally applicable tool that has been
used for numerous events, including anthrax preparedness and seasonal influenza.
Instead of developing a general model, some studies focus on case specific re-
sults. Aaby et al. (2006) consider vaccination clinics for Montgomery County and
Luangkesorn et al. (2012) look at health care centers for prevention and screening in
Abu Dhabi. The latter paper uses queueing and simulation models and propose an
adjusted design that reduces the size of the area needed for waiting. The decisions on
location of clinics, lay-out and staffing levels directly affect the people who visit these
clinics. Therefore, McCoy and Johnson (2014) explicitly take adherence into account,
which is assumed to depend on the travel distance to the facility. They study a clinic
which has a fixed budget that can be allocated over a number of time periods to
assign capacity for patients. During these time periods the epidemic continues to
spread with a speed dependent on the allocation decisions. An optimization problem
is formulated where the size of the infected population is minimized under a budget
restriction. For two special cases of adherence the solution is determined analytically.
The results show that incorporating adherence may significantly improve outcomes.
Most studies consider the setup of clinics in response to a pandemic and dedicated
to medical services. Alternatively, Whitworth (2006) designs a response plan for a
bioterror attack. The author analyzes candidate points, design and staffing levels
of PODs for a specific case study of one community. Ekici et al. (2014) consider
a pandemic, but specifically focus on food distribution. A disease spread model is
used and combined with a facility location model for the location problem of food
distribution points. To find close to optimal solutions, a heuristic is proposed which
can help policy makers in preparing for a pandemic. Although most studies analyze
PODs as a way to distribute medical supplies, there are also alternative distribution
possibilities. Richter and Khan (2009) compare some of these alternatives to dispense
prophylaxis to the population in a metropolitan area. Using multicriteria decision
analysis, the authors show that the current method of drive-thru is outperformed by
distribution via postal offices or via commercial pharmacies.
46 Literature Review - optimization in the vaccine supply chain
We next discuss the research in the OR/OM community on the distribution of
vaccines in case of planned vaccination. In developing countries, populations can
be hard to reach (see the next section), but in developed countries this final stage
of the supply chain does not bring large logistical problems. We already discussed
childhood vaccination programs in Section 2.4.2, which account for a substantial
part of the annual planned vaccinations in developed countries. There is another
class of vaccines, namely travel vaccines, for which also a scheduling problem arises.
Travel vaccines are intended to protect travellers against diseases that are prevalent
in their destination country. The demand for these vaccines is relatively low, which
brings about the following trade-off. Vaccines come in vials and multi-dose vials
are cheaper, but potentially result in waste as vaccine spoils rapidly. Abrahams and
Ragsdale (2012) study the scheduling problem for a travel clinic that aims to minimize
the total cost of the vaccination schedule while taking scheduling preferences of the
patients into account. The results show that their method results in significantly
lower costs compared to simple scheduling heuristics.
2.7.4 Mobile facilities
If possible, one prefers individuals go to PODs to get vaccinated. But there are
situations in which it is more efficient to bring the vaccines to the people instead of
the other way around. This can for example apply to mass vaccination campaigns
or vaccination in rural areas where mobile medical teams go from one location to
another. The central question for such mobile teams is how to route them. Halper
and Raghavan (2011) define the mobile facility routing problem, with moving facilities
to serve demand at different nodes in a network. A facility at a node can serve a
subset of all the other nodes, for example those within a certain distance. The
demand of every node is assumed to depend on time. The satisfied demand thus
depends on the routing schedule. In case of multiple facilities the routing problem is
NP-hard and a heuristic is proposed to solve the problem. Rachaniotis et al. (2012)
study the same routing problem, with the significant simplification of only one mobile
medical team. This team consecutively visits subpopulations in which an epidemic
is ongoing. The authors determine the optimal order for visiting the subpopulations
such that the total number of new infections is minimized. The optimal schedule
significantly outperforms random scheduling.
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In developing countries mobile medical teams are crucial in reaching rural areas.
The organisation Riders for Health provides reliable transportation to health care
workers in sub-Saharan Africa, who are then able to visit more rural areas to provide
medical care such as vaccination. McCoy and Lee (2014) investigate the trade-off
between equity and effectiveness for this organisation. They propose a model that
can aid decision makers in deciding to which region newly available vehicles should
be allocated.
2.7.5 Discussion
Time is of high importance in the vaccine supply chain, also in the distribution phase.
When vaccines are distributed during an outbreak it is crucial that the distribution
can be done efficiently and quickly to avoid an explosive increase in infections. Large
scale vaccination campaigns, also known as mass vaccination campaigns, can be used
in case of a sudden outbreak with natural cause or due to a bioterror attack (Kaplan
et al. 2002). Performing a mass vaccination campaign is a huge logistical challenge
with decision problems related to vaccination locations, facility lay-out, the order
in which the population is vaccinated, staffing levels et cetera. The decision tool
RealOpt c© is an important contribution towards solving some of these decision prob-
lems, but the OR/OM community can further contribute here. In particular, from
our overview we observe that there are quite some studies on vaccine allocation for
sudden outbreaks, but the literature on how to actually distribute vaccines according
to this allocation is limited. Different allocation decisions might have different effects
on the operational level of vaccine distribution and some allocations might be easier
to distribute than others. Current literature does not integrate these two decision
problems, which provides research opportunities for the OR/OM community.
The discussion on the design of the supply chain particularly plays a role in
developing countries. In these countries the supply chains are often insufficiently
able to incorporate the introduction of new vaccines. This is partly due to a lack
of coordination between the multiple supply chain levels that each have their own
stockpiles. In the epidemiological literature there are quite some papers that study
this coordination and the redesign of the supply chain (Assi et al. 2013, Brown
et al. 2014, Lee et al. 2015a). But within the OR/OM community this topic has
not been considered yet. Since this community has experience in studying general
supply chain models, there are research opportunities to apply this knowledge to the
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vaccine supply chain and derive general insights on the structure of a robust vaccine
supply chain. Our review of the vaccine supply chain, which identifies the important
logistical problems that play a role, could serve as guideline.
Also the inventory control of vaccines in developing countries is only minimally
considered in the OR/OM community. Studying the vaccine supply chain results
in new perspectives on supply chain management in general. For the vaccine sup-
ply chain, and in particular the distribution phase, there are significant differences
between developing and developed countries. The existing literature on inventory
control could therefore be expanded to also be applicable to developing countries
that often suffer from unreliable electricity systems and unreliable transportation.
2.8 Discussion and future research directions
The research in this literature review has led to some interesting observations. In the
Sections 2.4.4, 2.5.4, 2.6.5 and 2.7.5 we have already discussed the observations re-
lated to the individual components of the supply chain. In this section, we summarize
and present common findings.
We have analyzed vaccine logistics and developed a supply chain perspective.
This allows to structure different classes of papers that all study logistic decision
problems related to vaccination. Our supply chain perspective also revealed the
importance of integrated analyses. Namely, the decisions made in one component of
the supply chain affect the downward components. In the epidemic literature there
are already some case studies that use a more integrated approach, e.g., the studies
on the effects of the used vial size on the supply chain (see Section 2.4.3). But these
results are very case specific and the OR/OM community can contribute here with
general models. The supply chain perspective can also aid governments or NGO’s
who want to invest in vaccine supply chains, for example in developing countries. We
present an overview of the supply chain challenges that should be considered when
introducing new vaccines or improving existing chains. Focusing on the entire supply
chain is expected to have more effect than optimizing individual components.
A second observation is the crucial importance of time (see also Figure 2.1):
composition decisions have to be made under time pressure, production is subject to
uncertain production times and a swift response is needed in case of an outbreak. The
combination of time pressure and extreme uncertainty, which is especially the case
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for sudden outbreaks, complicates decision making processes. Future research should
focus on these aspects to aid decision makers in these processes. Regarding research
on sudden outbreaks, we see a gap in literature in the first two components of the
supply chain (‘Product’ and ‘Production’) (see also Table 2.1). Further research is
needed to address questions regarding the development and production of vaccines
for sudden outbreaks.
Third, we see that the development of new technologies can have a large impact
on the decision problems in the vaccine supply chain. The introduction of cell-
based vaccines with shorter production times potentially changes existing decision
problems on vaccine composition and vaccine production. Also the development of
thermostable vaccines affects inventory control decisions and supply chain design.
Other new technologies, such as the use of genomics for the development of vaccines,
might bring new decision problems in which the OR/OM community can contribute.
The analysis of the vaccine supply chain is a contribution to general supply chain
literature. We see two important aspects in which the vaccine supply chain differs
from other supply chains. The first is that the vaccine supply chain is affected by the
consequences of distributed decision making and asymmetry, which can also be seen
in Figure 2.1. There are many parties involved in the vaccine supply chain, each with
their own interests. The ‘Product’ and ‘Production’ components of the supply chain
could be characterized as a pull-process in which public health organizations and
governments request the vaccines from the manufacturer. However, the allocation
and distribution phase are more related to a push-process where public health orga-
nizations determine the planning for the end user (i.e., the ‘patient’). Coordination
between policy makers and manufacturers is relatively well studied for the production
phase, but coordination regarding the packaging of vaccines is not studied. Also, the
role of the end customer (i.e., the ‘patient’) is hardly taken into account. As vaccine
hesitancy or even vaccine refusal will directly affect the effects of vaccination, future
research should incorporate this aspect in the models.
The second aspect in which the vaccine supply chain differs from many other sup-
ply chains is the quantitative difference between developed and developing countries.
This difference is most apparent in the distribution phase. Since most vaccines have
to be stored at low temperatures, reliable electricity systems to provide refrigeration
is crucial. Unfortunately, in many developing countries such reliable systems are
not available. Also transportation is often less reliable in developing countries, with
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poor road quality, frequent vehicle breakdowns and fuel shortages. At the same time
transportation of vaccines and medical teams is highly important, because is the only
way to reach communities in rural areas. The distribution of vaccines in developing
countries thus brings about different decision problems than in developed countries.
In extant supply chain literature, there is little attention for this difference. Studying
the vaccine supply chain thus reveals this possible future research direction.
2.9 Conclusions
In this review, we discuss publications on the vaccine supply chain. This topic origi-
nates in the epidemiological community, but has recently also found its way into the
OR/OM community. By analyzing the different aspects of the vaccine supply chain,
we connect the logistical questions that play a role in vaccination.
Based on our extensive literature review, we conclude that the vaccine supply
chain can benefit from the OR/OM perspective and ample examples of interesting
studies are presented in this chapter. The OR/OM community can contribute in
different dimensions to improving the vaccine supply chain in both developed and
developing countries. For example, this community has experience in presenting an
integrated view over a whole supply chain and in formally defining decision prob-
lems. These problems can be studied with OR tools to gain insights and to derive
specific decision support systems. Also we see that the epidemiologic literature often
makes use of case studies and scenario analysis. Although this approach provides
case specific insights, decision makers could benefit from the more general OR/OM
models and insights. General insights are particularly useful because similar decision
problems occur for similar types of outbreaks (e.g., expected or sudden), even if the
diseases of the outbreaks are different.
When analyzing current literature, some observations repeatedly appear over the
different components of the supply chain. We see the importance of the supply chain
perspective and the integration of the different components. We also observe that
time is of crucial importance and that the time pressure combined with uncertainty
makes decision problems complex. New technologies that emerge should be taken
into account as well, because they change current decision problems and bring up
new ones. We contribute to supply chain literature by demonstrating the unique
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characteristics of the vaccine supply chain: asymmetry between the various parties
and the quantitative difference between the developed and developing countries.
The papers discussed in this review show the valuable contribution that the
OR/OM community has already made to logistical problems in vaccination. Fur-
ther research in this area is promising and we present interesting research directions.
The growing availability of vaccines in developing countries results in ample opportu-
nities to use expertise on logistics and supply chains, such that medical developments
will not be hindered by logistical constraints.
Appendix
2.A Journal list
For this review we considered the top 20 journals in the category ‘Operations Research
and Management Science’ by Thomson Reuters’ InCites Journal Citation Reports2.
The following ranking is based on the Article Influence Score (AIS), with in brackets
the number of papers discussed in this review:
• Management Science (11)
• Journal of Operations Management
(3)
• Mathematical Programming (0)
• Operations Research (11)
• Mathematics of Operations Research
(0)
• Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management (5)
• Transportation Science (0)
• Transportation Research part B (0)
• Journal of Quality Technology (0)
• Omega - International Journal of Man-
agement Science (3)
• Systems & Control Letters (0)
• European Journal of Operational Re-
search (10)
• Computational Optimization and Ap-
plications (0)
• Transportation Research part E (2)
• Production and Operations Manage-
ment (8)
• OR Spectrum (3)
• INFORMS Journal on Computing (1)
• Decision Support Systems (4)
• Optimization Methods and Software
(1)
• Computers & Operations Research (3)
2See jcr.incites.thomsonreuters.com
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2.B Chronological analysis of publications
The 65 publications are published between 1969 and 2017. 3 publications fall inside
the time interval [1969-2000], 4 within the interval [2000-2005], 16 within the interval
[2006-2010] and the remaining 42 publications date from [2011-2017]. The histogram
in Figure 2.3 displays the number of publications over time.
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Figure 2.3: The relation between time and the publications on the vaccine supply
chain that are reviewed in this chapter.
2.C Bibliometric analysis
Six articles could not be found in the database of the Web of ScienceTM Core Col-
lection (search date March 20, 2017): Reveller et al. (1969), Berenguer et al. (2016),
Gallien et al. (2016), Levi et al. (2016), Demirci and Erkip (2017) and Chick et al.
(2017). Accept from the first paper, all papers are very recent, which is probably the
reason that they are not (yet) included in the database.
Chapter 3
Dose-optimal vaccine
allocation over multiple
populations1
3.1 Introduction
Infectious diseases have heavily influenced the course of history, and in recent years
we have seen new emerging epidemics due to the SARS coronavirus in 2003, the
novel influenza A H1N1 virus in 2009, the MERS-coronavirus in 2013, and the Ebola
virus in 2014. A large outbreak brings about deaths, health losses and economic
losses. Research on preventing an epidemic or mitigating its consequences is thus
of high priority. Vaccination is one of the most effective ways to control the spread
of a sudden epidemic. However, the vaccine stockpile is hardly ever sufficient to
vaccinate the entire population (e.g., for influenza: Monto 2006, Berkman 2009, Roos
2009, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2016b).
In this chapter, we investigate vaccine allocation problems. Specifically, we con-
sider a sudden outbreak in a population consisting of subgroups that differ geograph-
ically, and we investigate the allocation of a vaccine stockpile that is insufficient to
vaccinate the entire population. Two examples of such problems are the allocation of
1This chapter is based on Duijzer et al. (2015a).
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vaccines in case of a sudden outbreak (e.g., pandemic influenza, Ebola or an unknown
disease) or in response to a bioterror attack.
To illustrate the problem that is studied in this chapter, we examine a policy
maker who is confronted with a sudden outbreak of pandemic influenza. For such a
sudden outbreak, vaccination is one of the most effective ways to control the spread.
However, the available vaccine stockpile is insufficient to vaccinate the entire pop-
ulation and the development of additional vaccines may take months (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2016b). Thus, the policy maker must solve an allo-
cation problem: How should the doses of vaccine be allocated? During the 2009 H1N1
pandemic the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) used a pro rata
allocation (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009a) in which vaccines were
allocated among states relative to their population size. However, the spread of the
outbreak differed substantially per state, which motivates the study of alternative
allocations of vaccines over multiple regions, also referred to as ‘populations’ (see
also Teytelman and Larson 2013).
A reasonable objective for vaccine allocation is maximizing the number of people
who escape infection. This objective may be achieved by evaluating the eventual
outcome of alternative allocation methods by projecting the course of the epidemic
numerically (e.g., Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015), simulation (e.g., Fer-
guson et al. 2005, Cooper et al. 2006) or by telescoping-to-the-future (Teytelman and
Larson 2013). Such approaches may use detailed models and thus yield sophisticated
allocations, but they do not give a high-level explanation of why certain allocations
yield a higher health benefit. This is especially problematic because the resulting
allocations are often inequitable and behave counter-intuitively, as illustrated in Ta-
ble 3.1. For example, Population 1 has priority over Population 2 when 2000 doses are
available, but this priority switches at 8000 doses and again at 20000 doses. Similar
outcomes have been observed in various models (Rowthorn et al. 2009, Klepac et al.
2011, Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015), but remain poorly understood.
We apply analytical methods to study vaccine allocation for a seminal class of
epidemic models: The compartmental models introduced by Kermack and McKen-
drick (1927). These models divide the population into different compartments that
represent all people who are in the same disease state. We initially focus on the
classical SIR model, which consists of three compartments that respectively contain
susceptible (S), infected (I), and removed (R) individuals. People can be in the
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Vaccine stockpile Population 1 Population 2 Population 3
2000 2000 0 0
5000 4200 800 0
8000 0 8000 0
10000 1900 8100 0
15000 0 0 15000
20000 3600 0 16400
25000 0 8200 16800
30000 4100 8500 17400
Table 3.1: The optimal vaccine allocation over three non-interacting populations
(rounded to the nearest hundred). The sizes of population 1, 2 and 3 are respectively
10000, 20000 and 40000 and the fractions of people initially infected are 0.015, 0.012
and 0.010. (Section 3.3 contains a detailed description of the model and Section 3.5
gives the parameters used for this table.)
removed compartment because of recovery and immunity, successful vaccination or
death. Health benefits in this model are defined in terms of the total number of
people who escape infection. Vaccination affects health benefit in two ways: directly
for people who are vaccinated, and indirectly for people who are not vaccinated by
reducing their disease exposure throughout the epidemic.
Our analytical approach yields several new structural results and general insights
that cannot be derived via numerical or simulation methods. We first investigate the
total health benefit for a population as a function of the vaccination fraction that
is used. This function has long resisted analysis because it cannot be characterized
explicitly. We derive an implicit relation that extends the final size equation (Diek-
mann et al. 2013) and that forms the basis of our subsequent analysis. We contribute
to the extant literature by proving that the health benefits are in general convex-
concave and increasing-decreasing in the vaccination fraction, and that the convex
part arises only in populations where the disease has made limited progression yet.
The insight that the health benefit has a convex-concave response to the vaccination
fraction has crucial consequences for allocation. We provide an intuitive explanation
for convexity-concavity to arise that is based on the effect that vaccination has on
the peak of the proportion of infected.
56 Dose-optimal vaccine allocation over multiple populations
Our second contribution consists of exploring in detail the important implications
of these results for policy makers, which we summarize as follows. A single dose of
vaccination may be like a drop in the ocean, but multiple doses together can have a
substantial effect. To conceptualize this idea, we define our dose-optimal vaccination
fraction, a unique fraction that maximizes the health benefits per dose of vaccine in
a population. Health benefits per dose of vaccine decrease when moving away from
this fraction in either direction. This leads to a crucial implication for policy makers:
in order to effectively use the limited vaccine stockpile available after an outbreak,
they should focus exclusively on a few populations where dose-optimal coverage is
(closely) attainable.
Selecting the populations which should receive focus is a challenging combinatorial
problem, and our third contribution is exploring this problem for multiple non- and
interacting populations. We establish links to resource allocation literature (Ginsberg
1974, Ağralı and Geunes 2009). For the non-interacting case, we characterize the form
of the optimal solution. This leads to an explanation of the switching behavior of
Table 3.1. For cases with interaction, we illustrate how to apply the insights gained
from the non-interacting case.
We note that our dose-optimal fraction is conceptually different from the critical
vaccination coverage advocated in extant literature (e.g., Keeling and Shattock 2012,
Plans-Rubió 2012). The critical vaccination coverage aims at avoiding an increase in
infected individuals and is suitable to determine vaccination fractions when sufficient
vaccines are available in a pre-pandemic situation. It has also been advocated for
vaccine allocation under the assumption of scarce vaccines. However, we show that
our dose-optimal fraction is the right concept for allocating vaccines in this latter
case, and that it gives superior results compared to critical coverage.
Our first steps yielding high-level analytical insights into vaccine allocation may
aid policy-makers in grasping the sometimes puzzling outcomes of vaccine allocation
models, which may support their adoption in practice. With our insights, we also
contribute to the ethical debate on vaccine allocation in which policy makers have to
make complex trade-offs between equity and efficiency.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents an
extensive literature review to position our work. In Section 3.3, the vaccine allocation
problem is formulated. The objective of maximizing the number of people who escape
infection is further analyzed in Section 3.4 and the dose-optimal vaccination fraction
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for a population is presented. Based on this analysis, the structure of the solution to
the vaccine allocation problem is presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses the
generality of the results and the effect of the assumptions. We conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Literature
There are many different ways to model the spread of an epidemic in a population.
These range from deterministic models with differential equations based on Kermack
and McKendrick (1927), stochastic Markov formulations (e.g., Lefevre 1979) and
simulation models (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2005). An excellent overview of mathematical
methods to analyze epidemic models is given by Diekmann et al. (2013).
These models are often used to describe the evolution of an epidemic in multi-
ple populations that differ geographically (e.g., Sattenspiel and Dietz 1995, Arino
and Van den Driessche 2003). Others distinguish between age groups (e.g., Mylius
et al. 2008, Medlock et al. 2009, Goldstein et al. 2009) or between people heavily
contributing to the transmission of the disease and those who are very vulnerable
(e.g., Goldstein et al. 2012). Another approach is to focus on households and see
them as minor sub-populations (e.g., Becker and Starczak 1997, Ball and Lyne 2002,
Keeling and Ross 2015). In this chapter, we study non-interacting and interacting
populations. In particular we focus on geographically distant populations (cf., Sun
et al. 2009, Mamani et al. 2013).
Vaccination is one of the interventions often studied and included in epidemiologi-
cal models. Some studies consider vaccination in a completely susceptible population
(e.g., Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015). Others compare optimal vac-
cination strategies on different points in time and show how the optimal allocation
depends on the moment of vaccination (Mylius et al. 2008, Medlock et al. 2009, Ma-
trajt and Longini Jr 2010, Matrajt et al. 2013). Vaccination during an epidemic is
especially realistic in the context of a sudden outbreak, of pandemic influenza for
example, as a vaccine needs to be developed and produced in that case (cf. Bowman
et al. 2011).
There are different approaches to evaluating the effects of interventions such as
vaccination. One set of approaches focuses on the costs and uses cost-effectiveness
analysis or cost minimization. Many papers use such approaches. We discuss a few
of them with a topic or approach that is similar to ours. Hethcote and Waltman
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(1973) look for the least cost vaccination program that can prevent an epidemic.
Brandeau et al. (2003) use an analytical approach to study the allocation of a limited
budget on programs that affect the transmission rate. Boulier et al. (2007) analyze
the externalities of vaccination in the SIR model and their effects on the decision
problem for individuals who have to pay for their vaccination. Simons et al. (2011)
develop a tool based on the SIR model to derive the cost-effectiveness of vaccination
strategies for measles. These papers have in common that they explicitly take into
account the costs of certain interventions and compare these costs to the gain in
health.
Next to more cost-oriented approaches, a vast group of papers focusses on epi-
demic characteristics, while taking into account costs only implicitly or not at all.
These epidemic characteristics are measures to quantify the severity of an outbreak.
The final size, also referred to as the infection attack rate, is broadly used (e.g., Arino
et al. 2006, Matrajt and Longini Jr 2010, Keeling and Shattock 2012). It measures
the total number of people infected during an epidemic. An implicit analytical ex-
pression for the final size can be derived from the Kermack and McKendrick model
(cf. Diekmann et al. 2013). This final size equation may be shown to hold for a broad
range of model specifications (Keeling and Shattock 2012, Ma and Earn 2006). Our
objective also corresponds to minimizing the final size: an extension of the final size
equation serves as the starting point of our analysis. In contrast, Cairns (1989) and
Goldstein et al. (2009) investigate how to minimize another epidemic characteristic:
the basic reproduction ratio R0 (cf. Wallinga et al. 2010). R0 is defined as the number
of new infections caused by a single infectious individual in a completely susceptible
population. In the initial phase of an epidemic there are very few infected individ-
uals, so the population is almost completely susceptible. R0 is therefore related to
the exponential initial growth rate of an epidemic (cf. Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007).
Other studies analyze vaccine allocations that result in the threshold R0 = 1 (e.g.,
Becker and Starczak 1997, Tanner et al. 2008). In Chapter 4, we consider vaccina-
tion before an outbreak in an age structured population and minimize the required
vaccine stockpile to achieve R0 = 1. R0 is a myopic criterion, because it corresponds
to the initial growth rate, whereas the more traditional final size criterion considers
the entire time course of the epidemic. While the former criterion leads to a much
more tractable model, the latter approach may be more appropriate in many cases.
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Many researchers have identified the optimal intervention strategy by determining
the eventual outcome of alternatives using simulation models (e.g. Ferguson et al.
2005, Cooper et al. 2006, Germann et al. 2006, Halloran et al. 2008, Tuite et al. 2010,
Uribe-Sánchez et al. 2011) or numerical evaluation (e.g. Mylius et al. 2008, Keeling
and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015). Teytelman and Larson (2013) develop heuristic
algorithms to solve the vaccine allocation problem. They show that these heuristic
algorithms outperform a pro rata strategy by taking into account regional differences
in the flu wave that can be the result of differences in school holidays and school
openings. They use a dynamic approach in which vaccination decisions are updated
over time to incorporate incoming information about the epidemic. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to use an analytical approach to provide structural
insights explaining why certain interventions are eventually most effective. Our main
technical contribution is providing a detailed mathematical analysis of the final size
in the seminal SIR model. We show the convex-concave structure and prove that
there is a unique vaccination fraction that yields the highest health benefits per dose
of vaccine in a population: the dose-optimal vaccination fraction. The term dose-
optimal is also used by Ball and Lyne (2002) for a vaccine allocation that minimizes
R0 under different model specifications. In general, dose-optimality refers to the most
efficient use of available doses of vaccine.
A result on convexity of the final size is found by Wu et al. (2007) for the signif-
icantly simplified case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population and for
a limited range of vaccination fractions. We study the general model that holds for
vaccination at any possible time during or before the outbreak and for all possible
vaccination fractions. This general setting leads to the discovery of the dose-optimal
vaccination fraction, which plays a crucial role in the optimal allocation. Simu-
lation models and numerical analysis are incapable of deriving insightful structural
results. Our analytical approach is therefore essential to derive and formally proof the
convex-concave structure and the dose-optimal vaccination fraction. The structural
insights that we obtain may help practitioners to better understand the sometimes
counter-intuitive outcomes of a broad range of models.
By taking advantage of the results we obtain for the final size of the epidemic,
we analyze the vaccine allocation problem and establish a link to resource allocation
literature. This literature investigates for example the allocation of resources among
several production plants of a firm (Ginsberg 1974) or the allocation of a limited bud-
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get over multiple investments (Ağralı and Geunes 2009). Both Ginsberg (1974) and
Ağralı and Geunes (2009) study a knapsack problem with S-shaped return functions
and the latter paper proves it to be NP-hard. Srivastava and Bullo (2014) derive a
constant factor approximation algorithm with polynomial running time for the same
problem. Our results in Section 3.4 establish the applicability of this algorithm for
our vaccine allocation problem, but we do not explore this further because the main
purpose of this chapter is developing high-level insights into the problem.
Our research is in line with the growing interest for decision problems related to
the vaccine supply chain in the Operations Management community. In Chapter 2,
we characterize the following four components of the vaccine supply chain: product
(e.g., Cho 2010, Özaltın et al. 2011), production (e.g, Mamani et al. 2013, Adida et al.
2013), allocation (e.g., Sun et al. 2009) and distribution (e.g., McCoy and Johnson
2014). This chapter contributes to the literature on allocation.
3.3 Vaccine allocation
Vaccinating in multiple populations brings about the question of allocation: How
should the available doses of vaccine be divided over the populations? This chapter
models the spread of an epidemic using the seminal deterministic SIR model, which
is explained in Section 3.3.1. In Section 3.3.2, we explain the effect of vaccination
on the time course of an epidemic. The vaccine allocation problem is formulated in
Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 The SIR model
The SIR model is a classic model in epidemiology proposed by Kermack and Mc-
Kendrick (1927). Let J denote the set of populations. Every population is divided
into three compartments for which the time course is tracked (cf. Hethcote 2000).
Let sj(t), ij(t) and rj(t) be the fractions of the population respectively susceptible,
infected and removed in population j at time t. In this chapter, we consider the
removed compartment consisting of recovered individuals, deaths can be taken into
account straightforwardly. By interpretation it must hold that sj(t)+ij(t)+rj(t) = 1
for all t ≥ 0 and all j ∈ J . The SIR model is described by the following system of dif-
ferential equations, with the transmission rate and the rate of recovery in population
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j denoted by βj and γj , respectively.
dsj
dt
= −βjsjij
dij
dt
= βjsjij − γjij
drj
dt
= γjij
(3.1)
We assume that boundary conditions sj(0) = sj0, ij(0) = i
j
0 and rj(0) = r
j
0 are given,
with ij0 > 0 and s
j
0 + i
j
0 + r
j
0 = 1. (The limit i
j
0 ↓ 0 is discussed in Section 3.4.3.)
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the deterministic SIR model for population j with pa-
rameters γj = 1.5, βj = 3, i0 = 10−6.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the time course of an epidemic that evolves according to the
differential equations of the SIR model. (Figure 3.1 and 3.2 are computed with the
Runge-Kutta method (Greenbaum and Chartier 2012).) Two observations should be
made from this figure: 1) the epidemic eventually dies out and 2) not all susceptible
individuals become infected. As the fraction of susceptible individuals decreases over
time, it becomes less and less likely for an infected individual to come into contact
with such a susceptible individual. This eventually leads to a decrease in the fraction
of infected individuals. Specifically, we see that ij(t) increases for sj(t) > γjβj and
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decreases for sj(t) < γjβj . Accordingly, we refer to populations being pre-peak in the
first case and post-peak in the second case. Let τ ′ be the time at which sj(τ ′) = γjβj
, i.e., at τ ′ the peak in infectious is reached.
3.3.2 Vaccination
Vaccination reduces the fraction of susceptible individuals, in order to avoid or reduce
an increase in the fraction of infected individuals. To formally define vaccination,
we introduce the following notation. Let τ denote the time at which a fraction fj of
population j is vaccinated, with 0 ≤ fj ≤ sj(τ). Just prior to vaccination the system
is in state (sj(τ), ij(τ)). Assume that the used vaccine is completely effective after
a single dose and that vaccination takes no time, meaning that vaccination results
in complete immunity immediately. Assume also that it is possible to identify the
susceptible people. We refer to Section 3.6 for a discussion of these assumptions.
Under our assumptions vaccination causes a shift at time τ from state (sj(τ), ij(τ))
to state (sj(τ) − fj , ij(τ)). This implies that rj(τ) shifts to rj(τ) + fj . Figure 3.2
illustrates the changes at time τ .
To evaluate different vaccine allocations we base ourselves on the state of the
system when t → ∞. This state is also referred to as disease-free equilibrium,
because limt→∞ ij(t) = 0. We define Gj(fj) as the final fraction of people susceptible
in population j after vaccinating a fraction fj of the susceptible people at time τ .
More precisely, for fj ∈ [0, sj(τ)]
Gj(fj) = lim
t→∞ sj(t), (3.2)
with sj(t) evolving according to (3.1) for t > τ . The final fraction of people suscep-
tible is closely related to the following concepts, that we define here explicitly for
future use:
Herd immunity: the protection of susceptible individuals against infection because
they are surrounded by a sufficient number of immune individuals. The immu-
nity from the latter group may result either from vaccination or from recovery
from infection (cf. Fine 1993).
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the deterministic SIR model for population j with pa-
rameters γj = 1.5, βj = 3, i0 = 10−6. Dashed lines represent the time course without
vaccination. The solid lines represent the time course when either a fraction fj = 0.1
(left panel) or fj = 0.4 (right panel) is vaccinated at time τ when sj(τ) = 0.95.
Herd effect: the proportion of all people who are spared from infection because of
herd immunity. i.e., the proportion of all people who are still susceptible when
the epidemic has died out.
Thus, Gj(fj) measures the herd effect in population j. Section 3.4 studies Gj(fj) in
more detail.
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3.3.3 The vaccine allocation problem
We are interested in allocating a limited amount of vaccines V in order to maximize
health benefit, defined as the total number of people who escape infection:
max
herd effect︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j∈J
NjGj(fj) +
direct effect︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j∈J
Njfj
s.t.
∑
j∈J
Njfj ≤ V
0 ≤ fj ≤ sj(τ) ∀j ∈ J
(3.3)
Here, Nj denotes the size of population j. The objective function reflects that there
are two ways to escape infection: either you are vaccinated (direct effect) or you
escape infection without being vaccinated (indirect effect). Note that the fraction
of people escaping infection without being vaccinated in population j is precisely
the final fraction of susceptible people, i.e. the herd effect Gj(fj) introduced in
Section 3.3.2.
We discuss two equivalent formulations of the above allocation problem using
different objective functions in order to demonstrate the relation of our work to epi-
demiological literature. Firstly, in Theorem 3.D.1 we prove that it is optimal to
always use the complete vaccine stockpile, i.e., constraint
∑
j∈J Njfj ≤ V will al-
ways be met with equality. This implies that the objective could be changed from
maximizing the total effect of vaccination to maximizing only the herd effect. Sec-
ondly, maximizing the total effect of vaccination is equivalent to minimizing the final
size of the epidemic, i.e., the total number of people who get infected. The final size
of the epidemic may be expressed as Zj(fj) = sj(0) + ij(0) − fj −Gj(fj) and (3.2)
is thus formally equivalent to a minimization problem involving this final size (e.g.,
Wu et al. 2007, Keeling and Shattock 2012). The relation between Zj(fj), fj and
Gj(fj) is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Note that the fraction Gj(fj) may in fact increase
for smaller values of fj .
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Figure 3.3: The final state of the epidemic for different vaccination fractions, for an
epidemic with basic reproduction ratio σ = 2 with (s0, i0) = (0.99, 0.01) and τ = 0.
3.4 Analysis of the herd effect
In order to study the allocation problem (3.2), Section 3.4.1 analyzes and interprets
the structure of the herd effect G(f) (we drop the subscript j for convenience). Based
on this analysis, we present our dose-optimal vaccination fraction for a population in
Section 3.4.2 and compare this fraction to the so-called critical vaccination fraction
from literature in Section 3.4.3. We extend our analysis to more general compart-
mental models in Section 3.4.4. A minor detail is sorted out in Section 3.4.5: we
formally confirm that it is optimal to vaccinate as early as possible.
Figure 3.4 summarizes the main findings of this section and illustrates the struc-
ture of G(f). In Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 these results are derived formally.
3.4.1 Analysis of the structure of the herd effect
In this and the next section, we present the main technical contribution of this
chapter: a structural analysis of the herd effect G(f). Let σ := βγ . The overall
structure of G(f) is established in the following theorems:
66 Dose-optimal vaccine allocation over multiple populations
Figure 3.4: Illustration of the structure of G(f), which is proven in Section 3.4:
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 establish the increasing-decreasing and convex-concave struc-
ture of G(f), which is illustrated in this figure using the parameters (s0, i0) =
(0.99, 0.01), σ = 3 and τ = 0. Dashed lines represent the important vaccination
fractions f¯ (left), f∗ (right) and our dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ (middle).
The latter follows from Corollary 3.1. The straight dotted line illustrates that f˜ is
the only non-zero vaccination fraction for which the tangent line contains the point
(0, G(0)).
Theorem 3.1. There is a unique vaccination fraction f∗ = max
(
s(τ)− 1σ , 0
)
that
maximizes the herd effect: the herd effect G(f) is increasing in f for all f < f∗,
maximized for f = f∗ and decreasing for f > f∗.
Theorem 3.2. There exists a unique vaccination fraction f¯ with 0 ≤ f¯ ≤ f∗ such
that G(f) is strictly convex (G′′(f) > 0) for all f < f¯ and strictly concave (G′′(f) <
0) for all f > f¯ .
We first briefly discuss how these results are derived. The proofs for these results
and the supporting lemmas can be found in Appendix 3.B. We had to overcome a
number of significant challenges, particularly because no explicit formulation of the
herd effect G(f) exists. We develop an implicit relation characterizing G(f), and our
proof departs from that relation. We note that despite almost 90 years of research on
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the SIR model, the convex-concave shape and its repercussions for vaccine allocation
have not been considered.
We next discuss the intuition behind these theorems, and the consequences that
these results have for practice. The peak in the infections, illustrated in Figure 3.2,
plays a critical role in determining the herd effect. At this peak the proportion of
susceptibles is equal to γ/β = 1/σ and so infections decrease for s(t) < 1/σ. Note
that vaccinating with the fraction f∗ = s(τ) − 1/σ exactly results a proportion of
susceptibles equal to 1/σ directly after vaccination, which leads to the following
definition (cf, Keeling and Shattock 2012, Plans-Rubió 2012):
Critical vaccination coverage: the smallest vaccination fraction that results in
a decrease of infections directly after vaccination, denoted by f∗ as in Theo-
rem 3.1.
Vaccination beyond f∗ thus protects individuals that would not be likely to contract
the disease anyhow and expanding coverage beyond f∗ actually reduces the herd
effect.
The primary effect of vaccination is that it reduces the number of people to be
infected until the peak of infected is reached at s(t) = 1/σ. The convex-concave
structure results because this primary effect interacts with a secondary effect: f
affects the specific time at which the peak occurs. This secondary effect is non-
monotonic, because it consists of two competing phenomena: (1) Vaccination lowers
s(τ), thus reducing the further reduction in susceptibles needed until s(t) reaches 1/σ
and (2) Vaccination reduces the rate of initial exponential growth of infected people,
thus inhibiting the speed of reduction of s(t). For small f the second effect dominates,
resulting in a delayed peak as can be seen in Figure 3.2. For larger vaccination
fractions, when s(τ) comes close to 1/σ, the first effect dominates rendering the
peak to be advanced. A delayed peak is beneficial, since more time allows for more
recoveries and consequently results in fewer infections at the peak. Small vaccination
fractions benefit from the delayed peak, in addition to the primary effect, which
results in the convex and increasing herd effect. For larger vaccination fractions the
secondary benefit is reversed, which explains the concave increase.
The structure of the herd effect has some interesting practical consequences. Con-
sider for example a policy maker that faces a pandemic influenza outbreak where the
vaccine stockpile should be allocated over multiple populations with a comparable
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pre-peak state. It is better to concentrate on one or few of these populations instead
of allocating equally over all. By restricting attention to a few populations both
the primary effect and the secondary effect can be fully exploited for a few popula-
tions resulting in a higher overall herd effect. Our results thus yield understanding
why equitable allocations are often not efficient. This increased understanding is a
contribution to the ethical debate on vaccine allocation.
Note that Theorem 3.2 does not rule out that f¯ = 0, in which case there is no
convex part of G(f). Similarly, by Theorem 3.1 we may have f∗ = 0, in which case
G(f) is never increasing. The following theorem investigates these issues. It features
the constant C that is defined as C = 2/σ + W [−σ exp{−σ(s0 + i0) + log(s0)}]/σ,
where W [·] is the Lambert W function and C > 1/σ (cf. Appendix 3.E).
Theorem 3.3. For the structure of G(f) we can distinguish three cases based on
s(τ), the proportion of susceptibles at the moment of vaccination τ :
(i) C < s(τ) < 1: We have f∗ > f¯ > 0. Thus G(f) is increasing and convex
between 0 and f¯ , increasing and concave between f¯ and f∗, and decreasing and
concave above f∗.
(ii) 1/σ < s(τ) ≤ C: We have f∗ > 0 and f¯ = 0. Thus G(f) is increasing and
concave between 0 and f∗, and decreasing and concave above f∗.
(iii) 0 ≤ s(τ) < 1/σ: We have f¯ = f∗ = 0. Thus G(f) is decreasing and concave
everywhere.
Figure 3.4 graphically illustrates the herd effect G(f) with parameters for which
C = 0.7092. Since we use s(τ) = s0 = 0.99, the figure shows the most general shape
(i). Theorem 3.3 follows from the intuitive discussion earlier in this section. For s(τ)
high enough (more precisely higher than C) the peak in infections can be delayed
with small vaccination fractions, resulting in the convex increase in the herd effect.
When s(τ) is below C the peak can not be delayed through vaccination and the
herd effect has no convex part. If s(τ) < 1/σ, the population is already in a post-
peak state with infections declining. This implies that the risk of getting infected
for the people who are still susceptible is relatively low. In that case f∗ = 0 and
vaccination reduces the herd effect, because you vaccinate people who were unlikely
to get infected in the first place.
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Thus, policy makers that face an outbreak of pandemic influenza for example,
should resist the pressure to vaccinate in areas with many infected people. Indeed,
when infections are close to the peak, the effect of vaccination is lower. Vaccinating
in post-peak areas is even less effective, because the people who are vaccinated were
not likely to become infected anyhow (cf., Teytelman and Larson 2013). Thus, it is
best to vaccinate in pre-peak areas where s(τ) >> 1/σ. But to achieve most in such
populations, concentration of effort is needed. In Sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.1 we will
discuss this in more detail.
3.4.2 The dose-optimal vaccination fraction
In this section, we present a third important vaccination fraction, next to the vacci-
nation fractions f∗ and f¯ defined in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. To explore the impact of
vaccination we should take into account that susceptible people will escape infection
even without vaccination. Accordingly, we define:
Additional herd effect: the herd effect achieved through vaccination minus the
herd effect that would already be present without vaccination; denoted by
G(f)−G(0).
We introduce the function D(f) to measure the average additional herd effect per
dose of vaccine:
D(f) = 1
f
[G(f)−G(0)] (3.4)
Note that D(f) can also be interpreted as the average slope of the herd effect G(f)
on the interval [0, f ]. We derive following result:
Corollary 3.1. The function D(f) as defined by (3.4) is maximized by the unique
vaccination fraction f˜ for which G′(f˜) = D(f˜). The function D(f) is increasing for
f < f˜ and decreasing for f > f˜ .
We have thus determined three important vaccination fractions of which the re-
lation is presented in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Consider the following three vaccination fractions: f∗ as defined in
Theorem 3.1, f¯ as defined in Theorem 3.2 and f˜ as defined in Corollary 3.1. The
following relation holds: f¯ ≤ f˜ ≤ f∗
70 Dose-optimal vaccine allocation over multiple populations
Figure 3.5: Illustration of the dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ using the param-
eters (s0, i0) = (0.99, 0.01), σ = 3 and τ = 0. The slope of the straight line represent
the value of D(f) for f˜ . Observe that any other line starting at G(0) and intersecting
with G(f) would be less steep and not tangent to G(f).
Corollary 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 are illustrated in Figure 3.5. Observe that at f˜
the line connecting G(0) and G(f˜) is also the tangent line at G(f˜). Because of the
convex-concave structure of the herd effect G(f) there is only a single vaccination
fraction f˜ for which this holds, and this fraction must lie between f¯ and f∗. The
interpretation of Corollary 3.1 is that f˜ gives the highest additional herd effect per
dose of vaccine, which leads to the following definition:
Dose-optimal vaccination fraction: the vaccination fraction that maximizes the
average additional herd effect per dose of vaccine in a population, denoted by
f˜ .
A discussion of the implications of Corollary 3.1, and a comparison of the dose-
optimal f˜ with the critical vaccination coverage f∗ are provided in the next section.
3.4.3 Dose-optimal and critical vaccination coverage
Our dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ and the vaccination fraction f∗ represent two
different concepts in vaccine allocation. We compare the dose-optimal vaccination
fraction f˜ with the critical vaccination coverage f∗ and illustrate these fractions for
different values of σ in Table 3.2. The table shows that f˜ and f∗ are indeed quite
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σ 2 3 5 10 20 30 50 100
f¯ 0.3376 0.5411 0.7086 0.8398 0.9094 0.9340 0.9546 0.9712
f˜ 0.4134 0.6193 0.7746 0.8855 0.9386 0.9560 0.9697 0.9799
f∗ 0.4900 0.6567 0.7900 0.8900 0.9400 0.9567 0.9700 0.9800
Table 3.2: Illustration of the three important vaccination fractions f¯ , f˜ and f∗ for
increasing σ. To calculate the numbers an initial state (s0, i0) = (0.99, 0.01) and
s(τ) = 0.99 is used.
different. For σ growing large, both f˜ and f∗ converge to s(τ) (cf., Lemma 3.B.4 in
Appendix 3.B.3), but this limit is not very interesting because σ is between 2 and
20 for most diseases. For example, σ ≈ 3 for influenza, σ ≈ 3.5 − 6 for smallpox,
σ ≈ 6− 7 for rubella and σ ≈ 16− 18 for measles (Keeling and Rohani 2008).
As discussed in Section 3.4.2, the vaccination fraction f˜ results in the most ef-
ficient allocation per dose of vaccine in a population. The vaccination fraction f∗
on the other hand is attractive from another perspective and has been advocated
in literature (e.g., Keeling and Shattock 2012, Plans-Rubió 2012). It does not only
maximize the herd effect, but also directly results in a decrease in infected individuals
at time τ .
Corollary 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 clearly show that f˜ makes more efficient use of
vaccines then f∗. This can be intuitively understood as follows. Note that f∗ > f˜ .
Our intuitive interpretation of Theorem 3.2 reveals that while vaccination initially
delays the timing of the peak of infected, vaccinating with higher vaccination fractions
will actually render the peak to be advanced. As a consequence, vaccines issued to
expand coverage from f˜ to f∗ in a population are used inefficiently. We give an
example using the settings of Table 3.2 and σ = 3. In that case, the vaccines between
0 and f˜ result in an average herd effect of 0.31 per dose, whereas this average is only
0.17 per dose for the vaccines between f˜ and f∗. Hence, vaccinating beyond f˜ to
achieve f∗ is costly, and not a good use of a limited vaccine stockpile.
In literature optimal vaccination has often been explained in terms of avoiding
the further increase in infected individuals, which relates to vaccinating with f∗ (cf.,
Wu et al. 2007, Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015). Avoiding an increase
of infected people is suitable when there are initially no infected individuals, i.e., for
‘pre-pandemic vaccination’ (the limit i0 ↓ 0). However, allocating a limited vaccine
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stockpile typically goes hand in hand with a sudden outbreak: the limited stockpile
arises because not enough time is available to produce more. This arguably renders
pre-pandemic vaccination unrealistic in combination with allocating a limited vaccine
stockpile. In the case of influenza, this implies that the assumption of a limited
stockpile is more realistic for pandemic influenza than for seasonal influenza. Extant
literature has focused mainly on the less realistic case of a limited stockpile and
pre-pandemic vaccination, for which f∗ and f˜ coincide numerically as we show in
Appendix 3.B.3, and has thus missed the conceptual distinction between critical and
dose-optimal vaccination. In general, the concepts of dose-optimal vaccine allocation
and avoiding an increase in infections are substantially different. The explanation of
literature is therefore not generalizable.
3.4.4 The SEIR model and other extensions
An important extension of the standard SIR compartmental model is the SInR
model with n different consecutive infectious stages. This extension allows to include
a latent period or multiple levels of infectivity. Let βk and γk denote respectively
the transmission rate and recovery rate in infectious stage k. A special case of the
SInR model for which n = 2 is the SEIR model. Compared to the SIR model the
SEIR model has an additional compartment E containing the individuals that are
exposed and hence infected, but not yet infectious. We derive our results for the
general SInR model, in which there are arbitrary many additional compartments:
Lemma 3.3. The results of Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.3 and Corol-
lary 3.1 also apply to the SInR model with σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
. In particular, for each
SInR model with given initial conditions there exist vaccination fractions f¯ , f˜ and
f∗ that together characterize the convex-concave and increasing-decreasing shape of
the herd effect.
Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.1 form the basis for the
analysis of the vaccine allocation problem in Section 3.5. By Corollary 3.3 the results
derived in Section 3.5 are valid for the more general SInR model. The interested
reader is referred to Appendix 3.C, where we formally analyze the SInR model.
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3.4.5 The optimal timing of vaccination
We sort out a minor detail by formally proving that vaccination should ideally be
carried out as soon as possible. Thereto we determine the time τ at which the total
effect of vaccination, i.e., G(f, s(τ)) + f , is maximized. Assume that we have a
fixed vaccine stockpile, V , such that a fraction of the population can be vaccinated is
restricted by VN , where N is the population size. If s(τ) ≤ V/N , all susceptible people
can be vaccinated and the objective function for f = s(τ) reduces to s(τ), because
limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0 by Theorem 3.B.1. If s(τ) > V/N , all available doses of vaccine
are used and f = VN . In Lemma 3.B.6 we derive that the herd effect G(f, s(τ)) is
increasing in s(τ) in that case. Therefore, to maximize the number of people who
escape infection one should vaccinate as soon as possible in an ideal world. A policy
maker that has to allocate a limited vaccine stockpile over a number of populations
that face an outbreak of pandemic influenza should therefore concentrate on the
population in which the outbreak has least progressed.
3.5 Analysis of the vaccine allocation problem
In this section, we analyze the vaccine allocation problem (3.2), using the charac-
terization of the objective function in Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. These theorems
establish that our vaccine allocation problem is a combinatorial optimization prob-
lem that is likely difficult to solve to optimality (cf., Srivastava and Bullo 2014).
However, in this section we show that there is an interesting structure in the opti-
mal solution. Section 3.5.1 presents this central insight. Section 3.5.2 considers an
interesting special case to gain more understanding of the structure of the solution.
Section 3.5.3 translates the results gained in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 into insights
and simple guideline for arriving at an efficient allocation. In Section 3.5.4, we illus-
trate how the insights from the non-interactive case can be applied to geographically
distant populations that interact with each other.
3.5.1 The optimal allocation
We characterize the optimal allocation, which is the solution to problem (3.2). We
will make a few non-restrictive assumptions to allow us to focus on the most inter-
esting cases. Firstly, we assume that V < V ∗, where V ∗ =
∑
j∈J Njf
∗
j , reflecting
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our focus on severe shortages of vaccines. As argued in Section 3.4.3, this is a real-
istic assumption in case of a sudden outbreak such as pandemic influenza. Indeed,
with V ≥ V ∗ all locations can reach critical vaccination coverage f∗j , stopping any
further increase of infections. Moreover, we observed in Section 3.4.1 that post-peak
populations (with sj(τ) < 1/σj) should not receive vaccination until all pre-peak
populations receive at least f∗j . Thus, here we assume that all populations are pre-
peak (sj(τ) > 1/σj). We refer to Appendix 3.D for a description of the optimal
allocation in case these assumptions are relaxed.
We will show that every optimal solution to problem (3.2) is linked to a certain
marginal efficiency ω:
Marginal efficiency: the increase in herd effect if one additional dose of vaccine
would be allocated to a population, calculated as the derivative of Gj(fj) with
respect to fj .
Populations j ∈ J are vaccinated with marginal efficiency ω if G′j(fj) = ω. In the
optimal solution, by KKT conditions every population that is partially vaccinated
must be vaccinated with marginal efficiency ω. However, potentially two vaccination
fractions fj may satisfy G′j(fj) = ω:
Regular fraction: the vaccination fraction fj that results in a marginal efficiency
ω and lies in the domain where the herd effect is concave, i.e., fj > f¯j .
Exceptional fraction: the vaccination fraction fj that results in a marginal effi-
ciency ω and lies in the domain where the herd effect is convex, , i.e., fj < f¯j .
In the optimal solution there are three possible vaccination fractions for every popu-
lation j ∈ J : (i) the regular fraction, (ii) the exceptional fraction or (iii) fj = 0 and
population j is not vaccinated at all. Figure 3.6 illustrates these three possibilities
for population j.
Theorem 3.4 (Central Insight). Every optimal solution to (3.2) can be characterized
as follows:
(i). A subset of populations J ′ ⊆ J is vaccinated with the regular fraction that
corresponds to marginal efficiency ω.
(ii). Possibly another population k is also vaccinated with marginal efficiency ω, but
with the exceptional fraction for which fk < f¯k.
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(iii). The remaining populations are not vaccinated at all.
Figure 3.6: Illustration of the structure of the optimal allocation, using the param-
eters (s0, i0) = (0.99, 0.01), σ = 3 and τ = 0.
Determining ω for a specific problem is difficult, which relates back to the combi-
natorial nature of Problem 3.2. Still, a key insight can be derived from Theorem 3.4:
A policy maker should focus on a subset of populations when allocating vaccines and
leave other populations unvaccinated. By doing so the benefits of the herd effect are
best exploited, because only a concentrated effort can fully harness both the primary
and the secondary effects of vaccination. The structure of the optimal allocation
thus clearly brings about complex decisions for policy makers, who also have to take
equity considerations into account. Our results show that mathematically optimal
allocations are inherently inequitable due to the nonlinear dynamics of epidemics.
Hence, policy makers are to some extend forced to choose between equity and effi-
ciency. For a further discussions of the ethical dimension of vaccine allocation we
refer to Section 3.7.
3.5.2 The special case: identical parameters
We illustrate the intuition behind the central insight for an interesting special case:
the case of populations having identical disease parameters. This special case implies
identical functions Gj(fj) := G(fj) for all j ∈ J (σj := σ, sj0 := s0, ij0 := i0 for
all j ∈ J). In that case, the regular fraction fj for a certain marginal efficiency ω
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is the same for all populations j. This implies that the allocation described in (i)
of Theorem 3.4 is a pro rata allocation over the subset J ′, with pro rata as usual
denoting an allocation in which the doses of vaccine are distributed equally with
respect to population size, such that the vaccination fraction is the same in all selected
populations. For this special case, the optimal allocation may be characterized in
more detail.
Based on the results derived in Section 3.4, we conclude that our optimization
problem is a knapsack problem with convex-concave return functions. Ginsberg
(1974) study an investment problem over multiple factories with convex-concave
production functions. Mathematically, this problem is equivalent to our vaccine
allocation problem for the special case Gj(0) = 0 and Nj = N for all j ∈ J . Intu-
itively, this special case corresponds to a situation with a shifted herd effect and all
sub-populations having the same size. We build upon the results of Ginsberg (1974)
to characterize the optimal vaccine allocation in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. Consider a set of populations J with ∀j: Gj(f) = G(f) and a total
available amount of resources equal to V . Let |J | = n and order the populations such
that N1 ≤ ... ≤ Nn. The optimal allocation for particular cases is as follows:
(a). if V < f˜N1, then allocate only to the smallest population. Set f1 = V/N1 and
fj = 0 for j = 2, ..., n.
(b). if V =
∑
j∈K f˜Nj for a subset K ⊆ J , then set fj = f˜ for j ∈ K and fj = 0
for j /∈ K.
(c). if V >
∑
j∈J f˜Nj, then allocate pro rata over all the populations: fj = V∑
j∈J Nj
for all j ∈ J .
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix 3.D. Theorem 3.5 shows
that in order to make the best possible use of the herd effect, decision makers should
try to vaccinate close to f˜ in (a subset of) the populations. They should allocate all
vaccines to the smallest population if the vaccination fraction f˜ cannot be attained
in any of the populations (case (a)). For very large vaccine stockpiles, policy makers
do best in selecting the pro rata allocation over all populations (case (c)). Note that
Theorem 3.5 only specifies the allocation in specific cases of vaccine stockpiles, but
can be extended to any available amount of vaccines. However, the description of the
optimal allocation for a general vaccine stockpile is quite technical and less insightful
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and is therefore omitted. In general, the optimal allocation changes continuously for
small changes in V . For larger changes, discontinuities may arise when jumping from
one subset K to the other in item (b) of Theorem 3.5.
3.5.3 Discussion of the general case - The switching behavior
The vaccine allocation problem that we study is NP-hard, but we have derived an
interesting structure in Theorem 3.4 and Section 3.5.2. In this section, we translate
this structure to insights and a simple guideline for arriving at an efficient allocation.
Recall that in the special case discussed in Section 3.5.2 a decision maker should
look for a subset of populations such that it is feasible to vaccinate these populations
close to the fraction f˜ that yield the highest additional herd effect per allocated
dose. In the general case, the parameters may differ per population, causing the
functions Gj(·) to be different for different populations j. This implies that there is
no longer a single value for f˜ , but an f˜j for every population j ∈ J . The additional
herd effect per dose of vaccine in population j is the highest at f˜j and decreases
as the vaccination fraction moves away from f˜j in either direction. This has the
following implications for the optimal allocation: a decision maker should select a
subset of populations and divide the vaccines over them such that these populations
are vaccinated with a fraction close to their dose-optimal fractions f˜j . The marginal
efficiency ω of Theorem 3.4 determines how close the vaccination fraction exactly is to
the dose-optimal fraction. In any case, Theorem 3.4 guarantees that the vaccination
fraction lies in the interval [f¯j , f∗j ] for the populations in the selected subset, except
for at most one population which can be vaccinated with a fraction below f¯j .
The recommendation given by Wu et al. (2007), Keeling and Shattock (2012),
Yuan et al. (2015) to maximize the herd effect in some populations by setting fj = f∗j
is thus incorrect in typical practical settings of a limited vaccine stockpile, e.g., during
an outbreak of pandemic influenza. A decision maker should vaccinate close to f˜j to
use the vaccines efficiently in every population; any additional vaccinations used to
reach critical coverage f∗ in j are ineffective as discussed in Section 3.4.3.
Using the above characterization of the optimal allocation we can also explain
the switching behavior. The smallest populations are prioritized for small vaccine
stockpiles, as the number of doses of vaccine required to reach f˜j is smaller in those
populations. When the stockpile size increases, we can vaccinate close to the dose-
optimal vaccination fraction in larger populations and hence priority shifts to these
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populations. Numerical analysis of the optimal vaccine allocation (e.g., by Keeling
and Shattock (2012)) shows switch points where a small increase in vaccine stockpile
results in a completely different allocation. Our analysis explains these switch points:
they are related to a change in the subset of populations to approach the dose-optimal
vaccination fraction.
The structure of the optimal allocation is illustrated in Figure 3.7, where we use
the example from the introduction with three populations of size N1 = 10000, N2 =
20000 andN3 = 40000 respectively. The following parameters are used: τ = 0, σj = 2
for j = 1, 2, 3 and initial states (s10, i10) = (0.985, 0.015), (s20, i20) = (0.988, 0.012)
and (s30, i30) = (0.990, 0.010). In Figure 3.7, we indeed observe that the vaccinated
populations receive a number of allocated vaccines that is close to V˜j .
To relate Figure 3.7 to the description of the optimal allocation in Theorem 3.4,
we explain the optimal allocation for two vaccine stockpile sizes: V = 5000 and
V = 10000. For V = 5000, the optimal strategy is roughly to allocate 4200 vaccines
to population 1 and the remaining 800 to population 2. We thus see all three vacci-
nation possibilities of Theorem 3.4 present: (i) population 1 gets the regular fraction,
(ii) population 2 the exceptional fraction and (iii) population 3 is not vaccinated at
all. For V = 10000, we see the roles of population 1 and 2 reversed with population
1 getting 1900 vaccines and population 2 receiving the remaining 8100. We can cal-
culate that V˜1 = f˜1N1 = 3963, V˜2 = f˜2N2 = 8173 and V˜3 = f˜3N3 = 16702. The two
examples for V , as well as the optimal allocations in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.7, illus-
trate that vaccines in the optimal allocation are allocated such that the vaccination
fractions in the vaccinated populations are always close to the dose-optimal fraction
and that at most one population has a substantial lower vaccination fraction.
We use our explanation of the optimal allocation in terms of the dose-optimal
vaccination fraction to derive a guideline for the vaccine allocation problem (3.2).
This simple heuristic does not find the optimal solution, but it does capture an
important structure of the optimal solution: as many populations as possible are
vaccinated with their dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜j .
1. We order populations based on the benefits per dose of vaccine such that
D1(f˜1) ≥ ... ≥ Dn(f˜n), where the function D(f) is defined in (3.4).
2. Following the order of step 1, we vaccinate as many populations as possible with
their dose-optimal vaccination fraction until the vaccine stockpile is insufficient
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Figure 3.7: The graphs present the optimal vaccine allocation (the solid lines) over
three populations for different sizes of vaccine stockpile. The dashed and dotted lines
indicate the important vaccination fractions: the dashed line in the middle equals
V˜j = f˜jNj , the upper dotted line equals V ∗j = f∗jNj and the lower dotted line equals
V¯j = f¯jNj . The circles indicate the values from Table 3.1.
to reach dose-optimal coverage for the next population (case 1) or until dose-
optimal coverage is reached for all populations (case 2).
3. We allocate the remaining vaccines. In case 1, these vaccines are allocated to
the unvaccinated population in which these vaccines are most beneficial (i.e.,
the population for which allocating the remaining vaccines would result in the
highest Dj(fj)). In case 2, we allocate the remaining vaccines pro rata over all
populations.
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We evaluate the performance of the heuristic as well as the gains of using the
optimal allocation and compare to the equitable allocation in Table 3.3. Since the
direct effect of vaccination is not affected by the allocation, we focus only on the herd
effect. In particular, we look at the additional herd effect which leaves out the herd
effect that is already achieved without any vaccination:
additional herd effect =
∑
j∈J
Nj(Gj(fj)−Gj(0)) (3.5)
The table shows that the optimal allocation is significantly more effective in harness-
ing the herd effect than the pro rata allocation. We also observe that the allocation
heuristic performs close to optimal. It captures the same structure as the optimal
solution, which results in a good performance.
To investigate the impact of heterogeneous σ we have performed an additional ex-
periment in which the disease parameters of the populations change to σ1 = 1.5, σ2 =
2, σ3 = 2.5. The relative improvement of the optimal allocation over the pro rata
allocation increases from 0-21% to 5-72% in that case. We have also investigated an
algorithm based on minimizing R0. However, the performance of this algorithm was
poor and the corresponding results are therefore not reported.
Vaccine Equitable Heuristic Optimal Relative improvement optimal
stockpile allocation allocation allocation over equitable allocation
2000 671 762 762 + 13.56%
5000 1742 2037 2037 + 16.93%
8000 2893 3235 3511 + 21.36%
10000 3707 4274 4274 + 15.30%
15000 5912 6265 6702 + 13.36%
20000 8350 8842 8910 + 6.71%
25000 10930 11032 11170 + 2.20%
30000 13255 13226 13264 + 0.07%
Table 3.3: The additional herd effect (3.5) for three different allocation strategies
for various vaccine stockpiles. The equitable allocation allocates pro rata over all
populations, the heuristic allocation is determined via the heuristic described in Sec-
tion 3.5.3 and the optimal allocation is specified in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.7. The
population sizes are: N1 = 10000, N2 = 20000 and N3 = 40000.
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3.5.4 Interaction
Our model can be applied to geographically distant populations, and one might
wonder how our insights are affected when these populations exhibit some interaction
in the form of mutual infections. From a theoretical perspective, our results continue
to hold for sufficiently weak interactions, while they are invalidated by sufficiently
strong interactions. Indeed, for strong interaction sub-populations start to behave
like a single large population, implying that pro rata allocation should perform well.
We determine at what level of interaction our results start to deteriorate by
comparing the results derived for the non-interacting case with the structure of the
optimal allocation for various levels of interaction. The SIR model with interaction
is given by the following differential equations (Diekmann et al. 2013):
dsj
dt
= −
∑
k∈J
βjksjik ∀j ∈ J
dij
dt
=
∑
k∈J
βjksjik − γjij ∀j ∈ J
drj
dt
= γjij ∀j ∈ J
(3.6)
We consider an example with three populations with the population sizes and initial
states being the same as in the non-interacting example presented in Section 3.5.3.
We use the following parameters: γj = 1 and βjj = β = 2 for all j ∈ J . The
interaction is determined as follows: βjk = cβ Nk∑
m6=j Nm
for j, k ∈ J and j 6= k, such
that
∑
k 6=j βjk = cβ for all j ∈ J , with c being the interaction factor: interaction
between populations is a factor 1/c weaker than interaction within populations.
The vaccination fractions f¯j , f˜j and f∗j are computed by numerical evaluation
of (3.6) fixing fk = 0 for k 6= j. Perhaps surprisingly, we still observe the convex-
concave relation between the herd effect and the used vaccination fraction in that
population. Numerical experiments in which we determine the optimal allocation via
enumeration show that the insights for the non-interacting case carry over. Up to an
interaction factor of 0.02 the switching pattern is still clearly visible up to vaccine
stockpiles of around 30% of the total population size. For a factor 0.05 switching
priorities occur only for relatively small stockpiles and for a factor 0.1 the optimal
allocation does no longer display any switching behaviour. Yet for all compared lev-
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els of interaction (0.01, 0.02, 0.05 and 0.1) the optimal allocation of small vaccine
stockpiles remains unequitable, prioritizing initially only one population. Numerical
results also show that ignoring interaction performs close to optimal and even outper-
forms the equitable allocation. We refer to Appendix 3.F for a graphical illustration
of the numerical experiments mentioned in this section.
We assume that the interaction factor c is relatively small, which conforms to
Wu et al. (2007) who note that individuals spend on average more than 97% of their
time in their home regions. Also Sun et al. (2009) and Mamani et al. (2013) derive
their results for sufficiently small between-country transmission rates. In the latter
paper this is specified as the assumption that βijβjk ≈ 0. Our results indicate that
vaccine allocation can benefit from increasing returns to scale also in case of larger
interaction between populations. Hence, our structural results that characterize the
optimal allocation apply for typical interacting models.
3.6 Discussion of assumptions
We briefly discuss the effect of modelling assumptions, extensions and the generality
of the results. Our results continue to hold when several assumptions are relaxed
as will be discussed here. We assume that the vaccine is completely effective and
results in immunity directly. The effectiveness of a vaccine can be incorporated with
an efficacy parameter that rescales the vaccination fraction (cf. Hill and Longini Jr
2003, Mylius et al. 2008). A delay in immunity can be approximated by using a
slightly lower value for s(τ) than at the vaccination moment. We also assume that it is
possible to identify susceptible individuals. If this is not the case, some of the vaccines
would be administered to infected or immune people. Under the condition that the
vaccines are only effective for susceptible people, this implies that the proportion of
people effectively vaccinated equals fs(τ). i.e., we can simply rescale a parameter
to account for situations where susceptible people cannot be identified. All these
small adjustments in the parameters do not change the structure of the herd effect
and the optimal vaccine allocation. Thus, the structure described in the theorems
and lemmas continues to hold. Finally, we assume that a single dose of vaccine is
sufficient to achieve immunity. Our results cannot be directly applied to the situation
where multiple doses of vaccine are given to an individual, particularly because there
often needs to be a minimum time in between administering consecutive doses. As
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the epidemic continues to spread in the meantime, this brings extra complexity to
the problem (See Chapter 5).
The results in this chapter are established under the assumption that vaccination
is the only intervention used. However, in practice vaccination is often combined
with hygiene measures and treatment or isolation of infected patients. These other
interventions change the course of the epidemic by influencing for example the trans-
mission rate or the recovery rate. Further research is needed to investigate how the
results derived in this chapter carry over when multiple interventions are combined.
This study uses an analytical approach to determine the essential problem charac-
teristics that govern the structure of the solution. This implies that the structure of
the solution can be generalized to problems with the same characteristics. Note that
the deterministic model considered in this chapter can be seen as the fluid approxi-
mation of a stochastic model. Unpublished numerical results by the authors indicate
that the convex-concave pattern in the herd effect also holds for this stochastic SIR
model. This is an indication that the insights of this chapter carry over, although
proving convexity is even more difficult for the stochastic model. For populations
with interaction we numerically illustrate in Section 3.5.4 and Appendix 3.F that the
insights gained from the non-interacting case can still be applied, which is in line
with the findings of Wu et al. (2007).
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze the optimal allocation of a vaccine stockpile in order to
maximize the health benefit, where we define health benefit as the total number of
people who escape infection. We find that vaccination can have a secondary effect in
addition to the primary one, which causes a second dose of vaccine to have a bigger
effect than the first. Based on this result we show that there is a unique vaccination
fraction that results in the highest health benefit per dose of vaccine in a population
and introduce the term dose-optimal for this fraction.
We discuss the qualitative difference between dose-optimal and critical vaccination
coverage, where the latter aims at maximizing health benefits. We show that policy
makers should stop vaccinating before the health benefits are maximized in order to
achieve the most efficient allocation. When vaccines are scarce, the final doses needed
to maximize health benefits in a population yield more in another population.
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We characterize the solution of the vaccine allocation problem and we show the
crucial importance of the dose-optimal vaccination fraction. A single dose of vaccine
may be a drop in the ocean, but multiple doses together can save a population.
Policy makers should therefore select a subset of populations to which the vaccines
are allocated. By focusing on a limited number of populations, the available vaccine
stockpile is used more efficiently than by allocating pro rata over all populations.
In the distribution of vaccines many logistical aspects play a role, ranging from
transporting the vaccines from a central warehouse to health facilities, to setting up
points of dispensing where people can be vaccinated. Allocating vaccines only to
certain populations, might be easier from an logistical viewpoint than allocating to
all populations. On the other hand, if vaccines are stockpiled locally, redistributing
vaccines might lead to coordination problems (cf., Mamani et al. 2013). Further
research could study the logistical consequences of vaccine allocation.
Vaccine allocation has an ethical dimension, unlike many other resource alloca-
tion problems where equity does not play a role. In this chapter, we distinguish
between groups of people based on geography. Others use age groups or risk groups
(e.g., Mylius et al. 2008, Medlock et al. 2009, Goldstein et al. 2009, 2012). Although
prioritizing based on geography might seem unfair, geography might play a role in
outbreaks of influenza, measles or in bioterror attacks. In the past, there have been
outbreaks with large regional differences such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention 2009b). In situations with a large asymmetry
between the regions, a geographic assymetric approach is perhaps more easily ac-
cepted. However, our results also show that sometimes asymmetric choices should
be made in symmetric cases (e.g., two regions with the same parameters and disease
progression). In those situations, our optimal allocation is less politically viable, and
new ideas are needed to reconcile equity and efficiency in such cases.
Thus, the policy that we describe as optimal need not be the best policy if we also
take equity considerations into account. The CDC for example uses ethical guidelines
in decision making on influenza pandemics (Kinlaw and Levine 2007). These ethical
guidelines are the result of an ethical debate on finding good vaccine allocations. The
results derived in this chapter can be a valuable contribution to this ethical debate.
Our optimal allocations can be used as a benchmark to determine the effects on the
final size of an epidemic if a suboptimal policy is selected motivated by fairness. Next
to that, policy makers can use strategies in which they balance between efficiency
3.A The herd effect function 85
and equity. For example, they can reserve part of the vaccine stockpile for pro rata
allocation and allocate the remaining vaccines optimally (cf. Kaplan and Merson
2002, Wu et al. 2007). Another possibility is to add equity constraints that either
set minimum levels for vaccination in each region or restrict the relative difference
between populations (Teytelman and Larson 2013). Our relatively simple model, and
the analytical results we obtained for it, could be a valuable starting point to test
ideas on balancing equity, political viability, and effectiveness of vaccine allocations.
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Appendix
3.A The herd effect function
In this chapter, we study the herd effect of vaccination, denoted by the function
Gj(fj). In Section 3.3.2 we have defined Gj(fj) as the final fraction of people sus-
ceptible in population j after vaccinating a fraction fj of the susceptible people at
time τ . More precisely, for fj ∈ [0, sj(τ)]
Gj(fj) = lim
t→∞ sj(t), (3.7)
with sj(t) evolving according to the differential equations of the SIR model (3.1) for
t > τ . In this appendix, we present and analyze an alternative formulation of the
herd effect Gj(fj), which forms the basis of the structural analysis of the herd effect.
3.A.1 Implicit formulation of the herd effect
Based on the differential equations of the SIR model we derive an implicit expression
for the herd effect. From (3.1) the following equation follows, which presents the
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relation between ij(t) and sj(t) at any time t (Hethcote 1976):
ij(t) = −sj(t) + log(sj(t))
σj
+ s0,j + i0,j − log(s0,j)
σj
(3.8)
Above relation characterizes the state of the system at any point in time, but prior to
vaccination. Upon vaccination at time τ the state of the system changes from state
(sj(τ), ij(τ)) to state (sj(τ)− fj , ij(τ)). Hence, the state (sj(τ)− fj , ij(τ)) directly
after vaccination can be seen as a new initial state, where ij(τ) can be obtained from
(3.8). Gj(fj) is then obtained from (3.8) by setting ij(t) = 0 and thus is the unique
solution to:
0 = −Gj(fj) + log(Gj(fj))
σj
+ sj(τ)− fj + ij(τ)− log(sj(τ)− fj)
σj
⇔ 0 = −Gj(fj) + log(Gj(fj))
σj
+ s0,j + i0,j − 1
σj
log
(
s0,j
(
1− fj
sj(τ)
))
− fj
(3.9)
Above equation holds for all i0,j > 0. The value of Gj(fj) in the limit i0,j ↓ 0 can
be determined by substituting i0,j = 0. (3.9) extends the final size equation to any
initial state. The original final size equation can be recovered for fj = 0, s0,j → 1 and
i0,j → 0 (see e.g., Kermack and McKendrick (1927), Ma and Earn (2006), Diekmann
et al. (2013) and Keeling and Shattock (2012)). We refer to Appendix 3.E for an
alternative expression of Gj(fj) using the Lambert W function denoted by W (x) (cf.
Corless et al. 1996, Ma and Earn 2006).
3.A.2 Derivatives of the herd effect
We present implicit equations for the first and second order derivative of the function
G(f) with respect to f (we drop the subscript j for convenience). These derivatives
will appear in the next sections to prove the structural characteristics of the herd
effect G(f). Denote by G′(f) and G′′(f) respectively the first and second order
derivative of the function G(f) with respect to f which can be derived from (3.9):
G′(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
= 1
σ(s(τ)− f) − 1 (3.10)
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G′′(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
= 1
σ(s(τ)− f)2 −
1
σ
[
G′(f)
G(f)
]2
⇔ G′′(f) = G(f)
2 − [G′(f)(s(τ)− f)]2
(σG(f)− 1)G(f)(s(τ)− f)2
(3.11)
3.B Analysis of the herd effect
This appendix consists of theorems that describe the characteristics of the function
G(f). The proofs for Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 are presented as
well as other results required for these proofs. This appendix is structured as follows.
We start with deriving bounds on the herd effect in Section 3.B.1. Section 3.B.2
focuses on the structure of the function G(f). In Section 3.B.3 we formally derive
and study the dose-optimal vaccination fraction.
We need that the differential equations (3.1) have a solution s(t), i(t) and r(t)
for all t which conforms to intuition: all fractions are between 0 and 1, s(t) is non-
increasing over time and r(t) non-decreasing over time. We omit this technical result
for brevity.
3.B.1 Bounds on the herd effect
In the following three theorems we formally proof which values are feasible for G(f).
Theorem 3.B.1. It holds that G(f) > 0 for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)) and limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0.
Proof. Consider the characterization of G(f) in (3.28).
Note that W [0] = 0 and W [x] < 0 for −1e ≤ x < 0 (Appendix 3.E). In our case
x = −σ exp{−σB(f, σ)}, with limf↑s(τ)B(f, σ) = +∞. Thus, x < 0 for f ∈ [0, s(τ))
and approaches 0 for f ↑ s(τ). Therefore, W [x] < 0 and G(f) > 0 for f ∈ [0, s(τ))
and limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0.
Theorem 3.B.2. It holds that G(f) < 1σ for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)] under the assumption
that i0 > 0.
Proof. The differential equations in (3.1) show that i(t) is maximized when s(t) =
1/σ. Note that G(f) describes the fraction of people susceptible, when the pandemic
has died out. Therefore, if G(f) = 1/σ, the function i(t) is maximal when the
pandemic has died out, so i(t) is at most equal to 0. This contradicts our assumption
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that i0 > 0. Using the same argument, it can be noted that it is not possible for G(f)
to be greater than 1/σ. As long as s(t) > 1/σ, the number of infectives is increasing,
thereby reducing s(t). In a final state, when i(+∞) = 0, it must always hold that
the fraction of susceptible people is below 1/σ, which completes the proof.
Theorem 3.B.3. It holds that G(f) < s(τ)− f for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)) for vaccination
in an infected population.
Proof. Upon vaccination the system changes from state (s(τ), i(τ)) to state (s(τ)−
f, i(τ)). By assumption we have that s(τ) > 0 and i(τ) > 0 for vaccination in
an infected population. By the differential equations in (3.1) this implies that the
derivative of s(t) directly after vaccination is negative. As G(f) = limt→+∞ s(t) (3.2)
and s(t) is non-increasing over time, we have that G(f) < s(τ + ) ≤ s(τ)− f .
3.B.2 Analysis of the structure of the herd effect
This section is dedicated to deriving structural results on the herd effect G(f). This
is done by analyzing the derivatives of this function as presented in Section 3.A.2.
Lemma 3.B.1. The function G(f) is twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)) in
case of vaccination in an infected population (i0 > 0) and twice differentiable for all
f ∈ [0, s(τ)) with f 6= s(τ) − 1σ in case of vaccination in a completely susceptible
population (the limit i0 ↓ 0).
Proof. We prove the following four statements consecutively:
(i). The function G(f) is differentiable for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)) for vaccination in an
infected population.
(ii). In case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population (i.e., s0 > 0, i0 = 0
and s(τ) = s0) the function G(f) is indifferentiable if and only if f∗ = s(τ)− 1σ
or f = s(τ).
(iii). The function G(f) is twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)) in case of vaccina-
tion in an infected population.
(iv). The function G(f) is twice differentiable for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)) except for f =
f∗ = s(τ)− 1σ in case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population.
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We start the proof:
(i). Note that vaccination in an infected population means i(τ) > 0 and i0 >
0 which implies G(f) < 1σ by Theorem 3.B.2. For G(f) =
1
σ the function
G′(f) is not defined as can be seen in (3.10). However, this does not occur for
vaccination in an infected population (Theorem 3.B.2). The function G(f) :
[0, s(τ)] → R. We therefore also analyze the existence of the derivative at the
boundaries f = 0 and f = s(τ). Because G(0) < 1σ by Theorem 3.B.2:
lim
f↓0
G′(f) = 1[
1− 1σG(0)
] ( 1
σs(τ) − 1
)
(3.12)
By Theorem 3.B.1 we have limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0 < 1σ and thus limf↑s(τ)G′(f) <
0.
(ii). First we will prove that the given vaccination fractions indeed render G(f) to be
indifferentiable. Consider the explicit expression for G(f) in (3.28) and insert
the parameter settings for vaccination in a completely susceptible population
and the value for f∗:
G(f) = −1
σ
W [−σ exp{− log(σ)− 1}] = −1
σ
W [− exp{−1}] = 1
σ
By (i) the function G(f) is indifferentiable at f∗, because G(f∗) = 1σ . Part (i)
also states that G(f) is indifferentiable at f = s(τ). Now we will also prove that
for vaccination in a completely susceptible population G(f) is differentiable for
all f ∈ [0, 1) for which f 6= f∗. By definition of the Lambert W function,
W (y(f)), this function is differentiable for all y(f) /∈ {0,−1/e} (Corless et al.
1996). Let G(f) = −1σ W [y(f)], with y(f) = −σ(s(τ) − f) exp {−σ(s(τ)− f)}
for vaccination in a completely susceptible population (3.28). Clearly y(f) < 0,
since f < s(τ). Thus, we only need to investigate for which f the function
y(f) = − exp{−1}. Note that this only holds for: σ(s(τ) − f) = 1 ⇔ f =
s(τ)− 1σ = f∗
(iii). By (3.10) and (3.11) G(f) is twice differentiable unless one of the following
conditions holds: G(f) = 1σ , f = s(τ), G(f) = 0. In Theorem 3.B.1 we showed
that G(f) > 0 for all f ∈ [0, 1). By Theorem 3.B.2 we know that G(f) < 1σ for
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vaccination in an infected population and since limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0, part (iii)
follows directly.
(iv). For vaccination in a completely susceptible population we showed that G(f) =
1
σ ⇔ f = f∗ in part (ii), which proves part (iv).
Theorem 3.1. There is a unique vaccination fraction f∗ = max
(
s(τ)− 1σ , 0
)
that
maximizes the herd effect: the herd effect G(f) is increasing in f for all f < f∗,
maximized for f = f∗ and decreasing for f > f∗.
Proof. By Theorem 3.B.1 the function G′(f) is not defined for f = s(τ), but we
know that limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0. We analyze the derivative G′(f) (3.10). Because
G(f) < 1σ for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)] (Theorem 3.B.2), the function G(f) is maximized for
f = f∗ = s(τ)− 1σ . It is increasing for f < f∗ and decreasing for f > f∗. Note that
for s(τ) ≤ 1σ we get f∗ ≤ 0 and thus the function G(f) is only decreasing in that
case.
Lemma 3.B.2. Let G′′(f) be the second derivative of the function G(f) with respect
to f . Then for i0 > 0 the following holds:
(i). G′′(f) = 0 if and only if G(f) = 2σ − (s(τ)− f).
(ii). G′′(f) > 0 if and only if G(f) > 2σ − (s(τ)− f).
(iii). G′′(f) < 0 for f ≥ s(τ)− 1σ and G′′(f) < 0 if and only if G(f) < 2σ − (s(τ)−f)
for f < s(τ)− 1σ .
Proof. We analyze G′′(f) which is presented in (3.11). Because limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0
(Theorem 3.B.1), the function G′′(f) is not defined for f = s(τ). We prove the three
statements of the lemma:
(i). We analyze G′′(f) = 0 and consider that G(f) < 1σ (Theorem 3.B.2):
G′′(f) = 0⇔ G(f)
2 − [G′(f)(s(τ)− f)]2
(σG(f)− 1)G(f)(s(τ)− f)2 = 0
⇔ G(f)2 − [G′(f)(s(τ)− f)]2 = 0
⇔ G(f)2 =
[
[1− σ(s(τ)− f)]G(f)
[σG(f)− 1]
]2
⇔ [1− σ(s(τ)− f)]2 = [σG(f)− 1]2
(3.13)
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In the second step we use that (σG(f) − 1)G(f)(s(τ) − f)2 6= 0, which holds
for all f < s(τ) by Theorems 3.B.1 and 3.B.2. In the third step we substitute
(3.10). Thus G′′(f) = 0 if and only if one of the following two relations holds:
1− σ(s(τ)− f) = σG(f)− 1⇔ G(f) = 2
σ
− (s(τ)− f) if f < s(τ)− 1
σ
1− σ(s(τ)− f) = 1− σG(f)⇔ G(f) = (s(τ)− f) if f > s(τ)− 1
σ
By Theorem 3.B.3 G(f) < (s(τ) − f) which implies that the second relation
cannot hold. Thus, G′′(f) = 0 if and only if the first relation holds. The
functionG′′(f) = 0 on the interval
[
0, s(τ)− 1σ
)
for the value of f which satisfies
G(f) = 2σ − (s(τ)− f).
(ii). Consider the second expression in (3.11), by Theorems 3.B.1 and 3.B.2 we have:
(σG(f)− 1)G(f)(s(τ)− f)2 < 0 for f < 1 From (3.13) we derive:
G′′(f) > 0⇔ G(f)2 − [G′(f)(s(τ)− f)]2 < 0
⇔ G(f)2 <
[
[1− σ(s(τ)− f)]G(f)
[σG(f)− 1]
]2
⇔ [1− σ(s(τ)− f)]2 > [σG(f)− 1]2
Thus G′′(f) > 0 if and only if one of the following two relations hold:
1− σ(s(τ)− f) < σG(f)− 1⇔ G(f) > 2
σ
− (s(τ)− f) if f < s(τ)− 1
σ
1− σ(s(τ)− f) > 1− σG(f)⇔ G(f) > (s(τ)− f) if f ≥ s(τ)− 1
σ
By Theorem 3.B.3 the second relation cannot hold and thus G′′(f) > 0 if and
only if G(f) > 2σ − (s(τ)− f), which can only hold for f < s(τ)− 1σ .
(iii). Analogous to the previous proof we have: G′′(f) < 0 ⇔ [1 − σ(s(τ) − f)]2 <
[σG(f)− 1]2 Thus, G′′(f) < 0 if and only if one of the following two relations
hold:
1− σ(s(τ)− f) > σG(f)− 1⇔ G(f) < 2
σ
− (s(τ)− f) if f < s(τ)− 1
σ
1− σ(s(τ)− f) < 1− σG(f)⇔ G(f) < (s(τ)− f) if f ≥ s(τ)− 1
σ
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By Theorem 3.B.3 the second relation is satisfied and thus G′′(f) < 0 for all
f ≥ s(τ) − 1σ . For f < s(τ) − 1σ we have that G′′(f) < 0 if and only if
G(f) < 2σ − (s(τ)− f).
Theorem 3.B.4. The derivative of G(f) with respect to f , denoted by G′(f), is
bounded from above by 1, i.e., G′(f) < 1 ∀f ∈ [0, s(τ)]
Proof. From (3.10) we have:
G′(f)
[
1− 1
σG(f)
]
= 1
σ(s(τ)− f) − 1⇔ G
′(f) = σG(f)
σG(f)− 1 ·
1− σ(s(τ)− f)
σ(s(τ)− f)
(3.14)
From Lemma 3.B.2 we note that G′(f) has an extreme under the following condition:
G(f) = 2
σ
− (s(τ)− f) (3.15)
By contradiction we assume that there exists a vaccination fraction f¯ for which
G′(f¯) ≥ 1 and assume that f¯ meets condition (3.15), then:
G′(f¯) = 2− σ(s(τ)− f¯)
σ(s(τ)− f¯) ≥ 1⇔ f¯ > s(τ)−
1
σ
We arrive at a contradiction, because by Theorem 3.1 we have that G′(f) < 0 for all
f > s(τ)− 1σ . Thus, G′(f) < 1 for all f that are an extreme for G′(f). This completes
the proof that G′(f) < 1 for all f ∈ (0, s(τ)). We consider the two boundary cases:
f = 0 and f = s(τ). From Lemma 3.B.1 we know that limf↑s(τ)G′(f) < 0 and thus
the lemma is satisfied for f = s(τ). For limf↓0G′(f), we distinguish between three
cases:
(i). if G′′(0) = 0: then f = 0 is an extreme of the function G′(f) for which the
derivative is strictly smaller than 1.
(ii). if G′′(0) > 0: then for a very small  > 0 we have G′() > limf↓0G′(f) and
G′(f) < 1 for all f ∈ (0, s(τ)]. Thus also limf↓0G′(f) < 1.
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(iii). if G′′(0) < 0: then from Lemma 3.B.2 we have that G(0) < 2σ −s(τ). By (3.12)
we have:
lim
f↓0
G′(f) = 1[
1− 1σG(0)
] ( 1
σs(τ) − 1
)
Since G(f) < 1σ by Theorem 3.B.2, we have limf↓0G′(f) < 0 in case s(τ) <
1
σ .
In that case the theorem is satisfied. For s(τ) > 1σ we substituteG(0) <
2
σ−s(τ)
in (3.12):
lim
f↓0
G′(f) <
[
2− σs(τ)
1− σs(τ)
](
1− σs(τ)
σs(τ)
)
= 2
σs(τ) − 1 < 1
This completes the proof that G′(f) < 1 for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)].
Theorem 3.2. There exists a unique vaccination fraction f¯ with 0 ≤ f¯ ≤ f∗ such
that G(f) is strictly convex (G′′(f) > 0) for all f < f¯ and strictly concave (G′′(f) <
0) for all f > f¯ .
Proof. By (3.11) note that G′′(f) is a continuous function for f < s(τ), because both
G(f) and G′(f) are continuous by Lemma 3.B.1. Consider the function M(f) =
G(f) − 2σ + (s(τ) − f). From Lemma 3.B.2 we have that f¯ must satisfy G(f¯) =
2
σ − (s(τ)− f¯), i.e. M(f¯) = 0. Denote by M ′(f) the derivative of M(f) with respect
to f : By Theorem 3.B.4 we have M ′(f) < 0. This implies that M(f) = 0 has
only one solution and thus there is only one f¯ for which G′′(f¯) = 0. As G′′(f) is a
continuous function this implies that on either side of f¯ the function G(f) is either
convex or concave.
By Lemma 3.B.2 we have G′′(f) < 0 for f ≥ s(τ)− 1σ and thus G(f) is concave
for f > f¯ . Since M ′(f) < 0 and M(f¯) = 0 it holds that M(f) > 0 for f < f¯ . By
Lemma 3.B.2 this implies that G(f) is convex for all f < f¯ , which proves the convex-
concave shape of the function G(f). Note that this prove only holds for i0 > 0. In
case i0 = 0 we refer to Lemma 3.B.3. By Lemma 3.B.2 G(f) is concave for f ≥ f∗,
such that f¯ ≤ f∗. This completes the proof of this theorem.
Lemma 3.B.3. In case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population, the
function G(f) is convex for all f < f∗ and concave for all f > f∗, where f∗ =
s(τ)− 1σ .
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Proof. By Lemma 3.B.1(ii) we have that G(f∗) = 1σ for vaccination in a completely
susceptible population. Since the vaccination fraction f∗ also maximizes the function
G(f) (Theorem 3.1), it holds that G(f) < 1σ for all f 6= f∗. In Lemma 3.B.2 we
derived conditions for G(f) to be convex or concave where we needed that G(f) < 1σ .
These conditions can still be used if we apply them only to f 6= f∗.
G′′(f) > 0⇔ G(f) > 2
σ
− (s(τ)− f) and G′′(f) < 0⇔ G(f) < 2
σ
− (s(τ)− f)
Note that for f∗ we have G(f∗) = 1σ =
2
σ − (s(τ)−f∗). By Theorem 3.1 the function
G(f) is decreasing for f > f∗, whereas the expression 2σ−(s(τ)−f) is increasing in f .
This implies that G(f) is concave for all f > f∗. The function G(f) is increasing for
f < f∗, just as the expression on the right hand side in the conditions for convexity
and concavity. By Theorem 3.B.4 the expression 2σ − (s(τ) − f) increases with a
faster rate than G(f). This implies that G(f) is convex for all f < f∗.
Theorem 3.3. For the structure of G(f) we can distinguish three cases based on
s(τ), the proportion of susceptibles at the moment of vaccination τ :
(i) C < s(τ) < 1: We have f∗ > f¯ > 0. Thus G(f) is increasing and convex
between 0 and f¯ , increasing and concave between f¯ and f∗, and decreasing and
concave above f∗.
(ii) 1/σ < s(τ) ≤ C: We have f∗ > 0 and f¯ = 0. Thus G(f) is increasing and
concave between 0 and f∗, and decreasing and concave above f∗.
(iii) 0 ≤ s(τ) < 1/σ: We have f¯ = f∗ = 0. Thus G(f) is decreasing and concave
everywhere.
Proof. From Theorem 3.2 it follows that f¯ ≤ f∗. It therefore suffices to proof the
following two steps:
(a) f∗ > 0 if s(τ) > 1/σ and f∗ = 0 otherwise.
(b) f¯ > 0 if s(τ) > C and f¯ = 0 otherwise.
The proof is given below:
(a) This follows directly from Theorem 3.1: f∗ = max
(
s(τ)− 1σ , 0
)
.
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(b) We start from deriving the value C. By Theorem 3.2 the function G(f) has a
convex and a concave part for certain parameter settings. By Lemma 3.B.2 the
following condition must hold for G(f) to be convex: G(f) > 2σ − (s(τ) − f).
Since G(f) is convex for all values f below a certain threshold, the following
condition requires that the function G(f) has a convex part:
G(0) > 2
σ
− s(τ) (3.16)
We solve above inequality with equality to obtain the value C. By substituting
in (3.9) this results in the following, where H(x) = −x+ 1σ log(x):
0 = − 2
σ
+ s(τ) + 1
σ
log
(
2
σ
− s(τ)
)
+ s0 + i0 − 1
σ
log(s0)
H
[
2
σ
− s(τ)
]
= H[s0]− i0
s(τ) = W [−σ exp{kσ}] + 2
σ
= C with k = H[s0]− i0
We know that −1 < W [−σ exp{kσ}] < 0 (cf. Appendix 3.E) and thus 1σ < C <
2
σ . Note that for s(τ) ≤ 1σ condition (3.16) is never met by Theorem 3.B.2.
By Theorem 3.B.1 the condition is always met for s(τ) ≥ 2σ . Thus only for
s(τ) > C the function G(f) has a convex part and for s(τ) = C we have f¯ = 0.
This completes the proof of this theorem.
3.B.3 The dose-optimal vaccination fraction
We present the dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ and relate it to the vaccination
fractions f∗ and f¯ as defined in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 respectively.
Corollary 3.4. The function D(f) as defined by (3.4) is maximized by the unique
vaccination fraction f˜ for which G′(f˜) = D(f˜). The function D(f) is increasing for
f < f˜ and decreasing for f > f˜ .
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Proof. The function D(f) is defined as follows: D(f) = 1f [G(f)−G(0)].
d
df
D(f) = 1
f
[G′(f)−D(f)]
d2
df2
D(f) = 1
f
G′′(f)− 2
f2
[G′(f)−D(f)]
By the first derivative of D(f), f˜ is clearly an extreme of the function D(f). Observe
that in the limit f ↓ 0 is always a solution of the condition G′(f˜) = D(f), by limit
definition of the one-sided derivative. For parameter settings for which the function
G(f) does not have a convex part, the functionD(f) is maximized for f = 0. Namely,
in that case G(f) is concave, meaning that the slope of G(f) is decreasing in f .
The average slope on the interval [0, f ], measured by D(f), is then also decreasing.
Analogously, D(f) is increasing as long as G(f) is convex. This implies that f = 0
cannot maximize the function D(f) if G(f) has a convex domain and that f˜ is in the
concave domain of G(f).
Assume that f˜ is the first value in the concave domain for which G′(f˜) = D(f).
Because of concavity it holds that G(f) for all f > f˜ is below the line through G(0)
and G(f˜). For all f > f˜ this implies:
1
f
[G(f)−G(0)] < 1
f˜
[
G(f˜)−G(0)]
Let f1 be an arbitrarily selected value greater than f˜ . Because of concavity the
function G(f) for all f > f1 is below the line through G(0) and G(f1). This implies
that D(f) is decreasing for f > f˜ . Thus, there is only one strictly positive solution
for the condition G′(f) = D(f), which is in the concave and increasing domain of
G(f). By the second derivative of D(f), f˜ gives a maximum.
Lemma 3.5. Consider the following three vaccination fractions: f∗ as defined in
Theorem 3.1, f¯ as defined in Theorem 3.2 and f˜ as defined in Corollary 3.1. The
following relation holds: f¯ ≤ f˜ ≤ f∗
Proof. By Lemma 3.B.2 we know that G′′(f) ≤ 0⇔ G(f) ≤ 2σ − (s(τ)− f). Filling
in the expression for f∗ = s(τ) − 1σ results in G(f∗) ≤ 1σ . This clearly holds by
Theorem 3.B.2 and thus f¯ ≤ f∗, due to Theorem 3.2. The optimal vaccination
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fraction f˜ is defined as the fraction that maximizes the function D(f) and meets the
condition G′(f˜) = D(f˜). Observe that D(f˜) ≥ 0, because limf↓0D(f) = 0 and f˜
maximizes D(f). This implies that G′(f˜) ≥ 0 and thus f˜ ≤ f∗ by Theorem 3.1. By
argument we showed in Corollary 3.1 that f˜ cannot be in the convex domain of the
function G(f), such that f¯ ≤ f˜ . This completes the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 3.B.4. For increasing σ the dose-optimal vaccine fraction f˜ converges to
f∗.
Proof. The basic reproduction ratio is denoted by σ. By Lemma 3.2 it suffices to show
that limσ↑+∞ f∗ − f¯ = 0. By definition we have limσ↑+∞ f∗ = limσ↑+∞ s(τ) − 1σ =
s(τ). Clearly, for σ ↑ +∞ and f¯ = s(τ) the condition G(f¯) = 2σ − (s(τ) − f¯) is
satisfied, as limf↑s(τ)G(f) = 0 by Theorem 3.B.1. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.B.5. In case of vaccination in a completely susceptible population f¯ =
f˜ = f∗.
Proof. This result follows directly from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.B.3.
3.B.4 The best vaccination moment
In Section 3.4.5 we state that it is optimal to vaccinate as early as possible in an
ideal world. We prove this in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.B.6. The herd effect G(f) is increasing in s(τ).
Proof. Let G′s(τ)(f, s(τ)) be the derivative of G(f, s(τ)) with respect to s(τ):
G′s(τ)(f, s(τ))
[
1− 1
σG(f, s(τ))
]
= −f
σs(τ)[s(τ)− f ]
Observe that the objective function is increasing in s(τ), because G(f, s(τ)) < 1σ by
Theorem 3.B.2. Therefore, to maximize the herd effect one should vaccinate as soon
as possible, i.e., when s(τ) is as high as possible.
3.C Generality of the function G(f)
One of the extensions to the standard SIR compartmental model, is the SInR model
with n different consecutive infectious stages. Let s(t) and r(t) denote the fraction
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of people respectively susceptible and removed at time t. The fractions of people
susceptible in every state are given by ik(t) for k = 1, ..., n. Interpretation dictates
that s(t) +
∑n
k=1 ik(t) + r(t) = 1 for all t. Let βk and γk denote respectively the
transmission rate and recovery rate in infectious stage k. The differential equations
for the SInR model are:
ds
dt
= −s
n∑
k=1
βkik
di1
dt
= s
n∑
k=1
βkik − γ1i1
dik
dt
= γk−1ik−1 − γkik k = 2, ..., n
dr
dt
= γnin
(3.17)
Hyman et al. (1999) prove that R0 =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
for this model, with R0 denoting the
basic reproduction ratio.
Theorem 3.C.1. Up to a constant, the expression for G(f) given in (3.9) also
applies to the SInR model with σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
.
Proof. The following relation can be derived from (3.17), using σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
. Anal-
ogous to Ma and Earn (2006) we define Gk(t) =
∑n
j=k+1 ij(t) + r(t), Gn(t) = r(t).
From (3.17) this implies that ddtGk(t) = γkik.∫ ∞
0
1
s(t)ds =−
n∑
k=1
βk
∫ ∞
0
ik(t)dt⇔
log(s(t))− log(s(0)) =−
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
[Gk(t)−Gk(0)]
=σ
[
s(t) +
n∑
k=1
ik(t)
]
− σ
[
s(0) +
n∑
k=1
ik(0)
]
−
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
[
n∑
m=k+1
im(t)− im(0)
]
(3.18)
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We let t → ∞ and use that ik(∞) = 0 for k = 1, ..., n. This results in the following
expression, which is equal to the expression for the SIR (3.9) model up to a constant:
0 = −s(∞) + 1
σ
log(s(∞))− 1
σ
log(s(0)) + s(0) +
n∑
k=1
ik(0)− 1
σ
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
n∑
m=k+1
im(0)
(3.19)
We vaccinate a fraction f of the population at time τ . Analogous to the analysis of
the SIR model, we let (s(τ)− f, i1(τ), ..., in(τ)) be a new initial state and define the
value s(∞) according to (3.19). The values for ik(τ) for k = 1, ..., n can be calculated
according to (3.18). We define G(f) = limt→∞ s(t), where s(t) follows (3.17) for
t > τ . This results in the following:
0 =−G(f) + 1
σ
log(G(f))− 1
σ
log
(
s(0)
(
1− f
s(τ)
))
+ s(0) +
n∑
k=1
ik(0)
− f − 1
σ
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
n∑
m=k+1
im(0)
(3.20)
Above expression equals the expression for the SIR model (3.9) up to the final term,
which is a constant.
Lemma 3.6. The results of Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.3 and Corol-
lary 3.1 also apply to the SInR model with σ =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
. In particular, for each
SInR model with given initial conditions there exist vaccination fractions f¯ , f˜ and
f∗ that together characterize the convex-concave and increasing-decreasing shape of
the herd effect.
Proof. By Theorem 3.C.1 the expression for G(f) in the SInR model is equal to the
expression in the SIR model up to a constant. This constant disappears after taking
the derivative, implying that the first and second order derivative do not change.
The structural properties of the function G(f) thus carry over.
3.D Optimal vaccine allocation
In this appendix, we characterize the optimal solution to the vaccine allocation prob-
lem of Section 3.3.3. We first derive a basic result in Section 3.D.1: that it is subop-
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timal to leave vaccines unused. The main derivation of the optimality conditions is
presented in Section 3.D.2.
3.D.1 The total effect of vaccination
We formally show that it is optimal to use the entire available vaccine stockpile.
Thereto we define the function Fj(fj) as the total effect of vaccinating with a fraction
fj in population j:
Fj(fj) = Gj(fj) + fj (3.21)
Observe that the dose-optimal vaccination fraction f˜ as defined by Corollary 3.1
does not only result in the highest additional herd effect per dose of vaccine, but also
in the highest additional total effect per dose of vaccine. Formally, f˜ also maximizes
the average slope of the total effect F (f) on the interval [0, f ], calculated as [F (f)−
F (0)]/f . As vaccinating with the fraction f˜ is very efficient per dose of vaccine, the
optimal allocation tries to allocate as close as possible to f˜ in a subset of all the
populations as can be seen in Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 3.D.1. The fraction of people not infected during the epidemic, Fj(fj) =
Gj(fj) + fj, is increasing in fj for all fj ∈ [0, sj(τ)).
Proof. We prove this theorem for a single population and therefore drop the subscript
j in the proof. Let F ′(f) denote the derivative of F (f) with respect to f :F ′(f) =
d
df F (f) = G′(f) + 1. By Theorem 3.1 G′(f) > 0 for all f < s(τ)− 1σ and G′(f) < 0
for all f > s(τ) − 1σ . Hence, the function F (f) is increasing for all f < s(τ) − 1σ .
F (f) is increasing under the following condition:
F ′(f) = G′(f) + 1 = σG(f)
σG(f)− 1
[
1
σ(s(τ)− f) − 1
]
+ 1
= 1
σG(f)− 1
[
G(f)
(s(τ)− f) − 1
]
> 0
By Theorem 3.B.2 F ′(f) > 0 if and only if G(f) < (s(τ) − f), which holds by
Theorem 3.B.3 for all f ∈ [0, s(τ)). Thus the function F (f) is increasing for all
f ∈ [0, s(τ)).
Because the functions Fj(fj) are all non-decreasing there always exists an optimal
solution for which all available vaccines are used:
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Lemma 3.D.1. The vaccine allocation problem always has an optimal solution for
which
∑
j∈J fjNj = V .
Proof. Let xj for all j ∈ J be a solution of the vaccine allocation problem and assume
that
∑
j∈J xjNj < V . Let yj for all j ∈ J be the solution for which yj ≥ xj for all
j ∈ J , such that ∑j∈J yjNj = V . By Lemma 3.D.1 the functions Fj(f) are non-
decreasing and thus Fi(yi) ≥ Fj(xj) for all j ∈ J . This implies that:
∑
j∈J NjFj(yj) ≥∑
j∈J NjFj(xj). Hence, the proposed solution yj for all j ∈ J for which
∑
j∈J yjNj =
V is also an optimal solution.
3.D.2 Optimality conditions
Theorem 3.2 establishes that resource allocation Problem (3.2) is a knapsack problem
with S-shaped return functions: non-decreasing and convex for all x smaller than
some value xˆ and concave for all x > xˆ (cf. Ginsberg (1974) and Ağralı and Geunes
(2009)). As the vaccine allocation problem is a maximization problem with inequality
constraints, necessary conditions for the optimum are given by the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions. Let δ be the KKT multiplier for the capacity constraint,
λj for the non-negativity constraint fj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J and µj for the constraint
fj ≤ sj(τ) for all j ∈ J . Denote by f ,λ, µ the vectors with the variables fj , λj and
µj respectively. Let L(f ,λ, µ, δ) denote the Lagrange function of the maximization
problem. The KKT conditions for this problem are given in (3.22). Observe that the
marginal efficiency ω, as introduced in Section 3.5.1, follows from the KKT condition
that the partial derivative of L(f ,λ, µ, δ) with respect to fj equals 0 for all j ∈ J .
L(f ,λ, µ, δ) =
∑
j∈J
NjFj(fj)− δ
∑
j∈J
fjNj − V
−∑
j∈J
(µj(fj − sj(τ))− λjfj)
∂
∂fj
L(f ,λ, µ, δ) = 0 ∀j ∈ J
δ
∑
j∈J
fjNj − V
 = 0 δ ≥ 0
λjfj = 0 ∀j ∈ J λj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J
µj(fj − sj(τ)) = 0 ∀j ∈ J µj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J
(3.22)
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We analyze the solution to (3.2) using the KKT conditions. We first present the
solution to the general problem in Theorem 3.D.2. In Lemma 3.D.2 and Lemma 3.D.3
we discuss two simplifications. These enable us to proof the Central Insight in The-
orem 3.4.
Theorem 3.D.2. For every optimal solution to (3.2) there exist J ′ ⊆ J , k ∈ J ′ and
ω ≥ 0 such that:
(i). For all j ∈ J ′ \ {k}, fj is the unique solution to G′j(fj) = ω for which fj ≥ f¯j.
(ii). G′k(fk) = ω, and either fk is the unique solution to this equation for which
fk ≥ f¯k or fk is the unique solution for which fk < f¯k.
(iii). Either fj = 0 or fj = sj(τ) for every j ∈ J \ J ′.
Proof. The proof of this theorem consists of the following steps:
(a). Let J ′ ⊆ J such that 0 < fj < sj(τ) for all j ∈ J ′. We prove that G′j(fj) = ω
for all j ∈ J ′.
(b). We prove that for at most one population there is a strictly positive vaccination
fraction in the strictly convex domain, i.e. 0 < fk < f¯k for at most one k ∈ J ′.
We proof the two steps consecutively:
(a). This result follows from the KKT conditions. Note that for any population j
for which 0 < fj < sj(τ) the KKT conditions require that µj = 0 and λj = 0.
This gives the following:
∂
∂fj
L(f ,λ, µ, δ) = NjF ′j(fj)− δNj − µj + λj
= Nj
[
F ′j(fj)− δ
]
= 0⇔ F ′j(fj) = G′j(fj) + 1 = δ
Hence, G′j(fj) = ω, with ω = δ − 1.
(b). By contradiction assume there is an optimal solution with at least two strictly
positive variables in the convex domain. W.l.o.g. let 0 < fj < f¯j for j = 1, 2,
i.e. the functions F1(f) and F2(f) are convex at respectively f1 and f2. Choose
an 0 <  < min
{
f1, f2
N2
N1
, f¯1 − f1, (f¯2 − f2)N2N1
}
and let δ = N1N2 such that:
f1N1 + f2N2 = (f1 + )N1 + (f2 − δ)N2
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By the KKT conditions F ′1(f1) = F ′2(f2) and by convexity of F1(f1) and F2(f2)
the following can be derived:
N1F1(f1 + ) +N2F2(f2 − δ) > N1F1(f1) +N2F2(f2) + N1[F ′1(f1)− F ′2(f2)]
= N1F1(f1) +N2F2(f2)
Above relation shows that the objective function can be improved by a small
change in the allocation. Thus, a solution with more than one strictly positive
variable in the convex domain can never be optimal.
Lemma 3.D.2. If sj(τ) > 1σj for all j ∈ J , then there is no optimal solution to
(3.2) for which fj = 0 and fk = sk(τ) for two populations j, k ∈ J . This implies
that (iii) of Theorem 3.D.2 changes into: Either fj = 0 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}} or
fj = sj(τ) for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}}.
Proof. By contradiction assume that f1 = 0 and f2 = s2(τ) w.l.o.g. Let  > 0 and
δ = N1N2 < 1 such that:
f1N1 + f2N2 = (f1 + )N1 + (f2 − δ)N2
The following holds:
N1F1() +N2F2(s2(τ)− δ)−N1F1(0)−N2F2(s2(τ))
= N1[G1()−G1(0)] +N2[G2(s2(τ)− δ)−G2(s2(τ))] > 0
For sj(τ) > 1σj the function Gj(f) is initially increasing by Theorem 3.1, implying
that G1() > G1(0). Furthermore, by Theorem 3.B.1 Gj(fj) > 0 for all 0 ≤ fj <
sj(τ) and limfj↑sj(τ)Gj(fj) = 0. This implies that G2(s2(τ)−δ) > G2(s2(τ)). Thus,
a small change in allocation can improve the solution. We arrive at a contradiction
which completes the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 3.D.3. If sj(τ) > 1σj for all j ∈ J and V ≤
∑
j∈J Njf
∗
j then there is no
optimal solution to (3.2) with fj = sj(τ) for some j ∈ J . This implies that (iii) of
Theorem 3.D.2 changes into: fj = 0 for all j ∈ J \ {J ′ ∪ {k}}.
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Proof. By contradiction assume that there is a population k ∈ J for which fk = sk(τ)
in the optimal solution. Since sk(τ) > 1σk this implies that fk > f
∗
k = sk(τ) − 1σk .
Because V ≤ ∑j∈J Njf∗j there must also be a population l for which fl < f∗l
in the optimal allocation. Let  > 0 be sufficiently small such that fl +  < f∗l
and fk −  NlNk > f∗k . Then the following holds, where the inequality follows from
Theorem 3.1:
NlFl(fl + ) +NkFk
(
sk(τ)−  Nl
Nk
)
−NlFl(fl)−NkFk(sk(τ))
Nl [Gl(fl + )−Gl(fl)] +Nk
[
Gk(sk(τ))−Gk
(
sk(τ)−  Nl
Nk
)]
> 0
A small change in allocation can improve the solution. Hence, there cannot be an
optimal solution with fj = sj(τ) for some j ∈ J . We arrive at a contradiction
which proves the first part of this lemma. The implication then directly follows from
Lemma 3.D.2.
Theorem 3.4 (Central Insight). Every optimal solution to (3.2) can be characterized
as follows:
(i). A subset of populations J ′ ⊆ J is vaccinated with the regular fraction that
corresponds to marginal efficiency ω.
(ii). Possibly another population k is also vaccinated with marginal efficiency ω, but
with the exceptional fraction for which fk < f¯k.
(iii). The remaining populations are not vaccinated at all.
Proof. This theorem can be reformulated more analytically as follows: For every
optimal solution to (3.2) there exist J ′ ⊆ J , k ∈ J ′ and ω ≥ 0 such that:
(i). For all j ∈ J ′ \ {k}, fj is the unique solution to G′j(fj) = ω for which fj ≥ f¯j .
(ii). G′k(fk) = ω, and either fk is the unique solution to this equation for which
fk ≥ f¯k or fk is the unique solution for which fk < f¯k.
(iii). fj = 0 for all j ∈ J \ J ′.
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The proof then follows directly from Theorem 3.D.2, Lemma 3.D.2 and Lemma 3.D.3.
Theorem 3.5. Consider a set of populations J with ∀j: Gj(f) = G(f) and a total
available amount of resources equal to V . Let |J | = n and order the populations such
that N1 ≤ ... ≤ Nn. The optimal allocation for particular cases is as follows:
(a). if V < f˜N1, then allocate only to the smallest population. Set f1 = V/N1 and
fj = 0 for j = 2, ..., n.
(b). if V =
∑
j∈K f˜Nj for a subset K ⊆ J , then set fj = f˜ for j ∈ K and fj = 0
for j /∈ K.
(c). if V >
∑
j∈J f˜Nj, then allocate pro rata over all the populations: fj = V∑
j∈J Nj
for all j ∈ J .
Proof. This proof uses ideas that are also used in the proof of Proposition 1 of
Ginsberg (1974).
(a). Step (b) in the proof of Theorem 3.D.2 shows that an optimal allocation results
in at most one strictly positive vaccination fraction in the convex domain.
By this result, the proposed allocation follows directly from convexity of the
function G(·) for all f < f¯ < f˜ .
(b). The proposed allocation results in the maximum attainable value for the ob-
jective function for V available vaccines and is thus optimal.
(c). We prove the optimality of the proposed allocation using the items of Theo-
rem 3.D.2. More precisely, regarding item (iii) we show that fj = s(τ) cannot
occur for any j ∈ J ′ and we analyze the two types of strategies that remain.
Consider item (iii): for the special case of identical parameters it holds that
sj(τ) := s(τ) for all j ∈ J . We can show that an allocation with fj = s(τ) and
fk < s(τ) for arbitrary populations j, k ∈ J cannot be optimal:
NjF (fj − ) +NkF
(
fk + 
Nj
Nk
)
−NjF (fj)−NkF (fk) = Nj(F ′(fk)− F ′(fj)) > 0
The inequality follows because of the structure of the function F (·). Thus, it
is not optimal to set fj = s(τ) for some j ∈ J . Using this result, there are two
possible allocations remaining by Theorem 3.D.2:
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(i) Either the amount V is allocated pro rata over the populations in K ⊆ J .
i.e., fj = V∑
j∈K Nj
= xˆ and fj = 0 for all j /∈ K.
(ii) Or an amount ξ is allocated to one population k and the remaining (V −ξ)
is allocated pro rata over all populations in I ⊆ J\{k}. i.e., fk = ξ/Nk,
fj = V−ξ∑
j∈I Nj
= yˆ for j ∈ I and fj = 0 for all j /∈ I ∪ {k}.
First we consider scheme (i) and prove that it is optimal to allocate pro rata
over all populations, i.e., we show that it is optimal to let K equal J . Let zj
and xj respectively denote the pro rata allocation over K ⊂ J and over J , such
that zj = zˆ = V∑
j∈K Nj
for all j ∈ K and xj = xˆ = V∑
j∈J Nj
for all j ∈ J .
Note that zˆ > xˆ > f˜ , because V >
∑
j∈J Nj f˜ by assumption. This implies the
following inequality by Corollary 3.1:
[F (zˆ)− F (0)]/zˆ < [F (xˆ)− F (0)]/xˆ
⇔
∑
j∈K
NjF (zˆ)−
∑
j∈K
NjF (0) <
∑
j∈J
NjF (xˆ)−
∑
j∈J
NjF (0)
⇔
∑
j∈K
NjF (zˆ) +
∑
j /∈K
NjF (0) <
∑
j∈J
NjF (xˆ)
The first equivalence follows by substituting the definitions of xˆ and zˆ and the
second equivalence follows by rearranging terms. The last inequality shows
precisely that allocating pro rata over all populations gives a higher objective
value than allocating pro rata over K ⊂ J .
Second, we now consider allocation scheme (ii), in which an amount of ξ is
allocated to population k and the remaining V − ξ is allocated pro rata over
I ⊆ J\{k} to reach a vaccination fraction yˆ. We will show that allocation
scheme (ii) will never be superior to allocation scheme (i), in which the latter
allocates pro rata over all populations to reach a vaccination fraction xˆ. By
contradiction we assume that allocation (ii) is optimal and thus better than
allocation (i).
We first show that the vaccination fraction xˆ in allocation (i) is smaller than
the vaccination fraction yˆ in allocation (ii). By Theorem 3.D.2 ξ/Nk lies in
the convex domain of F (·), which implies ξ/Nk < f¯ < f˜ . We also know that
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f˜ < xˆ ≤ 1Nk (
∑
j∈J Nj −
∑
j∈I Nj)xˆ, where the first inequality follows because
xˆ > f˜ by V >
∑
j∈J Nj f˜ and the second inequality because I ⊆ J\{k}. By
combining the inequalities, we have that:
ξ/Nk <
1
Nk
(
∑
j∈J
Nj −
∑
j∈I
Nj)xˆ
⇔ ξ
∑
j∈J
Nj < V
∑
j∈J
Nj − V
∑
j∈I
Nj
⇔ V∑
j∈J Nj
<
V − ξ∑
j∈I Nj
The first equivalence follows from xˆ = V∑
j∈J Nj
and in the second equivalence
we rewrite terms. Note that the last inequality is precisely xˆ < yˆ.
We now compare allocation (i) and (ii). Under the assumption that (ii) is better
than (i), the following must hold:
NkF (ξ/Nk) +
∑
j∈I
NjF (yˆ) +
∑
j /∈I∪{k}
NjF (0) >
∑
j∈J
NjF (xˆ)
⇔NkG(ξ/Nk) +
∑
j∈I
NjG(yˆ) +
∑
j /∈I∪{k}
NjG(0) >
∑
j∈J
NjG(xˆ)
(3.23)
The equivalence above follows from the fact that both allocations allocate the
same amount of vaccines, i.e., the direct effect is the same. Hence, it suffices to
consider the herd effect instead of the total effect. (3.23) implies the following:
NkG
(
ξ
Nk
)
+
∑
j∈I
Nj
[∫ yˆ
0
G′(f)df +G(0)
]
+
∑
j /∈I∪{k}
NjG(0) >
∑
j∈J
Nj
[∫ xˆ
0
G′(f)df +G(0)
]
⇔ NkG
(
ξ
Nk
)
+
∑
j∈I
Nj
∫ yˆ
0
G′(f)df >
∑
j∈J
[
Nj
∫ xˆ
0
G′(f)df
]
+NkG(0)
⇔
∑
j∈I
Nj
[∫ yˆ
0
G′(f)df −
∫ xˆ
0
G′(f)df
]
>
∑
j /∈I
[
Nj
∫ xˆ
0
G′(f)df
]
−Nk
[
G
(
ξ
Nk
)
−G(0)
]
⇔
∑
j∈I
Nj
∫ yˆ
xˆ
G′(f)df >
∑
j /∈I
Nj [G(xˆ)−G(0)]−Nk
[
G
(
ξ
Nk
)
−G(0)
]
(3.24)
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The equivalences above follow from rearranging, cancelling and recombining
terms. By Lemma 3.2 f˜ is in the concave domain, which also holds for all
f > f˜ . Since yˆ > xˆ > f˜ it holds that G′′(yˆ) < 0 and G′′(xˆ) < 0. This implies
that (yˆ − xˆ)G′(xˆ) > ∫ yˆ
xˆ
G′(f)df . We thus have the following:
∑
j∈I
Nj [(yˆ − xˆ)G′(xˆ)] >
∑
j∈I
Nj
∫ yˆ
xˆ
G′(f)df
>
∑
j /∈I
Nj [G(xˆ)−G(0)]−Nk[G(ξ/Nk)−G(0)]
>
∑
j /∈I
NjG
′(xˆ)xˆ−Nk[G(ξ/Nk)−G(0)]
(3.25)
The second inequality follows from (3.24) and in the last inequality we use that
[G(f)−G(0)]/f > G′(f) for all f > f˜ by Corollary 3.1. The three inequalities
in (3.25) together establish that:∑
j∈I
Nj(yˆ − xˆ)G′(xˆ) >
∑
j /∈I
NjG
′(xˆ)xˆ−Nk[G(ξ/Nk)−G(0)]
⇔ G′(xˆ)
∑
j∈I
Nj(yˆ − xˆ)−
∑
j /∈I
Nj xˆ
 > −Nk[G(ξ/Nk)−G(0)]
⇔ −ξG′(xˆ) > −Nk[G(ξ/Nk)−G(0)]
⇔ G′(xˆ) < [G(ξ/Nk)−G(0)]/(ξ/Nk)
(3.26)
The first equivalence follows from rearranging terms and the second by defini-
tion of xˆ and yˆ. The third equivalence follows from multiplying both sides of
the inequality with −1/ξ.
We will now show that the last inequality in (3.26) will lead to a contradic-
tion. Because the function G(·) is convex at ξ/Nk we have that [G(ξ/Nk) −
G(0)]/(ξ/Nk) < G′(ξ/Nk). Thus, under the assumption that (ii) is optimal it
must hold that G′(xˆ) < G′(ξ/Nk) by the last inequality of (3.26). If allocation
(ii) is optimal we also have that G′(ξ/Nk) = G′(yˆ) by Theorem 3.D.2, and
thus that G′(xˆ) < G′(yˆ). However, because xˆ < yˆ and both fractions are in
the concave domain of the function G(·) it holds that G′(xˆ) > G′(yˆ). We thus
arrive at a contradiction, which implies that allocation scheme (ii) can never
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be better than allocation scheme (i) for V >
∑
j∈J Nj f˜ . Thus, the optimal
allocation for V >
∑
j∈J Nj f˜ is allocation (i): i.e., the pro rata allocation over
all populations in J . This completes the proof of part (c) of this theorem.
3.E The Lambert W function
This appendix considers the Lambert W function, or product log function (cf. Corless
et al. (1996)). This function is denoted by W (x) and solves:
x = W (x)eW (x) (3.27)
The herd effect G(f) can be expressed using the Lambert W function:
G(f) = −1
σ
W (−σ exp{−σB(f)})
with B(f) = s0 + i0 − 1
σ
log
(
s0
(
1− f
s(τ)
))
− f
(3.28)
which can be verified by substituting (3.28) into (3.27), which leads to (3.9). In this
study, we consider only real valued x and the function W (x) is then defined only for
x ≥ − 1e . For x ∈ [− 1e , 0] the function W (x) has two values, but two branches of
W (x) can be defined that are both single valued. The constraint W (x) ≤ −1 can be
added to construct the branchW−1(x) defined only for x ∈ [− 1e , 0]. The other branch
W0(x) holds for all x ≥ − 1e and meets the constraint W (x) ≥ −1. This branch is
also referred to as the principal branch, denoted by Wp(x).
Let G(f) = −1σ W [y(f)], with y(f) = −σs0
(
1− fs(τ)
)
exp {−σ(s0 + i0 − f)} (3.28).
We will study y(f) in more detail to determine which branch of the Lambert W
function is needed for the calculation of G(f).
Theorem 3.E.1. − 1e ≤ y(f) ≤ 0
Proof. We can easily see that y(f) ≤ 0, because σ > 0, s0 > 0 and f ≤ s(τ). Analyze
the extreme values of y(f):
d
df
y(f) = σs0 exp {−σ(s0 + i0 − f)}
[
1
s(τ) − σ
(
1− f
s(τ)
)]
= 0⇔ f = s(τ)− 1
σ
110 Dose-optimal vaccine allocation over multiple populations
It suffices to show that y(f) ≥ − 1e for f = s(τ)− 1σ :
− s0
s(τ) exp{−σ(s0 + i0 − s(τ))− 1} ≥ −
1
e
log(s0)− σ (s0 + i0 − s(τ)) ≤ log(s(τ))
0 ≤ −s(τ) + 1
σ
log(s(τ)) + s0 + i0 − 1
σ
log(s0)
By (3.8) above relation holds, because i(τ) ≥ 0.
By Theorem 3.B.2 we know thatG(f) < 1σ and thus−1 < W (−σ exp{−σB(f, σ)}) <
0. By Theorem 3.E.1 only the principal branchW0(x) is needed when using the Lam-
bert W function for G(f) in (3.28).
3.F Interacting populations
In Section 3.5.4, the optimal allocation is analyzed for geographically distant popu-
lations that interact with each other. We use the same initial states and population
sizes as in Section 3.5.3.
In this appendix, we study the relative performance of ignoring interaction by
either using the optimal allocation for non-interacting populations or by using the
equitable allocation, which allocates pro rata over all populations. In Figure 3.8 we
illustrate the performance of these two solutions relative to the optimal allocation
for the interacting case. We evaluate the additional herd effect and observe that
the non-interacting solution performs close to optimal and outperforms the equitable
allocation. Note that the additional herd effect becomes negative for large vaccine
stockpiles, because vaccinating many people leaves very few people susceptible. This
implies that herd effect can be lower for large vaccine stockpiles than for no vaccina-
tion, resulting in a negative additional herd effect.
We also study the optimal allocation for increasing levels of interaction. Fig-
ures 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 display the optimal allocation in case interaction
between populations is respectively 0.01, 0.02, 0.05 and 0.1 times the interaction
within a population. This corresponds to interaction between populations being a
factor 100, 50, 20 or 10 times weaker than interaction within a population. The
figures are discussed in Section 3.5.4.
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Figure 3.8: The left figure illustrates the relative performance of the optimal allo-
cation for the non-interacting case (Figure 3.7) and the equitable pro rata allocation
evaluated in the model as described in Section 3.5.4 with interactionfactor c = 0.01.
We evaluate the additional herd effect for vaccine stockpiles up to size 550, because
the right figure shows that for larger vaccine stockpiles the additional herd effect
becomes negative.
Each of the graphs present the optimal vaccine allocation (the solid lines) over
three interacting populations for different sizes of vaccine stockpile. The dashed
and dotted lines indicate the important vaccination fractions: the dashed line in the
middle equals V˜j = f˜jNj , the upper dotted line equals V ∗j = f∗jNj and the lower
dotted line equals V¯j = f¯jNj .
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Figure 3.9: The graphs present the optimal vaccine allocation (the solid lines)
over three interacting populations for different sizes of vaccine stockpile. The dashed
and dotted lines indicate the important vaccination fractions: the dashed line in the
middle equals V˜j = f˜jNj , the upper dotted line equals V ∗j = f∗jNj and the lower
dotted line equals V¯j = f¯jNj .
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Figure 3.10: The optimal allocation in case interaction between populations is 0.02
times the interaction within a population.
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Figure 3.11: The optimal allocation in case interaction between populations is 0.05
times the interaction within a population.
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Figure 3.12: The optimal allocation in case interaction between populations is 0.1
times the interaction within a population.

Chapter 4
The most efficient critical
vaccination coverage and its
equivalence with maximizing
the herd effect1
4.1 Introduction
In infectious disease epidemiology the potential of an infectious agent to cause an
epidemic is often expressed in terms of the reproduction ratio and the final size. The
final size is the eventual number of people who have become infected. The reproduc-
tion ratio, denoted by R, is considered to be one of the most important parameters in
infectious disease epidemiology and has received considerable attention (cf. Diekmann
et al. 2013). The effectiveness of a control strategy against the infectious agent is of-
ten expressed as the capability of the strategy to reduce the reproduction ratio or the
final size. Several studies focus on the minimization of R under a capacity constraint
on the available resources (e.g., Goldstein et al. 2009, Wallinga et al. 2010) or on the
threshold criterion R = 1 (e.g., Britton and Becker 2000, Hill and Longini Jr 2003).
1This chapter is based on Duijzer et al. (2016).
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R is rather tractable and hence the above papers typically use analytical methods
based on matrix algebra. In contrast, applying analytical methods to minimizing the
final size is more difficult, as the final size is implicitly defined. Therefore, numerical
evaluation (e.g., Arino et al. 2008, Keeling and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015) or
simulation (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2005, Cooper et al. 2006, Andradóttir et al. 2014)
are typically used to analyze the final size.
There is no obvious connection between minimization of the reproduction ratio R
and minimization of the final size. It is not clear how an intervention that minimizes
R affects the final size and vice versa. Tildesley and Keeling (2009) even show that
the reproduction ratio within a population is a bad predictor for the final size when
populations interact. The relation between R and the final size has been studied for
a single population and a one-to-one relation can be derived (Ma and Earn 2006).
However, this relation does not extend to multiple populations.
A first step in analyzing the relation between R and the final size for multiple
populations is made by Andreasen (2011) for the case without infection control. The
initial population is then completely susceptible and the reproduction ratio R equals
the basic reproduction ratio R0. Andreasen (2011) shows that an epidemic occurs
only for R0 > 1, implying that the final size equation has an interior solution in
that case. In case R0 ≤ 1 only the boundary solution exists, corresponding to no
outbreak. We build upon Andreasen (2011) by including vaccination in a completely
susceptible population and assuming that the disease is introduced after vaccination.
In a vaccinated population the final size is determined by the direct effect of vac-
cination and the indirect effect. This latter effect is also known as the herd effect.
The direct effect is measured as the proportion of the people who are protected from
infection by vaccination, whereas the indirect herd effect is measured as the propor-
tion of the people who are not exposed to infection and thus escape infection without
being vaccinated. The herd effect can be influenced by the vaccine allocation and is
therefore the most interesting.
We are interested in finding vaccine allocations that maximize the herd effect and
we define the following optimization problem: maximize the overall herd effect. This
problem is difficult to solve (Keeling and Ross 2015). We show that formulating the
equivalent optimization problem in terms of R enables to solve the problem. We show
analytically that the herd effect in a set of populations can only be maximized for a
vaccination allocation that results in R = 1. In Chapter 3 we already showed that
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this holds for a single population, we extend this in the current chapter to interacting
populations. The current chapter differs from Chapter 3 in studying prepandemic
vaccination with unlimited supply of vaccines, such that critical vaccination coverage
is always attainable. In contrast, Chapter 3 focuses on limited vaccine stockpiles for
sudden outbreaks, and it studies the intricate difficulties of allocating vaccines when
critical coverage cannot be attained.
The main contribution of this chapter is that we gain insights into vaccine alloca-
tion problems by looking at them from the perspective of mathematical optimization.
This enables us to formulate structured approaches to find the optimal allocation:
the best possible allocation according to some well-defined criterion. Our approach
differs from others in literature who either compare a few allocation schemes (e.g.,
Mylius et al. 2008, Tuite et al. 2010) or enumerate all possibilities (e.g., Medlock and
Galvani 2009, Keeling and Shattock 2012). (Note that many aspects play a role in
vaccine allocation [operational, ease of understanding et cetera]. So, our use of the
word optimal should be seen relative: the solution is optimal insofar as our criterion
for optimality is suitable.) Our contributions to vaccine allocation are summarized
as follows.
1. We prove the equivalence between two interesting vaccine allocation problems:
maximizing the herd effect and minimizing the required amount of vaccines to
obtain R = 1.
2. We characterize the optimal allocation for two special cases and guarantee that
no better allocation exists.
(a) We consider the case of separable mixing, which is often studied and as-
sumes that upon transmission from one individual to another the two in-
dividuals involved influence transmission independently (Diekmann et al.
2013). We derive an algorithm that provides especially interesting insights:
we show that vaccinating according to a very simple priority ordering based
on population size and disease parameters results in the optimal allocation.
(b) For two populations we derive an explicit expression of the solution.
3. We present an efficient solution approach for general cases (i.e, cases with more
than two populations and cases where separable mixing does not apply) based
on Perron-Frobenius Theory (Meyer 2000).
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4. Finally, we illustrate our approach to find the optimal allocation in a case study
for pre-pandemic vaccination in the initial phase of an impending influenza
pandemic. The results show that the amount of required vaccines to attain R =
1 can differ substantially if we compare the optimal allocation with proposed
allocations in literature.
The advantage of explicit solutions and an efficient solution approach is that optimal
solutions can be derived even when parameters are uncertain. With explicit solutions
one can directly see the effects of changes in parameters and the efficient solution
approach makes it computationally easy to perform a sensitivity analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we for-
mulate the problem: The herd effect and the reproduction ratio R are presented
and illustrated for the standard epidemiological SIR model. Next, we formulate the
two vaccine allocation problems that are the main focus of the chapter. Section 4.3
discusses the assumptions and some technical details that are needed for the analysis
of the optimization problems. In Section 4.4, we prove that the two vaccine allo-
cation problems are equivalent. Section 4.5 is dedicated to solving these problems.
Section 4.6 contains an application of our solution method. We conclude the chapter
with a discussion in Section 4.7.
4.2 Problem formulation
4.2.1 The SIR model
We consider the standard epidemiological SIR model for a set J consisting of n
interacting populations indexed by j, i.e., |J | = n. Every population is divided
into three compartments for which the evolution is tracked (cf. Hethcote 2000). Let
sj(t), ij(t) and rj(t) be the fractions of population j respectively susceptible, infected
and removed at time t. Let γj denote the recovery rate in population j and let
βjl denote the transmission rate between susceptible people from population j and
infected people from population l. The SIR model describes the time course of an
epidemic and consists of the following system of differential equations:
4.2 Problem formulation 121
dsj
dt
= −
∑
l∈J
βjlsjil ∀j ∈ J
dij
dt
=
∑
l∈J
βjlsjil − γjij ∀j ∈ J
drj
dt
= γjij ∀j ∈ J
(4.1)
Figure 4.1 illustrates the time course of an epidemic according to the SIR model.
As time progresses the number of infected individuals will approach zero and the
epidemic will die out, i.e., limt→+∞ ij(t) = 0 for all j ∈ J . When the state of the
system no longer changes, it is in a disease free equilibrium (DFE).
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the deterministic SIR model for two populations with
parameters γj = 2.3, βjj = 3 for j = 1, 2 and βjl = 1 for j 6= l. We introduce a minor
infection of ij(0) = 10−6 for j = 1, 2 to analyze the time course of the epidemic.
Because of symmetry between populations the time course is presented for only one
population.
We include vaccination in the SIR model at time t = 0. We assume that all
individuals are vaccinated before the start of the epidemic and that the fractions of
vaccinated individuals may differ between populations. Let fj denote the fraction
of people vaccinated in population j. We assume that one dose of vaccine suffices
and that vaccination instantaneously leads to permanent immunity against infection.
For a relaxation of the assumption of perfect vaccines we refer to Appendix 4.D.
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Upon vaccination the system changes from state (sj(0), ij(0), rj(0)) to state ((1 −
fj)sj(0), ij(0), rj(0) + sj(0)fj) for all j ∈ J .
We are interested in the final state of an outbreak, i.e., limt→+∞ sj(t), which
depends on the initial state at time 0. In the remainder of this chapter we consider
one specific initial state, namely the situation that vaccination takes place prior to
an outbreak in a completely susceptible population. In the literature this type of
vaccination is called pre-pandemic vaccination. Let s0, i0 and r0 respectively denote
the vectors with initial fractions of people susceptible, infected and removed. For pre-
pandemic vaccination it is assumed that s0 = 1 and i0 = r0 = 0. Note that without
infected individuals, the system in (4.1) is in equilibrium and no transmission can
occur. To analyze an outbreak after pre-pandemic vaccination many studies there-
fore consider that the system is externally exposed to a ‘shock’ or that the disease
is introduced after vaccination, meaning that an infinitesimal fraction of individu-
als gets infected. By Perron-Frobenius Theory the initial phase of an epidemic is
uniquely determined (see Section 4.3.1) and it is therefore not necessary to specify
the introduction of the disease in detail (cf. Diekmann 1977, Metz 1978).
4.2.2 Herd effect
Vaccination leads to people escaping infection in two ways: either directly or in-
directly. The direct effect is measured as the proportion of individuals that are
vaccinated themselves and hence immune. The indirect effect, also referred to as
the herd effect (Fine 1993), is measured as the proportion of individuals that are
unvaccinated and escape infection because of a reduction in force of infection due
to vaccination. The individuals that escape infection without being vaccinated are
still susceptible in the disease free equilibrium. Denote by Gj(f) the final fraction
of people susceptible in population j, i.e., the herd effect in population j. Here f
denotes the vector with the vaccination fractions fj for all populations j ∈ J . Then:
Gj(f) = lim
t→+∞ sj(t) ∀j ∈ J (4.2)
Note that this definition implies that there is a herd effect Gj(0) > 0 even without
any vaccination. Alternatively, one could compare the disease free equilibrium with
and without vaccination and let Hj(f) = Gj(f)−Gj(0) denote the herd effect. But
this definition has the disadvantage that the herd effect may become negative. In the
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remainder of this chapter we will refer to Gj(f) as the herd effect, as this definition
will be more convenient in demonstrating the relation between the herd effect and
final size equation.
Let σj = βjjγj . From (4.1) we derive the functions Gj(f) for all j ∈ J using the
initial conditions of pre-pandemic vaccination. We refer to Appendix 4.A.2 for the
details on this derivation. We end up with the following implicit set of equations for
the herd effect:
0 = −Gj(f) + log(Gj(f))
σj
− log(1− fj)
σj
+ (1− fj) + 1
σj
∑
l∈J:l6=j
βjl
γl
[1− fl −Gl(f)] ∀j ∈ J
(4.3)
For the remainder of the chapter it is more convenient to reformulate (4.3) in
matrix notation. Denote by γ, σ and B the following matrices, with γ and σ diagonal
matrices:
γ =

1
γ1
0
. . .
0 1γn
 σ =

1
σ1
0
. . .
0 1σn
 B =

β11 · · · β1n
... . . .
...
βn1 · · · βnn
 (4.4)
Furthermore, let G denote the vector [G1(f) · · ·Gn(f)]T . Let 1 denote the all ones
vector of length n. Then (4.3) can be written as follows, with log(·) used element
wise.
σ log(G) = σ log (1− f)− σBγ [1− f −G] (4.5)
We used the SIR model to illustrate the implicit expression for the herd effect.
Observe that for a single population with initial state (s0, i0, r0) = (1− f, 0, f) (4.5)
collapses to the well-known final size formula. The implicit expression in (4.5) is
therefore an extension of the final size formula, for which the generality is shown in
Ma and Earn (2006). The final size of an outbreak equals the total number of people
who have become infected and is therefore directly related to the number of people
who have escaped infection, i.e., the total effect of vaccination. This total effect is
the sum of the direct effect and the herd effect.
4.2.3 Reproduction ratio
The basic reproduction ratio, denoted by R0, is defined as the number of new infec-
tions caused by a single infectious individual in a completely susceptible population.
124
The most efficient critical vaccination coverage and its equivalence with
maximizing the herd effect
In the initial phase of an epidemic there are very few infected individuals, so the pop-
ulation is almost completely susceptible. R0 is therefore related to the exponential
initial growth rate of an epidemic (cf. Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007). For compartmen-
tal models, R0 can be determined from the differential equations (Diekmann et al.
2013).
After vaccination the population is no longer completely susceptible, so we can
no longer use the basic reproduction ratio. In this chapter, we therefore consider the
effective reproduction ratio. To formally define the effective reproduction ratio we
introduce the following notation: Let S(t) denote the diagonal matrix with entries
sj(t), and let B and γ be defined in accordance to (4.4).
Definition 4.1. The effective reproduction ratio at time t, denoted by Re(t), is
determined as follows: Re(t) = ρ(S(t)Bγ), with ρ(·) denoting the spectral radius,
i.e., the largest eigenvalue.
The matrix S(t)Bγ is also referred to as the next generation matrix at time t.
Hence, the effective reproduction ratio is the largest eigenvalue of the next generation
matrix. Note that the effective reproduction ratio at time t only depends on the
parameters and on the fractions of individuals susceptible. The fractions of infected
individuals do not play a role. We denote by Rf = Re(0) the effective reproduction
ratio at time 0, directly after vaccination. At time t = 0 it holds that sj(0) = (1−fj)
for all j ∈ J . This implies that Rf = ρ(FBγ), with F denoting the following diagonal
matrix:
F =

(1− f1) 0
. . .
0 (1− fn)
 (4.6)
Vaccination allocations f that result in Rf = 1 are referred to as ‘critical vaccination
fractions’ or ‘critical vaccination coverages’. In a homogeneous population, or in a
population where vaccine is allocated at random, such a critical vaccination coverage
would be a single number. Here we deal with multiple interacting populations, where
vaccine is not distributed at random, and hence we have multiple critical vaccination
coverages, each of which is a vector with a vaccination fraction for every population.
In Section 4.4, critical vaccination coverages and their importance for the herd effect
are discussed further.
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4.2.4 Vaccine allocation problems
Using the herd effect and the basic reproduction ratio we define two vaccine allocation
problems. The herd effect relates to unvaccinated individuals benefitting from the
vaccination of others. An efficient allocation thus makes the best possible use of the
herd effect. We define the optimization problem of maximizing the herd effect:
max
∑
j∈J
NjGj(f) (4.7)
s.t. f ∈ [0, 1]n (4.8)
In words, we maximize the number of susceptible individuals at the end of the epi-
demic, subject to the condition that the vaccine allocation f consists of proper pro-
portions between 0 and 1. The objective is to maximize the total herd effect (4.7),
with Nj denoting the size of population j. The fact that the herd effect is implicitly
defined (see (4.3)) significantly complicates the analysis of this optimization problem.
Therefore, papers that focus on maximizing the herd effect, or relatedly on minimiz-
ing the final size under a capacity constraint, typically rely on numerical evaluation
or enumeration to determine the optimal allocation (e.g., Arino et al. 2008, Keeling
and Shattock 2012, Yuan et al. 2015). In contrast, in this chapter we propose an
efficient approach to determine the optimal allocation. For specific cases of separable
mixing and two populations we derive closed form solutions.
We also define a vaccine allocation problem based on the reproduction ratio,
using the important threshold Rf = 1. For this threshold an outbreak will not lead
to an increase in infected individuals (cf. Section 4.4). There are multiple critical
vaccination coverages, i.e., vaccination allocations that result in Rf = 1. We are
interested in finding the critical vaccination coverage that uses the least amount of
vaccines, referred to as ‘the most efficient critical vaccination coverage’. This leads to
the following optimization problem that minimizes the required amount of vaccines
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such that Rf = 1:
min
∑
j∈J
Njfj (4.9)
s.t. ρ(FBγ) = 1 (4.10)
f ∈ [0, 1]n (4.11)
In words, we minimize the number of vaccinated individuals under the condition
that the reproduction ratio is precisely one and the vaccine allocation f is properly
defined. Constraint (4.10) implies Rf = 1.
The problem of achieving critical coverage while minimizing the required vaccine
stockpile, has been studied before in literature. Hill and Longini Jr (2003) consider
the same model specifications as we do in this chapter and extensively study critical
vaccination coverages. They also pay some attention to minimizing the number of
allocated vaccines and propose to solve the problem using Lagrangian multipliers,
which they acknowledge to be computationally inefficient. The authors present some
ideas for another solution method and in this chapter we build upon those ideas to
formulate our efficient solution approach. Under different model assumptions the
problem simplifies. For example, for a stochastic epidemic spread and a population
split up in households the problem can be approximated with a linear programming
problem (Becker and Starczak 1997, Ball and Lyne 2002, Keeling and Ross 2015).
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to analyzing the two vaccine allocation
problems presented in this section. We prove their equivalence, propose a general
solution approach and present explicit solutions for two special cases.
4.3 Preliminary analysis
In Section 4.3.1, we present some technical assumptions on the model and in Sec-
tion 4.3.2 we derive a number of basic technical results. This groundwork is needed
for the analysis of the optimization problems of Section 4.2.4.
4.3.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions with respect to the parameters:
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Assumption 4.2. The parameters γj and βjj are strictly positive for all j ∈ J and
βij are nonnegative for all i, j ∈ J with i 6= j.
Assumption 4.3. The matrix B with elements βij is irreducible.
The recovery rates γj are assumed to be strictly positive. If γj would equal 0
for some population j an infected individual in population j would remain infectious
forever, which is unrealistic. The parameters βij represent the transmission rates
from population j to population i. It is reasonable to assume that these rates are
nonnegative. Note that βij = 0 implies that there is no transmission between popu-
lation i and j. This is for example the case when there is no direct contact between
the two populations.
By Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3 the matrix B and the product Bγ are nonnegative
and irreducible which allows us to use Perron-Frobenius Theory (Meyer 2000). The
irreducibility of the matrix ensures that all populations interact with each other.
This interaction is either direct or indirect, i.e., via other populations. Excluding
the unlikely possibility that the disease can be transmitted from population i to
population j but not vice versa, the assumption that the matrix B is irreducible
does not restrict generality. Namely, if B would be reducible, the problem can be
decomposed into subproblems each consisting of a subset of populations with an
irreducible transmission matrix.
By Perron-Frobenius Theory a nonnegative and irreducible matrix has a unique
positive eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue. This eigenvector repre-
sents the distribution of infected individuals over the populations in the initial phase
of the epidemic. Using this initial distribution the time course of the epidemic can
be uniquely determined (Theorem 4.1).
4.3.2 Basic technical results
In this section, we derive a number of technical results to formally prove our equiva-
lence results in Section 4.4. In Lemma 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A, we formally prove that
the differential equations in (4.1) behave in accordance to interpretation: sj(t), ij(t),
rj(t) ∈ [0, 1] and sj(t) + ij(t) + rj(t) = 1 for all j ∈ J and t ≥ 0. Furthermore,
the fraction of susceptible people is non-increasing over time and the fraction of re-
moved people is non-decreasing over time. The next theorem formally shows that
the differential equations of the SIR model have a unique solution.
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Theorem 4.1. Given the initial values sj(0), ij(0), rj(0) ∈ [0, 1] such that sj(0) +
ij(0)+rj(0) = 1 for all j ∈ J the differential equations in (4.1) have a unique solution
at any time t.
Proof. We prove that the differential equations in (4.1) are Lipschitz continuous (see
Appendix 4.A). By the Picard-Lindelöf Theorem (Lindelöf 1894) there is a unique
solution to the initial value problem.
The following lemma establishes bounds on the herd effect Gj(f), that is charac-
terized in (4.3). We use these bounds in later sections.
Lemma 4.4. For all j ∈ J the following holds:
(i) 0 ≤ Gj(f) ≤ min
{
(1− fj), 1σj
}
(ii) Gj(f) = 0 if and only if fj = 1.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
4.4 Equivalence results
We are now able to analyze in detail the relation between the basic reproduction
ratio and the herd effect. Section 4.4.1 relates Rf = ρ(FBγ) to the solutions to
the implicit expression of the herd effect in equation (4.5). Based on this relation
we prove in Section 4.4.2 that the two optimization problems of Section 4.2.4 are
equivalent.
4.4.1 The relation between Rf and the herd effect
The stability of disease free equilibria and the relation with R0 has been investigated
for different types of compartmental models (among others Van den Driessche and
Watmough 2002, Andreasen 2011, Hu et al. 2012). Typically, the conclusion is that
a disease free equilibrium (DFE) is stable for R0 < 1 and unstable for R0 > 1. A
DFE represents a solution to the final size equation, which is directly related to the
herd effect as discussed before. The results in the literature focus on the case without
interventions. In this section, we extend these results to pre-pandemic vaccination by
deriving the relation between Rf and the herd effect. The pre-pandemic vaccination
case can directly be translated to models without vaccination, by changing the initial
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fraction of people susceptible sj(0) := sj(0)(1 − fj). Our definition of Rf is thus
directly related to R0. We confirm the critical role of Rf and the threshold Rf = 1.
The herd effect is defined according to the implicit set of equations (4.5). By
Lemma 4.4 we know that any solution Gj(f) lies in the interval [0, (1 − fj)] for all
j ∈ J . By Theorem 4.1 the differential equations (4.1) have a unique solution at
any point in time. This implies that there is also a unique solution for Gj(f), which
is a stable disease free equilibrium (DFE). Let G˜ denote the vector with elements
Gj(f)/(1− fj). We use log(·) element wise and rewrite (4.5) into:
0 = log
(
G˜
)
+BγF
(
1− G˜) (4.12)
It can easily be verified that equation (4.12) always has the solution G˜ = 1, i.e.,
Gj(f) = (1 − fj). This solution will be referred to as the trivial solution in accor-
dance to Andreasen (2011) and corresponds to the situation of no outbreak. Recall
that directly after vaccination the fraction of people susceptible equals (1 − fj) in
population j. Hence, in the trivial solution all susceptible people will remain suscep-
tible. Additionally, we consider solutions that do correspond to outbreaks. We use
the term ‘interior solution’ to refer to a solution for which Gj(f) ∈ (0, (1− fj)) for
all j ∈ J . We extend Lemma 1 of Andreasen (2011) to include vaccination and the
case that Rf equals 1.
Lemma 4.5. For Rf ≤ 1 equation (4.12) does not have an interior solution.
Proof. By contradiction assume that there is an interior solution, denoted by Y.
Let Y˜ denote the vector with elements Yj/(1 − fj) which are all in (0, 1). Recall
that Rf = ρ(FBγ) and let v be the left eigenvector corresponding to this largest
eigenvalue. From Perron-Frobenius Theory (Meyer 2000) we know that we can choose
v such that all elements are nonnegative and ||v||1 = 1. Left multiplication of (4.12)
with vTF results in the following:
0 = vTF log
(
Y˜
)
+ vTFBγF
(
1− Y˜)
= vTF log
(
Y˜
)
+RfvTF
(
1− Y˜)
= vTF
[
log
(
Y˜
)
+ (1− Y˜)]+ (Rf − 1) vTF (1− Y˜)
(4.13)
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Note that vTF ∈ (0, 1)n and also (1− Y˜) ∈ (0, 1)n. Furthermore, using that log x <
x− 1 for x 6= 1 we derive:
[
log
(
Y˜
)
+ (1− Y˜)] < 0
Thus, the third line of (4.13) is the summation of a strictly negative and a nonpositive
term for Rf ≤ 1 and is therefore strictly negative. We arrive at a contradiction, which
completes the proof of this lemma.
The interpretation of Lemma 4.5 is as follows: in case Rf ≤ 1 the system is in a
stable disease free equilibrium. Introduction of a disease in the population will not
lead to an outbreak in that case.
To analyze the case that Rf > 1 we use a variable transformation and introduce
the variable vector x(f) with elements xj(f) = 1− Gj(f)1−fj . We rewrite (4.5) into:
x(f) = 1− exp
{
− [BγFx(f)]j
}
(4.14)
From (4.14) and Lemma 4.4 we can derive that the variables xj(f) lie in the interval
[0, 1) for all j ∈ J .
Theorem 4.2. For Rf > 1 equation (4.12) has a unique interior solution.
Proof. This theorem is equivalent to the statement that (4.14) has a unique positive
solution in case Rf > 1. Equation (4.14) has a positive solution if and only if
ρ(BγF) > 1 (Theorem 1 of Chan 2013). Note that F is an invertible matrix, which
implies that the matrices BγF and FBγ are similar and have the same eigenvalues.
Hence, Rf := ρ(FBγ) = ρ(BγF). This completes the proof of this theorem.
Recall that the herd effect expression is directly related to the final size equation.
Theorem 4.2 therefore coincides with Diekmann and Heesterbeek (2000) who claim
(in exercise 6.19) that the final size equation has a unique non-trivial (i.e., non-zero)
solution in case R0 > 1.
4.4.2 Equivalence of the two problems
The results in the previous section are minor extensions of known results in the
literature. However, based on these results we are now able to prove one of the main
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contributions of this chapter: the equivalence of the two vaccine allocation problems
that were discussed before.
Theorem 4.3. The overall herd effect,
∑
j∈J NjGj(f), is maximized for a vaccine
allocation f that results in Rf = 1.
Proof. We will prove this lemma by contradiction in two steps. First we show that
the overall herd effect cannot be maximized for a vaccine allocation that results in
Rf < 1 and in the second step we will exclude the possibility that an allocation with
Rf > 1 maximizes the overall herd effect.
Step 1: by contradiction assume that there is a vaccine allocation x resulting in
Rf < 1, which maximizes the overall herd effect. Denote by X the diagonal matrix
with entries (1 − xj). Furthermore, define the function g(t) = ρ[(tI + (1 − t)X)Bγ]
for t ∈ [0, 1]. By construction g(0) = ρ(XBγ) < 1 and to avoid triviality we can
assume that g(1) = ρ(Bγ) > 1. By Lemma 4.B.1, which is formulated and proven in
Appendix 4.B, the function g(t) is continuous in t. Hence, there exists a t∗ ∈ (0, 1)
for which g(t∗) = 1 by the intermediate value theorem. Let Y := t∗I + (1 − t∗)X.
Note that Y is also a diagonal matrix and let the vector y be such that (1− yj) for
all j ∈ J are the diagonal elements of Y. We compare the vaccine allocation vectors
y and x: It holds that yi ≤ xi for all i ∈ J and a strict inequality for at least one
population by the fact that t∗ ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 4.5 the trivial solution holds for
both x and y, because ρ(XBγ) < 1 and ρ(YBγ) = 1. Hence,∑
j∈J
NjGj(y) =
∑
j∈J
Nj(1− yj) >
∑
j∈J
Nj(1− xj) =
∑
j∈J
NjGj(x)
We arrive at a contradiction: x cannot maximize the overall herd effect. Thus, we
conclude that the overall herd effect is maximized for a vaccination fraction that
results in Rf ≥ 1.
Step 2: by contradiction assume that there is a vaccine allocation z resulting in
Rf > 1, which maximizes the overall herd effect. By definition of Rf we have that
Re(0) > 1 which implies by Lemma 4.B.6 (see Appendix 4.B) that limt→+∞Re(t) <
1. We know that Re(t) is continuous in t (Lemma 4.B.4 in Appendix 4.B) and hence
by the intermediate value theorem there exists a time τ > 0 at which Re(τ) = 1.
Since limt→+∞Re(t) < Re(τ) and Re(t) can only decrease by a decrease in the
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fraction of people susceptible, the following holds:∑
j∈J
NjGj(z) = lim
t→+∞
∑
j∈J
Njsj(t) <
∑
j∈J
Njsj(τ) (4.15)
Let us now consider an alternative vaccination allocation denoted by y, such that
yj = (1−sj(τ)) for all j ∈ J . The definition of Re(τ) does not depend on the fraction
of people infected at time τ . By construction we thus have that y results in Rf = 1.
From Lemma 4.5 we conclude the following:∑
j∈J
NjGj(y) =
∑
j∈J
Nj(1− yj) =
∑
j∈J
Njsj(τ) >
∑
j∈J
NjGj(z),
where the inequality follows from (4.15). We arrive at a contradiction: z cannot
maximize the overall herd effect.
We conclude that the vaccine allocation f that maximizes the overall herd effect
cannot result in Rf > 1 nor in Rf < 1. Thus, Rf must equal 1, which completes the
proof of this lemma.
We are now able to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 4.4. Problem (4.7) - (4.8) and Problem (4.9) - (4.11) are equivalent.
Proof. We conclude the following:
max
∑
j∈J
NjGj(f)
s.t.
f ∈ [0, 1]n
⇔
max
∑
j∈J
NjGj(f)
s.t. Rf = 1
f ∈ [0, 1]n
⇔
max
∑
j∈J
Nj(1− fj)
s.t. Rf = 1
f ∈ [0, 1]n
⇔
min
∑
j∈J
Njfj
s.t. Rf = 1
f ∈ [0, 1]n
The first implication follows from Theorem 4.3. For the second implication we apply
Lemma 4.5 which states that Gj(f) = (1− fj) for all j ∈ J in case Rf = 1.
By Theorem 4.4 the two optimization problems presented in Section 4.2.4 are
equivalent. The intuitive explanation of this result is that the problem of minimizing
the number of vaccines to attain Rf = 1 requires a very efficient allocation of vaccines.
Maximizing the herd effect thus leads to the most efficient allocation of vaccines.
4.5 Solving the problems 133
4.5 Solving the problems
Optimization problem (4.9) - (4.11) has a simple linear objective function. The main
difficulty of this problem is the constraint Rf = 1, which is not in general convex
(or concave) (c.f. Hill and Longini Jr 2003). We have shown in Theorem 4.4 that
Problem (4.7) - (4.8) can also be formulated as an optimization problem with a
linear objective function and the constraint Rf = 1. In this section, we show that
this constraint simplifies for two special cases. This simplification has important
consequences, as it enables us to solve the vaccine allocation problem to optimality
for these two special cases. In Section 4.5.1, we assume a special structure on the
contact matrix Bγ: separable mixing. Section 4.5.2 studies the important special
case of two populations. Finally, in Section 4.5.3 we present a novel solution method
that is able to solve the vaccine allocation problems for the general case, without
additional assumptions on the contact matrices or the number of populations.
4.5.1 Separable mixing
For notational convenience we will use kij to denote the elements of the matrix Bγ.
We consider a special structure on the matrix Bγ, where kij = aibj . This structure is
called separable mixing and means that population j is equally susceptible to all other
populations and population i is equally infectious to all other populations (Diekmann
et al. 2013). The special case that a is proportional to b, i.e., ai = δbi for all i ∈ J , is
called proportionate mixing. Separable and proportionate mixing are often studied
(e.g., Hethcote and Van Ark 1987, Cairns 1989, Ross and Black 2015). For separable
mixing, Rf can explicitly be determined. Denote by Tr(·) the trace of a matrix
and let σj = βjjγj . By definition σj can be seen as an internal reproduction ratio in
population j. For separable mixing Rf is defined as follows:
Rf = Tr(FBγ) =
∑
j∈J
βjj
γj
(1− fj) =
∑
j∈J
σj(1− fj)
By Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.B.3 any solution for which Rf < 1 can never be optimal.
Hence, the solution to Problem (4.9) - (4.11) does not change if we relax the constraint
Rf = 1 to Rf ≤ 1. The linear definition of Rf for separable mixing significantly
134
The most efficient critical vaccination coverage and its equivalence with
maximizing the herd effect
simplifies the optimization problems of Section 4.2.4 which now become:
max
∑
j∈J
Nj(1− fj) (4.16)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
σj(1− fj) ≤ 1 (4.17)
f ∈ [0, 1]n (4.18)
In words, we maximize the herd effect subject to the constraint that Rf ≤ 1 and
properly defined vaccination fractions.
Based on the relaxation we are able to derive a solution method for the problem.
Observe that Problem (4.16) - (4.18) is the linear programming (LP) relaxation of a
knapsack problem, one of the basic problems in combinatorial optimization. This LP
relaxation can be solved to optimality by a simple greedy algorithm (Dantzig 1957).
A greedy algorithm is a procedure that consecutively makes decisions that are locally
optimal. For the LP relaxation of a knapsack problem such a procedure also results
in the global optimum. We propose the greedy algorithm in Algorithm 1 to solve
Problem (4.16) - (4.18) to optimality.
Algorithm 1 The greedy algorithm for solving Problem (4.16) - (4.18)
1: procedure Greedy Algorithm
2: reorder the populations such that N1σ1 ≤ ... ≤ Nnσn
3: fj ← 0 for all j ∈ J . Initialize the solution
4: k ← 1
5: while
∑n
j=k+1 σj(1− fj) > 1 do
6: fk ← 1
7: k ← k + 1
8: end while
9: fk = 1− 1σk
[
1−∑nj=k+1 σj(1− fj)]
10: f = [fj ]j
11: return f . Return the optimal solution
12: end procedure
The ordering of the populations in line 2 can be done without loss of generality.
The allocation resulting from Algorithm 1 prioritizes small populations and popula-
tions with a high σj . Vaccinating these populations costs relatively few vaccines, but
has a large impact on lowering the reproduction ratio Rf . Note that population j
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has a high σj either because this population has a high transmission rate or a long
infectious period (and therefore a low recovery rate). i.e., either βjj is high or γj is
low. Because of the structure of separable mixing, a population with a high internal
transmission rate also plays an important role in the transmission between itself and
other populations. Thus, the prioritized populations either contribute heavily to the
transmission or have a long infectious period. The algorithm uses these simple char-
acteristics to derive the vaccination allocation that results in the highest overall herd
effect (and equivalently, the most efficient critical vaccination coverage).
The optimal order in the greedy algorithm is identical to the optimal order re-
ported for a related problem studied by Cairns (1989), who considers vaccination
with a fixed rate during a time interval and the objective of minimizing the effective
reproduction ratio at a certain time. The authors prove that for separable mixing
it is optimal to allocate all vaccination effort to one population during a specific
time interval. During consecutive time intervals the populations are vaccinated in
order of increasing activity, which is exactly the order used in our greedy algorithm.
Although the problem studied by Cairns (1989) differs in many respects from the
problem in this chapter, it is interesting to observe that under the assumption of
separable mixing the same optimal population ordering is found.
4.5.2 Two populations
For two populations an explicit expression for the condition Rf = 1 is derived in
Section 4.5.2. Based on this expression we are able solve the optimization problem
explicitly. In Section 4.5.2 we present this explicit solution.
Explicit expression for Rf = 1
Recall that Rf = ρ(FBγ). Denote by σ1 = β11γ1 , by σ2 =
β22
γ2
. Denote by c = β12β21β11β22 .
We use det(·) and Tr(·) to denote respectively the determinant and trace of a matrix.
From the definition of the largest eigenvalue for a 2 × 2 matrix we derive that any
vaccination allocation f1, f2 for which Rf = 1 satisfies the following condition:
det(FBγ)− Tr(FBγ) + 1 = 0
Furthermore, we use that Tr(FBγ) = Tr(Bγ) − σ1f1 − σ2f2 and det(FBγ) = (1 −
f1)(1−f2) det(Bγ). After substituting Tr(Bγ) = σ1 +σ2 and det(Bγ) = σ1σ2(1− c)
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we obtain that the critical vaccination fractions satisfy the following equation:
(1− f1)(1− f2)σ1σ2(1− c)− σ1(1− f1)− σ2(1− f2) + 1 = 0 (4.19)
Not all solutions to (4.19) are critical vaccination coverages. In fact, (4.19) is a
hyperbola and all critical vaccination coverages lie on one branch of the hyperbola
(cf. Hill and Longini Jr 2003). The part of the correct branch of the hyperbola
that contains the critical vaccination coverages is characterized in Lemma 4.6. This
lemma is also illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the hyperbola with parameters βjj = 3, γj = 1 for j = 1, 2
and βij = 1 for i 6= j. The lower branch results in the smallest eigenvalue, denoted
by λmin, being equal to 1. The upper branch is the correct branch, and results in a
largest eigenvalue, denoted by λmax = Rf , equal to 1.
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Lemma 4.6. Let D denote the feasible region for the vaccination fractions:
D = {(f1, f1)|f1, f1 ∈ [0, 1]} .
The part of the hyperbola for which Rf = 1 is described by (f1, f2) ∈ D and the
condition 1− σ1(1− c)(1− f1) > 0 (equivalently the very same part of the hyperbola
may also be characterized by (f1, f2) ∈ D and the condition 1−σ2(1−c)(1−f2) > 0).
Proof. We first show that the condition 1−σ1(1−c)(1−f1) > 0 results in the correct
branch of the hyperbola. The condition (f1, f2) ∈ D stipulates that the vaccination
fractions are properly defined. Secondly, we show that the other condition can be
derived analogously. Rewriting (4.19) gives:
(1− f2) = 1− σ1(1− f1)
σ2[1− σ1(1− c)(1− f1)] (4.20)
From (4.20) we derive that the hyperbola has an asymptote for 1−σ1(1−c)(1−f1) =
0. Distinguish between the following two cases: (i) c < 1 and (ii) c ≥ 1. First we
analyze case (i): For Rf = 1 we have Gj(f) = (1 − fj) and by Lemma 4.4 we know
that Gj(f) < 1σj . This implies the following:
(1− f1) < 1
σ1
<
1
σ1(1− c)
Thus, vaccination fractions that result in Rf = 1 can only occur in the branch of
the hyperbola for which 1− σ1(1− c)(1− f1) > 0. Consider case (ii): For c ≥ 1 the
asymptote lies outside the feasible region and therefore it is not needed to specify a
single branch. However, the condition 1 − σ1(1 − c)(1 − f1) > 0 is always satisfied
for (f1, f2) ∈ D. It can thus be added without changing the solution space.
In the same way the condition on f2 can be derived by noting that (4.20) can be
rewritten as follows:
(1− f1) = 1− σ2(1− f2)
σ1[1− σ2(1− c)(1− f2)]
Using the same argument, we can show that the correct branch of the hyperbola
is described by 1 − σ2(1 − c)(1 − f2) > 0. Hence, the symmetry between the two
populations is still retained.
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Solution
The conditions derived in Lemma 4.6 to specify the part of the hyperbola that con-
tains the critical vaccination coverages can replace the constraint Rf = 1 in the
vaccine allocation problem:
max N1(1− f1) +N2(1− f2) (4.21)
s.t. (1− f1)(1− f2)σ1σ2(1− c)− σ1(1− f1)− σ2(1− f2) + 1 = 0 (4.22)
1− σ2(1− c)(1− f2) > 0 (4.23)
fj ∈ [0, 1] j = 1, 2
(4.24)
Constraints (4.22) and (4.23) stipulate that Rf = 1. It suffices to use only one of the
equivalent conditions of Lemma 4.6.
In Theorem 4.5 we will present the solution to Problem (4.21) - (4.24). This
solution contains a list of at most three candidate solutions: two boundary solutions
(with fj ∈ {0, 1} for j = 1 or j = 2) and possibly one interior solution (with
f ∈ (0, 1)2). The interior solution can be derived by substituting (1 − f2) in the
objective function using equality constraint (4.22). By setting the derivative of the
objective function with respect to f1 equal to zero we obtain a solution, which is
presented in Theorem 4.5. However, it is possible that this solution does not satisfy
(4.23) - (4.24). In that case, we will show that the optimal solution to (4.21) - (4.24)
must be a boundary solution: i.e., a solution (f1, f2) that satisfies (4.22) - (4.23)
for which f1 ∈ {0, 1} and/or f2 ∈ {0, 1}. In Lemma 4.7 we therefore present an
exhaustive list of all possible boundary solutions:
Lemma 4.7. There are always precisely two boundary solutions to Problem (4.21) -
(4.24). The first solution depends on σ1:
(i) f1 = 0 f2 = 1− 1
σ2
[
1− σ1
1− σ1(1− c)
]
if σ1 ≤ 1
(ii) f1 = 1− 1
σ1
f2 = 1 if σ1 > 1
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The second solution depends on σ2:
(iii) f1 = 1− 1
σ1
[
1− σ2
1− σ2(1− c)
]
f2 = 0 if σ2 ≤ 1
(iv) f1 = 1 f2 = 1− 1
σ2
if σ2 > 1
Proof. To derive the four boundary solutions we use that fj ∈ [0, 1] for j = 1, 2
by (4.24). We fix the vaccination fractions per population to the two boundary values
0 and 1. Condition (4.22) is used to derive the expression for the other vaccination
fraction. This gives us the four boundary solutions that are presented in the lemma.
In the remainder of the proof we analyze the feasibility of the boundary solutions
with respect to constraints (4.23) - (4.24) for the different ranges of σ1 and σ2.
Note that solutions (i) and (ii) are identical in case σ1 = 1. The same holds for
solutions (iii) and (iv) in case σ2 = 1. To investigate the feasibility of solution (i)
we substitute the value f1 = 0 in constraint (4.23) and obtain that 1−σ1(1− c) > 0.
If we now consider the expression for f2 in solution (i), we see that we need σ ≤ 1
to have f2 ≤ 1. Thus solution (i) can only satisfy constraints (4.23) and (4.24)
at the same time if σ1 ≤ 1 Equivalently, solution (iii) can only satisfy both con-
straints (4.23) and (4.24) if σ2 ≤ 1. Using constraint (4.24) we can easily verify
that solution (ii) is only feasible in case σ1 > 1, because that prevents negative f1.
Equivalently, σ2 > 1 renders solution (iv) feasible.
Based on these conclusions we proved which of the boundary solutions are feasible
for which values for σ1 and σ2. This completes the proof of this lemma.
Theorem 4.5. The optimal solution to Problem (4.21) - (4.24) can be found among
the boundary solutions given in Lemma 4.7 and the following solution:
f1 = 1− 1
σ1
1−
√
cσ1N2
σ2N1
1− c
 and f2 = 1− 1
σ2
1−
√
cσ2N1
σ1N2
1− c

For c ≥ 1 only the boundary solutions need to be considered.
The proof of Theorem 4.5 can be found in Appendix 4.E. Observe that the
vaccination fractions in Theorem 4.5 are closely related to fj = 1 − 1σj for j = 1, 2
with a correction factor for the interaction. Without interaction, i.e., when c = 0,
the vaccination fractions boil down to fj = 1− 1σj for j = 1, 2.
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4.5.3 The general case
In this section, we present a general solution approach for the vaccine allocation
problems. Thereto we reformulate the optimization problems using Perron-Frobenius
theory (Meyer 2000). Rf is the largest eigenvalue of the nonnegative and irreducible
matrix FBγ by Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3.
Perron-Frobenius theory states that a nonnegative and irreducible matrix has
exactly one right eigenvector, the so-called Perron vector which is normalized and
strictly positive. This eigenvector corresponds to the largest eigenvalue and has the
following epidemiological interpretation: the Perron vector is the frequency distribu-
tion over the populations of the number of cases in the initial phase of an epidemic.
The Perron vector can be used to reformulate the optimization problem of Sec-
tion 4.2.4 (cf. Hill and Longini Jr 2003). Hill and Longini Jr (2003) also speculate
that a solution approach based on Perron-Frobenius theory might be an interesting
research direction. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to derive such a
solution approach.
Let v denote the right eigenvector that corresponds to Rf = 1. The following
holds:
FBγv = v⇒
∑
j∈J
(1− fi)βij
γj
vj = vi
We normalize the vector v such that ‖v‖ = 1, using the `1-norm. The optimization
problems of Section 4.2.4 are then equivalent to the following problem:
max
∑
j∈J
Nj(1− fj) (4.25)
s.t. (1− fi)
∑
j∈J
βij
γj
vj = vi i ∈ J (4.26)∑
j∈J
vj = 1 (4.27)
vj > 0 j ∈ J (4.28)
(1− fj) ∈ [0, 1] j ∈ J (4.29)
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Given the objective function and the nonnegativity of the parameters βij and γj ,
constraints (4.26) can be relaxed to:
(1− fi)
∑
j∈J
βij
γj
vj ≤ vi i ∈ J (4.30)
Lemma 4.8. For any solution to Problem (4.25) - (4.29) we have fi ≥ 1− γiβii .
By constraints (4.29) we have that fj ∈ [0, 1]. In case βiiγi > 1 the lower bound
derived in Lemma 4.8 is stronger than the bound fi ≥ 0. For βiiγi ≤ 1 the lower bound
of Lemma 4.8 is already satisfied by the nonnegativity of fi. Observe that Lemma 4.8
implies that the reproduction number within every population is less than or equal
to 1 in the optimal solution.
Lemma 4.9. The feasible region of Problem (4.25) - (4.29) is not convex.
The proofs of Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.9 can be found in Appendix 4.C.
Problem (4.25) - (4.29) contains two classes of variables: (1 − fj) and vj for all
j ∈ J . The objective function (4.25) and the constraints (4.27) - (4.29) are all linear
in these variables. Constraints (4.26) are quadratic in the two classes of variables,
which makes this problem a quadratically constrained programming problem (QCP).
The quadratic constraints (4.26) are not convex.
The lack of convexity makes it difficult to solve Problem (4.25) - (4.29) to op-
timality. We therefore propose a solution approach that cannot guarantee global
optimality, but works well in our numerical experiments. We implement the formu-
lation of our solution approach in Matlab and use the built-in function fmincon. This
function is able to minimize nonlinear programming problems with different types
of constraints: linear (in)equality constraints, bounds on the variables and nonlinear
(in)equality constraints. It is therefore suitable to solve the QCP formulation (4.25) -
(4.29). The problem formulation can easily be transformed into a minimization prob-
lem by multiplying the objective function with -1. The solution approach of fmincon
is based on interior point methods and barrier functions (c.f. Waltz et al. 2006).
Global optimality cannot be guaranteed, because constraints (4.26) are not convex.
To reduce the likelihood of ending up in a local optimum, we propose to use a multi
start approach where we solve the problem multiple times for random start solutions.
In our numerical experiments we compare the outcome of the solution approach to
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the optimal solutions derived in the previous sections for randomly generated cases
with separable mixing or two populations. Note that the problem for two populations
can either be convex or concave (Hill and Longini Jr 2003). Next to these special
cases, we also compared the solution to the example in Hill and Longini Jr (2003)
with five age groups and no separable mixing. For all of these problem instances our
proposed solution approach is able to find the optimal solution within seconds.
Generating a random start solution that is feasible with respect to constraints
(4.26) - (4.29) is not trivial, as the feasible region is not convex by Lemma 4.9.
We propose the following approach to generate start solutions that satisfy most
constraints. We can easily generate a random unit vector in (0,1), that satisfies
constraints (4.27) - (4.28). We then determine fi with constraint (4.26) and set
fi = 0 in case this results in a negative vaccination fraction. This guarantees (4.29)
and possibly also constraints (4.26) for some i ∈ J .
4.6 Practical application
In this section, we present a practical application to illustrate our results. We apply
our optimization model to a case study using the model and parameter values of
Wallinga et al. (2010). Section 4.6.1 describes this case study and in Section 4.6.2
we present the results.
4.6.1 Case study - case description
We now present a case study for which the parameters are taken from the literature
(Wallinga et al. 2010). An age-structured population is considered with six age
groups: 0-5, 6-12, 13-19, 20-39, 40-59 and 60+. The population sizes Nj and contact
parameters, denoted by δij are presented respectively in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.
Age group 0-5 6-12 13-19 20-39 40-59 60+ total
Population (×103) 1060 1265 1642 4857 3312 2477 14613
Table 4.1: The population sizes of the different age groups.
The spread of the disease is modeled with a heterogeneous SIR model, see Sec-
tion 4.2.1. The transmission rates βij as presented in this chapter can be calculated
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δij (10−7 day−1) 0-5 6-12 13-19 20-39 40-59 60+
0-5 1.393 0.259 0.146 0.284 0.130 0.094
6-12 0.259 2.261 0.266 0.287 0.170 0.095
13-19 0.146 0.266 1.847 0.418 0.309 0.123
20-39 0.284 0.287 0.418 0.623 0.407 0.207
40-59 0.130 0.170 0.309 0.407 0.504 0.272
60+ 0.094 0.095 0.123 0.207 0.272 0.447
Table 4.2: The age-specific contact matrix.
as follows: βij = δijNj , with δij being the proportion of age group i contacted by
an infected individual in age group j per unit of time. The recovery rate is assumed
to be the same for every age group: γj = 0.286 for all j ∈ J . This results in an
expected duration in the infected compartment (i.e., the generation interval) of 3.5.
The reproduction ratio without vaccination is equal to ρ(Bγ) = 2.1. The parameter
values for both the generation interval and the reproduction ratio are in line with
other studies in literature (Boëlle et al. 2011, Vink et al. 2014).
4.6.2 Case study - solution
We solve our optimization problems to determine the optimal vaccine allocation. The
resulting optimal allocation is compared to the following four allocation schemes:
• Random allocation - The vaccines are allocated at random (i.e., pro rata)
over the age groups.
• Greedy allocation - The age groups are prioritized in accordance to the
priority order presented in Algorithm 1.
• High-infection scheme 1 - The age groups are prioritized based on the final
size as a fraction of the age group size, which results in the following order:
13-19, 20-39, 6-12, 40-59, 0-5, 60+.
• High-infection scheme 2 - The prioritization is determined based on the
absolute final sizes (i.e., fractional final size weighted by age group size). This
leads to the following priority order: 20-39, 40-59, 13-19, 60+, 6-12, 0-5.
A high-infection risk scheme is also studied by Mylius et al. (2008). To determine
the priority order in these allocation schemes we determine for every age group the
expected final size (i.e., infection attack rate) without vaccination. These final sizes
are presented in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The final size without vaccination for the different age groups in frac-
tions of the age group size (left) and in absolute numbers (right).
For the greedy allocation and the high-infection schemes we vaccinate according
to the priority order until we achieve the threshold Rf = 1 in a similar way as in
Algorithm 1. The resulting vaccine allocations are presented in Table 4.3.
Age groups
0-5 6-12 13-19 20-39 40-59 60+
Optimal allocation 0.000 0.515 0.862 0.791 0.000 0.000
Random allocation 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530
Greedy allocation 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.635 0.000 0.000
High-infection scheme 1 0.000 0.124 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
High-infection scheme 2 0.000 0.022 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 4.3: The vaccination fractions in every age group for the different allocation
schemes.
We compare the vaccine allocation schemes in terms of the herd effect and the
required vaccine stockpile to achieve the threshold Rf = 1. The differences between
the different allocations can be substantial, as can be seen in Table 4.4.
The results in Table 4.4 show that the optimal allocation significantly outper-
forms the other allocation schemes. High-infection scheme 1 results in the second
best performance, but nevertheless achieves a herd effect of approximately 9% below
the optimum. High-infection scheme 2 results by far in the lowest herd effect (and
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Herd effect Required vaccine stockpile
Optimal allocation 8.705 5.908
Random allocation 6.867 7.746
Greedy allocation 7.563 7.050
High-infection scheme 1 7.957 6.656
High-infection scheme 2 2.297 12.316
Table 4.4: The herd effect and required vaccine stockpile to attain Rf = 1 for
different allocation schemes (unit 106).
equivalently in the largest required vaccine stockpile). Even when we disregard this
worst performing allocation scheme, the optimal allocation still increases the herd
effect with 9 to 26%.
We analyzed the robustness of our optimal allocation for different values of γ.
The analysis shows that the optimal allocation only changes minimally, for example
for γ = 0.30 the optimal allocation for the consecutive age groups is as follows:
f = [0, 0.4905, 0.8545, 0.7297, 0, 0].
4.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we analyze the impact of vaccine allocation on the reproduction ratio
and the herd effect. We prove the equivalence of two vaccine allocation problems:
finding the optimal allocation that results in a critical coverage and finding the op-
timal allocation that maximizes the herd effect. We use this equivalence to propose
solution methods for finding optimal allocations. The solution methods depend on
the transmission of infection within and between subpopulations. For the general
case, an efficient solution approach is presented based on Perron-Frobenius theory.
For two special cases, we can characterize the optimal solution completely: we pro-
vide an exact algorithm for the case where the population contact structure follows
separable mixing, we derive an explicit solution for the case where the population
consists of two subpopulations.
Our contribution to the existing literature on vaccine allocation derives from our
application of mathematical optimization techniques. The meaning of the phrase
‘optimal allocation’ differs slightly in the existing literature. In the epidemiological
literature an ‘optimal allocation’ often refers to an allocation that is the best out of
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the numerically evaluated allocation schemes, where the schemes are selected (e.g.,
Mylius et al. 2008, Tuite et al. 2010) or obtained in an exhaustive search of all
possible alternatives (e.g., Medlock and Galvani 2009, Keeling and Shattock 2012).
In contrast, we rely on mathematical optimization where the focus is on finding and
characterizing the best possible solution according to a given objective (optimization
criterion). The main practical benefit of mathematical optimization is that, once
the optimal solution is found, we can evaluate it numerically with standard software,
often this allows for an efficient sensitivity analysis with arbitrary precision. From
our perspective, an even larger benefit is that we know what the optimal allocation
looks like and that we can guarantee that there is no better allocation. To the best
of our knowledge we are the first to solve the considered vaccine allocation problems
to optimality.
Our results on optimal allocation schemes come with a guarantee of being optimal.
In this, they are qualitatively different from other allocation schemes that have been
put forward in the existing literature that might perform well, but do not guarantee
that there is no better allocation possible. Some of our results confirm existing
findings. For example, for separable mixing we found that a simple allocation scheme
does guarantee optimality. Some of our results significantly improve over existing
allocation schemes. For example, in the case study in Section 4.6 we show that the
optimal allocation significantly outperforms other allocation schemes. The allocation
schemes, whether obtained through enumeration or mathematical optimization, are
primarily intended to inform public health policy makers. The actual decisions may
rely on other aspects than optimality alone, and could include ethical and operational
considerations.
In our approach, we assume that transmission parameters within and between
subpopulations remain constant and are known. In practice it is not possible to de-
termine these contact parameters exactly. For infections that are transmitted through
close contacts, studies often rely on proxy measures derived from social contacts (e.g.,
Wallinga et al. 2006, Mossong et al. 2008, Hens et al. 2009). Building upon this work
others such as Goeyvaerts et al. (2010) and Fumanelli et al. (2012) use serological
and socio-economic data respectively to estimate the structure of the transmission
matrix. In order to apply our results in practice, these methods represent a valuable
direction of research for obtaining increasingly precise estimates of the transmis-
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sion parameters that we require in our models. We stress that even without precise
knowledge of parameters our finding are meaningful. Using numerical analysis we
show that increasing parameter estimation errors results in worse performance for all
allocation schemes, and the allocation that is optimal for the parameter estimates
continues to perform well. Our optimal allocation is therefore robust for errors in
estimating the transmission parameters.
Other assumptions include the use of a deterministic transmission model, the
unlimited availability of vaccines and the irreducibility of the transmission matrix.
To derive our results, we made use of the deterministic SIR compartmental model.
The final size equation and the reproduction ratio for this model are valid for a
broader class of models (Ma and Earn 2006, Van den Driessche and Watmough 2002,
Diekmann et al. 2013). The deterministic assumption is only valid in case of a large
population. Our results do not apply to small populations where stochastic effects
cannot be neglected. The assumption of an unlimited stockpile enables to achieve the
threshold Rf = 1. The solutions are relevant for stockpiles large enough to achieve
this threshold, but not for smaller stockpiles. For small stockpiles the problem of
maximizing the herd effect becomes more complex (see Chapter 3). In order to use
Perron-Frobenius theory, we assume that the transmission matrix FBγ is irreducible.
Although irreducibility is technically lost in case fk = 1 for some k ∈ J , this does
not affect our solution method. In that case, a reduced matrix can be constructed
which is nonnegative and irreducible (cf. Section 7.2 of Diekmann et al. 2013).
To conclude, we have applied mathematical optimization in vaccine allocation
problems. Our results bring two interesting insights to the field of vaccine alloca-
tion. First, we show that in some cases optimizing different criteria results in the
same allocation. This is the case for the optimization of the short term reproduc-
tion ratio and optimizing the long term herd effect. Secondly, we have demonstrated
that vaccine allocation problems are susceptible to mathematical optimization. If
the objective can properly be defined, it is expected that one can also derive the cor-
responding optimal allocation. Future research on vaccine allocation could therefore
focus on exactly specifying the objective of vaccination. It is worthwhile to inves-
tigate to what extend optimization in vaccine allocation can be applied with other
transmission models or objectives.
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Appendix
4.A Analysis of the SIR model
We start with proving some technical results on the differential equations of the SIR
model in Section 4.A.1. In Section 4.A.2 we explain the derivation of the implicit
herd effect definition and prove the bounds on the herd effect.
4.A.1 Differential equations
Lemma 4.A.1. For initial values sj(0), ij(0), rj(0) ∈ [0, 1] and sj(0)+ij(0)+rj(0) =
1 for all j ∈ J , the solution (sj(t), ij(t), rj(t)) to (4.1) satisfies the following condi-
tions:
(i) sj(t) + ij(t) + rj(t) = 1 for all j ∈ J and at any time t ≥ 0
(ii) sj(t), ij(t), rj(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all j ∈ J and at any time t ≥ 0
(iii) sj(t) is non-increasing over time and rj(t) is non-decreasing over time for all
j ∈ J
Proof. We prove the statements consecutively.
(i) Immediate from dsjdt +
dij
dt +
drj
dt = 0.
(ii) By item (i) it suffices to prove that sj(t), ij(t), rj(t) are nonnegative for all
j ∈ J . Note that the differential equations in (4.1) are continuous. Assume by
contradiction that sj(t2) < 0 at t2 > 0. Due to the continuity of the differential
equations there must be a time 0 < t1 < t2 at which sj(t1) = 0. However, by
(4.1) we then have dsjdt = 0, implying that sj(t) must then stay 0. We arrive
at a contradiction: it is not possible for sj(t) to become negative. Analogous
we can prove that ij(t) is nonnegative, since dijdt ≥ 0 when ij(t3) = 0 for some
t3 > 0. Finally, ij(t) being nonnegative implies that rj(t) is non-decreasing and
thus rj(t) is also nonnegative. We proved the lemma for a single population j,
but the proof applies to all j ∈ J .
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(iii) The result follows directly from the differential equations in (4.1) and the non-
negativity of sj(t) and ij(t) for all j ∈ J and for any time t proven in item
(ii).
Theorem 4.1. Given the initial values sj(0), ij(0), rj(0) ∈ [0, 1] such that sj(0) +
ij(0)+rj(0) = 1 for all j ∈ J the differential equations in (4.1) have a unique solution
at any time t.
Proof. To prove this theorem we will show that the differential equations are Lipschitz
continuous: a function f(x) : Rn → R is Lipschitz continuous if and only if there is
a bounded nonnegative constant K and a norm such that:
|f(x1)− f(x2)| ≤ K||x1 − x2||
We prove Lipschitz continuity for one population, but the proof applies to all popu-
lations j ∈ J . Denote by x = [s1(t), ..., sn(t), i1(t), ..., in(t)] and define the functions
f1(x) = dsj(t)dt , f2(x) =
dij(t)
dt , f3(x) =
drj(t)
dt . By Lemma 4.A.1 we have 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
element wise. We derive the following, using the `1-norm:
|f1(x1)− f1(x2)| =
∣∣∣∣∣−∑
l∈J
βjls
1
j i
1
l +
∑
l∈J
βjls
2
j i
2
l
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣(s2j − s1j )∑
l∈J
βjli
1
l + s2j
∑
l∈J
βjl(i2l − i1l )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
l∈J
βjl
(∣∣(s2j − s1j )∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
l∈J
(i2l − i1l )
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤
∑
l∈J
βjl ‖x1 − x2‖1
150
The most efficient critical vaccination coverage and its equivalence with
maximizing the herd effect
For f2(x) we derive that:
|f2(x1)− f2(x2)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
l∈J
βjls
1
j i
1
l − γji1j −
∑
l∈J
βjls
2
j i
2
l + γji2j
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣(s1j − s2j )
∑
l∈J
βjli
1
l + s2j
∑
l∈J:l 6=j
βjl(i1l − i2l ) +
(
s2jβjj − γj
)
(i1j − i2j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
γj +
∑
l∈J
βjl
)∣∣(s1j − s2j )∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
l∈J:l 6=j
(i1l − i2l )
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣(i1j − i2j )∣∣

≤
(
γj +
∑
l∈J
βjl
)
‖x1 − x2‖1
Finally, we also conclude that f3(x) is Lipschitz continuous:
|f3(x1)− f3(x2)| =
∣∣γji1j − γji2j ∣∣ ≤ γj ‖x1 − x2‖1
Given the initial value and the Lipschitz continuous differential equations, we can
apply the Picard-Lindelöf Theorem (Lindelöf 1894). This theorem states that there
is a unique solution to the differential equations for any point in time, which completes
the proof.
4.A.2 The herd effect
In this chapter, we make extensive use of the herd effect, which is implicitly defined
in (4.3). We will shortly explain in this section how (4.3) can be derived. Based on
the differential equations in (4.1) we can derive the following relation by inserting
the expression for drldt into the expression for
dsj
dt :
sj(t) = sj(0) exp
{
−
∑
l∈J
βjl
γl
[rl(t)− rl(0)]
}
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Considering that sj(t) + ij(t) + rj(t) = 1 for all t and for all j ∈ J and denoting by
σj = βjjγj :
sj(t) =sj(0) exp
{
−
∑
l∈J
βjl
γl
[sl(0) + il(0)− sl(t)− il(t)]
}
ij(t) =− sj(t) + 1
σj
log(sj(t)) + sj(0) + ij(0)− 1
σj
log(sj(0))
+ 1
σj
∑
l∈J:l 6=j
βjl
γl
[sl(0) + il(0)− sl(t)− il(t)]
Equation (4.A.2) holds for every t, so also for t → +∞. By the definition in (4.2)
we have that Gj(f) = limt→+∞ sj(t) for all j ∈ J . We also know that ij(+∞) = 0
for all j ∈ J . Inserting the expressions for t→ +∞ results in the implicit herd effect
definition in (4.3).
Lemma 4.10. For all j ∈ J the following holds:
(i) 0 ≤ Gj(f) ≤ min
{
(1− fj), 1σj
}
(ii) Gj(f) = 0 if and only if fj = 1.
Proof. We can rewrite (4.3) using the Lambert W function (cf. Corless et al. 1996,
Ma and Earn 2006):
Gj(f) =
−1
σj
W
−σj(1− fj) exp
−σj
(1− fj) + 1
σj
∑
l∈J:l 6=j
βj,l
γl
[1− fl −Gl(f)]


Denote by Bj(f) the following function, such that Gj(f) = −1σj W [Bj(f)]:
Bj(f) = −σj(1− fj) exp
−σj
(1− fj) + 1
σj
∑
l∈J:l 6=j
βjl
γl
[1− fl −Gl(f)]

Note that σj > 0 for all j ∈ J by Assumption 4.2. By definition of the Lambert W
function W (0) = 0 and W (x) ∈ [−1, 0) for x ∈ [−1e , 0). To complete the proof of this
lemma, it therefore suffices to show that Bj(f) ∈
[−1
e , 0
]
and Bj(f) = 0 if and only if
fj = 1. From the nonnegativity of the exponential function, it follows directly that
Bj(f) ≤ 0 and Bj(f) = 0 if and only if fj = 1. Using that Gj(f) ≤ (1− fj) and that
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the function f(y) = −yey is minimized for y = 1, the following holds:
Bj(f) = −σj(1− fj) exp
−σj
(1− fj) + 1
σj
∑
l∈J:l 6=j
βjl
γl
[1− fl −Gl(f)]

≥ −σj(1− fj) exp {−σj(1− fj)} ≥ −1
e
We showed that 0 ≤ Gj(f) ≤ 1σj and that Gj(f) = 0 if and only if fj = 1. By
Lemma 4.4 we also know that Gj(f) ≤ (1 − fj), which completes the proof of this
lemma.
4.B Theoretical results on Rf
Lemma 4.B.1. The largest eigenvalue of a matrix A, denoted by ρ(A), is a contin-
uous function of A.
Proof. The eigenvalues of a matrix A are equal to the roots of the characteristic
polynomial of A. By Naulin and Pabst (1994) the roots of a polynomial depend
continuously on the coefficients of the polynomial. That implies that the eigenvalues
of A are continuous in the matrix A. Let A be a n × n matrix. Denote by a and
b the vectors with elements ai and bi for i = 1, ..., n, i.e., the vectors with the
eigenvalues of the matrices A and B respectively. This implies that ρ(A) = maxi |ai|
and ρ(B) = maxi |bi|. For every i the following holds:
|ai| ≤ |bi|+ |ai − bi| by the triangle inequality
≤ ρ(B) + ‖a− b‖∞
This implies that ρ(A) ≤ ρ(B)+‖a− b‖∞ and by symmetry also ρ(B) ≤ ρ(A)+‖a−
b‖∞. Thus, |ρ(A)−ρ(B)| ≤ ‖a−b‖∞, meaning that the largest eigenvalue of a matrix
continuously depends on the eigenvalues. Since the eigenvalues are continuously
dependent on the matrix, the largest eigenvalue is a continuous function of the matrix.
This completes the proof of this lemma.
The largest eigenvalue of a matrix can be defined with Gelfand’s formula, which
holds for any norm:
ρ(A) = lim
k→+∞
∥∥Ak∥∥ 1k (4.31)
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Using Gelfand’s formula we derive the following result:
Corollary 4.B.2. Let A and B be two nonnegative matrices with A ≤ B element
wise. If the inequality between A and B is strict for at least one element, then
ρ(A) < ρ(B). Otherwise, ρ(A) ≤ ρ(B).
Proof. This proof is based on Meyer (2000) (Example 7.10.2). The Frobenius norm
is defined as follows:
‖A‖F =
√∑
i
∑
j
|aij |2
Note that the following holds:
A ≤ B ⇒ Ak ≤ Bk ⇒ ‖Ak‖F ≤ ‖Bk‖F
The proof can easily be completed using (4.31):
‖Ak‖F ≤ ‖Bk‖F ⇒ ‖Ak‖
1
k
F ≤ ‖Bk‖
1
k
F ⇒ lim
k→+∞
‖Ak‖ 1kF ≤ lim
k→+∞
‖Bk‖ 1kF
Above result implies that ρ(A) ≤ ρ(B). Using the Frobenius norm we establish that
‖Ak‖F < ‖Bk‖F when A is strictly smaller than B for at least one element. In that
case we thus have ρ(A) < ρ(B). This completes the proof.
From Corollary 4.B.2 we can derive the following result:
Lemma 4.B.3. Let f i denote a vector of vaccination fractions with corresponding
reproduction ratio Rf (f i) for i = 1, 2. If f2 ≥ f1 for all elements and f1 6= f2, then
Rf (f2) < Rf (f1).
Proof. Denote by F1 and F2 the matrices with on the diagonal respectively the
elements of (1 − f1) and (1 − f2). It holds that Rf (f2) = ρ(F2Bγ) and Rf (f1) =
ρ(F1Bγ). We also have that F2 ≤ F1 with at least one element strict, because
f1 6= f2. We can apply Corollary 4.B.2:
Rf (f2) = ρ (F2Bγ) < ρ (F1Bγ) = Rf (f1)
Lemma 4.B.4. Re(t) is continuous in t.
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Proof. In Lemma 4.B.1 we show that the largest eigenvalue of a matrix A, denoted by
ρ(A), is a continuous function of A. From the differential equations (4.1) we conclude
that sj(t) is a continuous function for all j ∈ J . By Definition 4.1 this implies that
Re(t) is continuous in t, which completes the proof.
Corollary 4.B.5. Re(t) is monotonically non-increasing in t, i.e., Re(t+) ≤ Re(t)
for any δ > 0.
Proof. By Lemma 4.A.1 sj(t) is non-increasing and thus S(t+ δ) ≤ S(t). By Corol-
lary 4.B.2 this implies: Re(t+ δ) = ρ(S(t+ δ)Bγ) ≤ ρ(S(t)Bγ) = Re(t).
Lemma 4.B.6. If Rf > 1 then limt→+∞Re(t) < 1. [Theorem 2 in Chan (2013)]
4.C Optimization problems
Lemma 4.11. For any solution to Problem (4.25) - (4.29) we have fi ≥ 1− γiβii .
Proof. Let k ∈ arg minj∈J\{i}
{
βij
γj
}
. We derive the following relation for fi us-
ing (4.26) - (4.28):
fi = 1− vi∑
j∈J
βij
γj
vj
≥ 1− vi
βik
γk
(1− vi) + βiiγi vi
To derive a lower bound on fi we maximize above expression with respect to vi:
d
dvi
[
1− vi
βik
γk
(1− vi) + βiiγi vi
]
=
βik
γk[
βik
γk
(1− vi)βiiγi vi
]2 ≥ 0
By Assumption 4.2 the derivative is nonnegative and the expression is thus maximized
for vi = 1. This proves the lower bound on fi: fi ≥ 1− γiβii .
Lemma 4.12. The feasible region of Problem (4.25) - (4.29) is not convex.
Proof. It suffices to give a counter example. Consider the case that |J | = 2 and
define the matrix Bγ and the variable vector x:
Bγ =
[
1 3
3 1
]
x = [(1− f1), (1− f2), v1, v2]
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One can easily check that the following two vectors are feasible with respect to
constraints (4.26) - (4.29): x1 = [0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5] and x2 = [0.1 0.5 0.25 0.75].
Take the convex combination x3 = αx1 + (1 − α)x2 with α = 0.5, that results in
x3 = [0.175 0.375 0.375 0.675]. Constraints (4.27) - (4.29) are clearly satisfied by x3.
However, x3 is not feasible with respect to constraint (4.26) nor to the relaxation
in (4.30):
0.175× [1× 0.375 + 3× 0.675] ≈ 0.3937 > 0.375
0.375× [3× 0.375 + 1× 0.675] ≈ 0.6563 6= 0.675
This completes the proof.
4.D Vaccine efficacy
In this chapter, we assumed that a vaccine is completely effective and leads to com-
plete immunity. In literature this assumption is often relaxed by including a vaccine
efficacy parameter (cf. Hill and Longini Jr 2003). In this section, we study the ef-
fects of such a relaxation. Let ψj denote the vaccine efficacy rate in population j.
Vaccination then implies a shift from state (sj(0) = 1, ij(0) = 0, rj(0) = 0) to state
((1− ψjfj), 0, ψjfj) for all j ∈ J . Introducing a vaccine efficacy parameter is simply
a rescaling of the vaccination fraction fj . However, this rescaling has consequences
for the equivalence of the two optimization problems defined in Section 4.4.2. As a
result of reduced vaccine efficacy, the number of allocated vaccines is no longer equal
to the number of effective vaccines. The total herd effect attained when Rf = 1
is now equal to
∑
j∈J Nj(1 − ψjfj), whereas the number of allocated vaccines still
equals
∑
j∈J Njfj . Thus, the last implication in the proof of Theorem 4.4 no longer
holds. Only for the special case that ψj = ψ for all j ∈ J the equivalence still holds.
Without equivalence the two problems can still be solved with the solution ap-
proach of Section 4.5.3. The quadratic equality constraint in (4.26) can be reformu-
lated as follows:
(1− ψifi)
∑
j∈J
βij
γj
vj = vi ⇔ fi = 1
ψi
1− vi∑
j∈J
βij
γj
vj
 i ∈ J (4.32)
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The objective function and the other constraints of Problem (4.25) - (4.29) re-
main valid for the problem of minimizing the required amount of vaccines to achieve
Rf = 1. For maximizing the herd effect the objective function must be changed to
max
∑
j∈J(1− ψjfj)Nj .
4.E Proof for n = 2
Theorem 4.5. The optimal solution to Problem (4.21) - (4.24) can be found among
the boundary solutions given in Lemma 4.7 and the following solution:
f1 = 1− 1
σ1
1−
√
cσ1N2
σ2N1
1− c
 and f2 = 1− 1
σ2
1−
√
cσ2N1
σ1N2
1− c

For c ≥ 1 only the boundary solutions need to be considered.
Proof. By (4.20) we rewrite the objective function of Problem (4.21) - (4.24) into:
O(f1) = N1(1− f1) +N2
[
1− σ1(1− f1)
σ2[1− σ1(1− c)(1− f1)]
]
We analyze the extrema of this function by setting the derivative of O(f1) with
respect to f1 equal to 0:
d
df1
O(f1) =−N1 + cσ1N2
σ2[1− σ1(1− c)(1− f1)]2 = 0
⇔[1− σ1(1− c)(1− f1)]2 = cσ1N2
σ2N1
⇔f1 = 1− 1
σ1
1−
√
cσ1N2
σ2N1
1− c

In the third step we use (4.23). The objective function O(f1) thus has a unique
extreme:
f1 = 1− 1
σ1
1−
√
cσ1N2
σ2N1
1− c
 and f2 = 1− 1
σ2
1−
√
cσ2N1
σ1N2
1− c
 (4.33)
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where f2 is derived by substituting the expression for f1 in (4.20). To verify whether
this extreme is a minimum or a maximum, we analyze the second order derivative of
O(f1):
d2
d(f1)2
O(f1) =
−2σ21c(1− c)N2
σ2[1− σ1(1− c)(1− f1)]3
Note that the denominator is positive by constraint (4.23). We distinguish between
the following three cases: (a) c = 1, (b) c > 1 and (c) c < 1. In case (a) the function
O(f1) is linear. For case (b) the second order derivative is positive, implying that the
extreme in (4.33) is a minimum. For both case (a) and (b) the function O(f1) is thus
maximized in one of the boundary points. In case (c) the second order derivative is
positive.
Thus, for c ≥ 1 the optimal solution can be found among the two boundary
solutions that are feasible according to Lemma 4.7. For c < 1 the solution in (4.33)
is a candidate for the optimal solution. However, this candidate possibly results
in f1, f2 that violate constraints (4.23) or (4.24), rendering the candidate solution
infeasible. Therefore, also the feasible boundary solutions must be compared. This
completes the proof of this theorem.

Chapter 5
The benefits of combining
early aspecific vaccination
with later specific
vaccination1
5.1 Introduction
One of the crucial aspects of successful vaccination is timing. As an infectious disease
can spread quickly through a population, the earlier people can be immunized, the
better. However, an effective response strategy cannot always be started directly,
either because the characteristics of the outbreak are not yet known or because it
takes time to produce and distribute the right vaccines. Thus, policy makers face
a trade-off between the timing of vaccination and the effectiveness of the response.
The effectiveness of the response is related to the efficacy of a vaccine, which is a
measure of relative risk in a vaccinated group compared to an unvaccinated control
group. The higher the efficacy of a vaccine, the better the vaccine is able to achieve
immunity in the vaccinee.
1This chapter is based on Duijzer et al. (2017a).
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There are numerous practical situations where policy makers have to make a
trade off between the efficacy of vaccines and the timing of vaccination. Here are
three examples:
1. The production for the annual influenza vaccine starts well before the influenza
season starts. That implies that detailed knowledge about the characteristics
of the annual flu is missing and that it is difficult to design a good vaccine.
Policy makers face a ‘commit-or-defer’ decision: either they should decide on
the vaccine composition early with little knowledge available, or they decide
to defer the decision in order to learn more about the coming influenza season
(e.g., Kornish and Keeney 2008, Cho 2010). Quick decisions have the advantage
of having the vaccines available early, but deferring could lead to vaccines with
a higher efficacy.
2. Whereas the annual influenza is expected, an unexpected outbreak of influenza
can also occur, potentially resulting in a pandemic. In those situations, policy
makers have to determine how to respond. They can often choose among
multiple vaccine types: vaccines with a high efficacy or vaccines with a lower
efficacy. The latter might seem worse, but might have a lower price, a shorter
delivery time or may be available in larger quantities. Nguyen and Carlson
(2016) vary the time at which vaccines become available and the stockpile size
to determine the effects on the epidemic.
3. For some vaccines, a single dose only results in limited protection. To benefit
fully from the vaccine, you need multiple doses that are administered a number
of days apart. When only a limited number of doses of vaccine is available,
policy makers have to decide how this vaccine stockpile should be allocated:
they can either give a large number of people a single dose, or two doses to
half of the group (Matrajt et al. 2015). It may not be obvious how timing of
vaccination plays a role in this example. But the fact that there is a fixed time
in between two doses implies that the epidemic can spread between the first
and the second dose. A one-dose strategy thus corresponds to a quick response,
whereas a two-dose strategy has a higher efficacy.
In this chapter, we synthesize these different decision problems and formulate
a general problem that encapsulates all three examples. We formulate this general
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problem in terms of example 2, but the other examples can analogously be analyzed.
We consider a policy maker who has a limited budget to fight an outbreak of an
infectious disease. The budget can be spent on different vaccine types that differ in
the time at which they are available and in their efficacy. The simplest example on
which most of our research focuses, is the case of two vaccine types: type 1 is an
early aspecific vaccine, which has a low efficacy, and type 2 is a late specific vaccine,
which has a high efficacy. We analyze for which combinations of parameters (efficacy,
moment of availability) the late specific vaccine is preferred over the early aspecific
vaccine. We first prove a rather intuitive result: the existence of a switching curve
which separates the region in the parameter space where the late specific vaccine is
preferred from the region where the early aspecific type is preferred. In this chapter,
we give an analytical expression characterizing this curve.
More importantly, we show that the decision maker should not only consider
spending her entire budget on one of the vaccine types. Instead, she should suitable
invest in both vaccine types to benefit both from the early response and from the
good vaccine. Such a hybrid strategy is not well taken up in literature, although
some national pandemic response plans propose a similar strategy by emphasizing
the importance of investing in stockpiles of vaccines for known virus types as well
as expanding the vaccine manufacturing capacity for the production of pandemic
vaccines tailored to the specific virus (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2005, Homeland Security Council 2006).
Our main contribution in this chapter is formally proposing and analyzing such
hybrid strategies. We characterize the areas in the parameter space where either
of the two pure strategies or the hybrid strategy is optimal. We prove that there
is an area around the switching curve where hybrid strategies are superior to pure
strategies. We argue that this is due to the nonlinear dynamics of an epidemic: By
using both vaccine types the early vaccine can be used to reduce the initial growth
in infections, while the better vaccine is used to control the epidemic. Our numerical
results show that a hybrid strategy can reduce the number of infections by more than
50% compared to the best pure strategy. We note that, because our formulation
generalizes examples 1-3 above, our analysis of hybrid strategies contributes to three
streams of literature (see Section 5.2).
In this chapter, we focus on the most interesting case of hybrid strategies, namely
those with two vaccine types. Our numerical results show that this choice is not
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restrictive, as hybrid strategies with more than two vaccine types are not beneficial.
Moreover, our results can also be applied to vaccines that become available in batches
instead of instantaneously.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. We start with a literature
review in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we formally define the vaccination problem.
This problem is analyzed in Section 5.4: we compare the two vaccine types and
analyze hybrid strategies. In Section 5.5, we derive our numerical results. We close
with a discussion and conclusions in Sections 5.6 and 5.7.
5.2 Literature
Extant literature considers the trade-off between timing of vaccination and vaccine
efficacy in three separate practical settings. We now first discuss literature in the
setting of the annual influenza vaccine, then literature on the effects of timing of
vaccination and finally literature on the number of doses to use. Timing of vaccination
is part of a much broader stream of literature on vaccine logistics. An overview can
be found in Chapter 2.
Annual influenza vaccine The trade-off between timing and efficacy is well stud-
ied for the annual influenza vaccine. There exist multiple types of the influenza virus
and mutations might lead to new types. Every year the World Health Organization
(WHO) advices on the composition of the influenza vaccine (Silva et al. 2015), i.e.,
which virus types to include in the vaccine. To produce a sufficient number of doses,
the composition of the vaccine must be determined well before the influenza season
starts.
Wu et al. (2005) discuss the ‘follow policy’, where the forecasted epidemic strain
is included in the annual vaccine. The authors investigate whether this policy can be
improved by including information on the strains to which the individual has been
exposed in the past. The results show that the follow policy is only slightly subop-
timal and is therefore recommended to be continued. Kornish and Keeney (2008)
study when it is beneficial to defer the decision on the vaccine composition in order to
buy time to gather more information about the coming influenza season. Deferring
reduces uncertainty and could lead to better decisions on which strains to include
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in the vaccine. However, waiting too long reduces the available time for production,
potentially leading to higher production costs. The authors assume that they can
estimate the number of cases during the outbreak, based on the information at the
current time. The authors formulate a commit-or-defer model and derive conditions
on the optimal decision using dynamic programming. When discussing their model
assumptions, the authors mention the disadvantage of waiting with production while
gathering information on one of the strains that are included in the vaccine. They
suggest a solution in which production of the other strains could start earlier and the
new strain is only added to the vaccines subsequently produced. This solution can
be seen as some kind of hybrid strategy, but the strategy is not formally analyzed by
the authors.
Cho (2010) extend the work of Kornish and Keeney (2008) by including produc-
tion yield uncertainties. Decision makers have to decide on retaining the current
vaccine or shifting to updated compositions. The latter may have more production
yield uncertainty. A discrete time model is proposed with three possible decisions
at every time: select the current vaccine strain, update to the most prevalent new
strain or postpone decision making to the next period. Özaltın et al. (2011) allow for
choosing among multiple possible strains for the vaccine, not only the most prevalent
one. The authors use parameters to quantify the proportion of the population that
got infected with a certain influenza strain. A multi-stage stochastic mixed integer
model is formulated to integrate the composition decision and the timing of this de-
cision. The results show that selecting a less prevalent strain might be beneficial,
if this strain has higher production yields for example. All papers on the influenza
composition decision consider only situations in which all vaccines are of the same
type. In other words, the policy maker either decides to ‘commit’ or to ‘defer’. A
hybrid strategy, in which the decision maker commits for part of the budget and
defers for the remaining budget, is not analyzed, apart from the brief discussion in
Kornish and Keeney (2008).
Timing of vaccination The second example of a trade-off between timing and
efficacy is the selection among multiple vaccine types with different delivery times.
Matrajt and Longini Jr (2010) study a related problem and compare multiple mo-
ments of vaccination and different available stockpiles. Their results show how the
vaccine stockpile size and the moment at which this stockpile becomes available af-
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fect the optimal allocation over the different age groups and risk-groups. A similar
setting is studied by Matrajt et al. (2013), who focus on a network of cities connected
by an airline network instead of a single population. Motivated by practical consid-
erations, they shortly discuss the case of vaccines that arrive in two batches, with
fixed amounts of vaccines per batch. This is a form of hybrid strategy and results
show that the optimal allocation almost coincides with the pro rata allocation over
children in the different cities. Yarmand et al. (2014) study a two-phase allocation
problem with minimum required vaccination levels in each phase, where the required
level for a region in the second phase only applies if the epidemic in that region is not
yet contained after phase 1. They formulate a stochastic programming problem and
show how the optimal allocation depends on the minimum required levels. Nguyen
and Carlson (2016) compare different vaccination strategies which differ in when and
how much vaccines become available. Deterministic and stochastic models are used
and the optimal allocation for two coupled populations is determined numerically.
All vaccines are assumed to be available at one time. The authors present contour
plots that indicate which combinations of the vaccination fraction and the timing of
vaccination result in the same final size. We extend this work by analytically de-
scribing the shape of these contour curves as well as by analyzing hybrid strategies
where people can be vaccinated at multiple moments in time.
Optimal vaccine dosage There are some studies on determining the optimal dose
for vaccines against pandemic influenza. Riley et al. (2007) show that a lower vaccine
dose may be preferred, because it increases coverage levels. Similar results are found
by Wood et al. (2009), who find that the lowest dose results in the smallest attack
rate. Matrajt et al. (2015) compare the effects of a one-dose and a two-dose strategy
for influenza vaccination and use a more analytical approach. The authors prove
that there is a threshold in the level of protection that is obtained after the first dose
below which the two-dose strategy is the best. For pre-pandemic vaccination this
threshold can analytically be characterized and for reactive vaccination numerical
and simulation results are found. Our results contribute two this literature in two
ways: we derive an analytical approach that also holds for the reactive case, but
more importantly we propose hybrid strategies and show their benefits. These hybrid
strategies translate to some people receiving one dose and others receiving two doses.
Riley et al. (2007) briefly mention the possibility to give health care workers a higher
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dosage than the remainder of the population, but this strategy is not analyzed. This
strategy can be seen as a hybrid strategy which is advocated in this chapter.
Model We now relate our modelling choices to current literature. We make use of
the SIR model, which is a seminal model in epidemiology proposed by Kermack and
McKendrick (1927). As our problem incorporates the effect of timing of vaccination,
we allow for vaccination during an outbreak (see also Meyers et al. 2009, Chowell
et al. 2009, Matrajt and Longini Jr 2010, Tuite et al. 2010). Alternatively, there
are studies that focus on pre-pandemic vaccination, assuming that all vaccines are
available prior to the outbreak (e.g. Wu et al. 2007, Keeling and Shattock 2012,
Duijzer et al. 2016). To evaluate the effects of different vaccination strategies we
focus on minimizing the final size, i.e., the proportion of people infected during the
outbreak (e.g., Wu et al. 2007, Wang et al. 2009, Keeling and Shattock 2012, Lee et al.
2015b). An alternative performance criterion is the reproduction ratio R, which is
related to the initial growth of infections (Diekmann et al. 2013). There are studies
that focus on minimizing the reproduction ratio (Goldstein et al. 2009, Wallinga
et al. 2010) or on reaching a certain threshold value of the reproduction ratio (e.g.,
Tanner et al. 2008, Gittings and Matson 2016). The reproduction ratio differs from
the final size by focusing on the short term, whereas the final size takes into account
the entire time course of the epidemic. However, in Chapter 4 we show that under
certain conditions optimization problems involving these two performance criteria
are equivalent.
5.3 Problem formulation
We evaluate the effects of different vaccination strategies and make use of the de-
terministic SIR model to model the time course of the epidemic. This model is
explained in Section 5.3.1. In Section 5.3.2, we describe the effect of vaccination
on the epidemic and the considered decision problem. We formalize this in Sec-
tion 5.3.3. In Section 5.3.4, we formulate the optimization problem that is studied
in this chapter.
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5.3.1 The SIR model
The SIR model is a seminal model in epidemiology proposed by Kermack and Mc-
Kendrick (1927). The population is divided into three compartments for which the
time course is tracked (cf. Hethcote 2000). Let s(t), i(t) and r(t) be the fractions
of the population respectively susceptible, infected and removed at time t. In this
chapter, we assume that the removed compartment consists of recovered individuals,
deaths can be taken into account straightforwardly. By interpretation it must hold
that s(t) + i(t) + r(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0. The SIR model is described by the following
system of differential equations, with the transmission rate and the rate of recovery
denoted by β and γ, respectively.
ds
dt
= −βsi
di
dt
= βsi− γi
dr
dt
= γi
(5.1)
We assume that boundary conditions s(0) = s0, i(0) = i0 and r(0) = r0 are given,
with i0 > 0 and s0 + i0 + r0 = 1. Figure 5.1 illustrates the time course for an
epidemic that evolves according to the SIR model. This figure is made using the
Runge-Kutta method (Greenbaum and Chartier 2012). The figure shows that not
everybody gets infected during the outbreak. Around 50% of the population is still
susceptible when the epidemic has died out, so they have escaped infection. We
also observe in the figure that the fraction of infected individuals initially increases
until it reaches a certain peak value. After the peak, the epidemic starts to die out.
From the differential equations we can derive that this peak occurs when s(t) = γβ .
We therefore refer to an epidemic being controlled when s(t) is below the threshold
γ
β . Although the number of infected people in a controlled epidemic can still be
substantial, there are more recoveries than new infections per time unit so that the
proportion of infected people is decreasing.
5.3.2 Problem description
Vaccination reduces the fraction of susceptible individuals, in order to control the
epidemic at an earlier point in time and to avoid or reduce an increase in the fraction
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the deterministic SIR model with parameters γ =
0.25, β = 0.35, i0 = 10−6 and s0 = 1− i0.
of infected individuals. The effect of vaccination is twofold. The people who directly
benefit from vaccination are the vaccinees, because they acquire (partial) immunity
due to vaccination. Indirectly also unvaccinated people benefit from the vaccination
of others, as it reduces their disease exposure. This indirect effect of vaccination is
known as the herd effect (Fine 1993).
Consider a decision maker who has a budget available to spend on the different
vaccine types in the set J . These vaccine types differ in three aspects: the price per
dose of vaccine (pj), the efficacy of the vaccine (φj) and the time at which the vaccine
becomes available (τj). The efficacy of a vaccine is the level at which the vaccine
is able to induce immunity and can be interpreted as the proportion of vaccinated
people who will get immune after vaccination. We assume that all vaccines can
quickly be distributed as soon as they are available. Denote by B the total budget of
the decision maker. Her goal is to divide this budget over the vaccine types in such
a way that as few people as possible will get infected during the outbreak.
The effect of vaccination on the epidemic is illustrated in Figure 5.2. In this figure
we consider a population of 106 individuals where 150 000 people are vaccinated at
time 10 with a vaccine that has efficacy 0.4 and another 100 000 people are vaccinated
at time 100 with a vaccine that has efficacy 0.7. This means that effectively 150 000 ×
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0.4 + 100 000× 0.7 = 130 000 people have become immune through vaccination. If we
compare Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, we see that vaccination lowers the peak in infected
individuals. In addition, more people have escaped infection when vaccination is used:
the proportion of people still susceptible when the epidemic has died out (i.e., the
herd effect) has increased from 50% to almost 60%.
Time
0
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Removed
Figure 5.2: Illustration of vaccination in the deterministic SIR model with vacci-
nation, with parameters as in Figure 5.1.
In the remainder of this section we give a detailed model for the problem.
5.3.3 Vaccination
To formally define vaccination, we introduce the following notation. Denote by Bj
the budget allocated to vaccines of type j. Furthermore, let ϕj = φjpj be the efficacy
per dollar for vaccines of type j which are available at τj . The vaccines are admin-
istered to susceptible individuals and we assume that it is possible to identify the
susceptible people. Thus, the fraction of people no longer susceptible and immune
due to allocating Bj to vaccines of type j equals fj = ϕjBjN , where N is the size
of the considered population. It makes sense to consider only Bj ≤ pjs(τj)N : the
amount of allocated budget is at most enough to vaccinate the entire susceptible
population. Under this constraint fj ≤ s(τj)φj . For Bj > pjs(τj)N we stipulate
that fj = s(τj)φj .
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We also assume that vaccination takes no time, meaning that vaccination re-
sults in immunity immediately. We refer to Section 5.6 for a discussion of these
assumptions. Under our assumptions vaccination causes a shift at time τj from state
(s(τj), i(τj)) to state (s(τj) − fj , i(τj)). This implies that r(τj) shifts to r(τj) + fj .
This is a common way of modelling vaccination (e.g., Hill and Longini Jr 2003, Bansal
et al. 2006, Mylius et al. 2008).
To compare different vaccination strategies we consider the state of the system
when t → ∞. This state is also referred to as ‘disease-free equilibrium’, because
limt→∞ i(t) = 0 which can be derived from the differential equations (5.1). For
notational convenience, we define f = (f1, ..., fn) and τ = (τ1, ..., τn). Let G(f , τ)
denote the final fraction of people susceptible in the disease-free equilibrium. More
precisely, for fj ∈ [0, φjs(τj)] and for all j ∈ J
G(f , τ) = lim
t→∞ s(t), (5.2)
with s(t) evolving according to (5.1) in between two consecutive vaccination moments
and after the last vaccination moment. We determineG(f , τ) with an implicit relation
called the final size equation, details are in Appendix 5.A. G(f , τ) quantifies the so-
called herd effect, which is the indirect effect of vaccination where unvaccinated people
benefit from the vaccination of others. We refer to Chapter 3 for a more extensive
analysis of the herd effect and the function G(f , τ) for a single vaccination moment.
In the remainder of this chapter we focus on the final size, i.e., the proportion of the
population that has been infected during the outbreak. The final size is denoted by
Z(f , τ) and can be calculated as follows:
Z(f , τ) = s0 −G(f , τ)−
∑
j∈J
fj + i0 (5.3)
Observe that the part s0 − G(f , τ) in above equation determines the proportion of
people who were susceptible at the beginning of the outbreak, but are no longer
susceptible at the end. These people have either become infected or have become im-
mune because of vaccination. By correcting for those that are vaccinated (
∑
j∈J fj),
we remain with the number of infections during the outbreak. We add the initial
infections (i0) to determine the final size of the outbreak. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of modelling vaccination in the SIR model we refer to Chapter 3.
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5.3.4 Optimization problem
In this section, we formally define our decision problem. Recall that we consider a
decision maker with a total budget B to spend on the vaccine types in J in order
to minimize the final size of the outbreak. Using the notation that is introduced in
Section 5.3.3, the optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
min Z(f , τ)
s.t. N
∑
j∈J
fj
ϕj
≤ B
fj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J
(5.4)
The objective is to minimize the final size. We formulate the optimization problem
using the variables fj , but the constraints can easily be rewritten in terms of Bj . The
first constraint ensures that the budget B is not exceeded. The second constraint
makes sure that the amount of vaccines is non-negative for all vaccine types.
5.4 Analytical results
In this section, we study Problem (5.4) and compare different vaccination strategies.
In Section 5.4.1, we start with showing that a hybrid vaccination strategy can equiv-
alently be summarized as a vaccination strategy with a single vaccination moment.
The characterization of this single moment strategy enables us to analyze hybrid
strategies in the following sections. In Section 5.4.2, we focus on comparing two vac-
cination strategies. We analyze pure strategies in which the entire budget is spent
on one vaccine type, and we consider hybrid strategies where the budget is divided
over the two vaccine types. Section 5.4.3 is dedicated to the analysis of two vaccine
types that arrive in batches, such that vaccination does not take place at a single
moment, but during a vaccination campaign.
5.4.1 Characterizing hybrid vaccination strategies
Hybrid vaccination strategies are difficult to compare, because they differ both in
the times at which people are vaccinated and in the proportion of the population
vaccinated at those times. To simplify the comparison, we show how to construct
for each hybrid strategy a single moment strategy, such that the hybrid strategy and
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the single moment strategy have the same final size. Note that this single moment
strategy differs from the pure strategies described earlier, because the vaccination
moment for the single moment strategy need not, and typically is not, one of the
moments at which vaccination is possible for the hybrid strategy.
The formal result is presented in the following theorem. The proof can be found in
Appendix 5.B. In this theorem s(i)(t) and s(ii)(t) respectively denote the proportion
of people susceptible at time t in the hybrid strategy (i) and the single moment
strategy (ii).
Theorem 5.1. We consider an initial state denoted by (s0, i0) and use the SIR
model to evaluate the epidemic. A hybrid vaccination strategy (i) with n vaccination
moments at times τ1, ..., τn and corresponding vaccination fractions f1, ..., fn results
in the same final size as a single moment vaccination strategy (ii) with one vaccina-
tion moment at time τT and a vaccination fraction fT =
∑n
j=1 fj if and only if τT
satisfies the following condition:
1− f
T
s(ii)(τT )
=
∏
j∈J
(
1− fj
s(i)(τj)
)
(5.5)
There is always exactly one τT ∈ [τ1, τn] satisfying (5.5).
The interpretation of Theorem 5.1 is as follows. Effectively vaccinating a certain
number of people divided over n moments in the time interval [τ1, τn] results in the
same final size as effectively vaccinating this same number of people at once at some
time τT . Although the existence of τT may be intuitive, its characterization in (5.5)
is not trivial. The contribution of Theorem 5.1 is therefore that we characterize the
single moment vaccination strategy: we describe the vaccination fraction and the
time at which vaccination should take place.
The condition (5.5) that characterizes s(ii)(τT ) has the following interpretation.
Upon vaccination at time τj in strategy (i) the susceptible population reduces from
s(i)(τj) to s(i)(τj) − fj = s(i)(τj)
(
1− fjs(i)(τj)
)
, i.e., s(i)(τj) is multiplied with the
factor
(
1− fjs(i)(τj)
)
. The time τT is such that multiplying s(ii)(τT ) with the product
of all these factors for j = 1, ..., n results in a reduction of fT . The characterization
of τT allows us to compare different hybrid strategies with each other and with
pure strategies. To compute the actual value for τT , we numerically evaluate of the
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differential equations in (5.1) to determine at which time the proportion of susceptible
people equals s(ii)(τT ).
In Appendix 5.C, we show that the result of Theorem 5.1 also holds for a more
general epidemic model, namely the SInRmodel with n consecutive infectious stages.
The SInR model can also take into account a latent period or multiple levels of
infectivity. Since the characterization of s(τT ) in Theorem 5.1 underlies the other
results in this chapter, we conjecture that these results also extend to this more
general epidemic model. If this conjecture is true, our choice for the simple SIR
model is not restrictive.
5.4.2 Comparison of vaccination strategies
In this section, we focus on comparing vaccination strategies in which two vaccine
types can be used, i.e., |J | = 2. Consider a policy maker that has a certain budget
available to spend on these two vaccine types. We start with considering strategies in
which all budget is spent on one vaccine type. We refer to these vaccination strategies
as ‘pure strategies’. Next, we extend these results to hybrid strategies in which the
budget may be divided over the two types.
Pure strategies
The two considered vaccine types are characterized by a vaccine efficacy per dollar
and a time at which the vaccines become available, respectively denoted by ϕj and
τj for j = 1, 2. We refer to vaccine type 1 as the vaccine type which is available
early, but has a low efficacy per dollar and to type 2 as the vaccine type which is
available at a later point in time, but has a high efficacy per dollar. Hence, τ1 < τ2
and ϕ1 < ϕ2. Let us assume that the characteristics are fixed for vaccine type 1. We
analyze the effects of varying the availability and efficacy per dollar of type 2 to see
which vaccine type is preferred.
If the vaccines of type 2 are available very early, i.e., just after τ1, hardly any
new infections will occur in the interval [τ1, τ2]. The higher efficacy per dollar of type
2 outweighs the delayed availability, because it allows to effectively vaccinate more
people and possibly even to control the epidemic directly at τ2. On the other hand,
if the vaccines of type 2 are available when the epidemic is already declining, they
are of little use. In a declining epidemic the risk of becoming infected is low and you
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would almost only vaccinate people who would not have become infected anyways.
Thus, when type 2 is available very late, we prefer type 1 vaccines because they are
available in time to reduce the growth in infections and lower the risk of infection for
unvaccinated people.
We thus see that type 1 is preferred when type 2 is available very late, but also
that type 2 is preferred if this type is available early. This implies that there is a
specific time for the availability of type 2 at which the two pure strategies are equally
good. Theorem 5.2 derives a formal result along these lines and characterizes the
curve where the pure strategies are equally good. In this theorem τ2 is implicitly
defined through s2(τ2), with sj(t) denoting the proportion of people susceptible in
strategy j at time t.
Theorem 5.2. The pure strategies 1 and 2 result in the same final size under the
following condition:
s2(τ2) =
s1(τ1)ϕ2G(f1, τ1)
ϕ1G(f1, τ1) +
(
s1(τ1)− Bϕ1N
)
(ϕ2 − ϕ1)
(5.6)
If s2(τ2) is smaller (larger) than the right-hand side in above expression, then strategy
2 is worse (better).
Recall that the proportion of people susceptible is decreasing over time, such
that a lower s2(τ2) implies a later availability (i.e., a higher τ2). Thus, Theorem 5.2
confirms our finding that strategy 2 is worse if the vaccines of this type are available
late, but better if they are available early. We can derive the following managerial
implications from Theorem 5.2. First, we observe that if the two vaccine types have
the same efficacy per dollar, the best vaccine is the one that is available at the earliest
time. Secondly, if the two vaccine types are available at the same time such that
s1(τ1) = s2(τ2), the vaccine with the highest efficacy per dollar results in the lowest
final size. In short, vaccinating early is better and vaccines with a higher efficacy per
dollar are better. These conclusions also imply that later available vaccine types with
a lower efficacy per dollar are always dominated by vaccine types that are available
at an earlier time and have a higher efficacy. This confirms our choice to consider
vaccine types for which τ1 < τ2 and ϕ1 < ϕ2.
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If the epidemic can be controlled with only vaccines of type 1, then there are not
many new infections after τ1 andG(f1, τ1) is only slightly smaller than
(
s1(τ1)− Bϕ1N
)
.
By (5.6) in that case vaccines of type 2 can only be preferred if τ2 is very close to τ1.
In condition (5.6) the two parameters that characterize type 2 appear: the avail-
ability and the efficacy per dollar. For strategy 1 and 2 to be equally good, there
is a trade-off between those two parameters. Delaying should be compensated by a
higher efficacy per dollar. Though if the availability is too far delayed, there is no
compensation possible.
Corollary 5.1. The value for τ2 that satisfies (5.6) is increasing in ϕ2.
We illustrate the switching curve for two vaccination strategies in Figure 5.3. We
can compute τ2 easily from (5.6) by numerical evaluation of the differential equations
(5.1). The parameters for this figure are as follows: B/N = 0.5 and β = 0.35, γ =
0.24. Both vaccines have a price of 1 dollar per dose. Vaccines of type 1 have efficacy
per dollar ϕ1 = 0.4 and are available at time 0 when i0 = 10−6 and s0 = 1− i0. To
construct the figure, we use (5.6) to determine the relation between s2(τ2) and ϕ2
and we evaluate the differential equations to derive τ2 from s2(τ2). The figure shows
the same structure as described before. We also see that vaccines which become
available very late are never preferred, regardless of their efficacy per dollar.
Hybrid strategies
In addition to the pure strategies that are analyzed above, we can also consider hybrid
strategies. In hybrid strategies the budget is partly spent on vaccines of type 1 and
partly on vaccines of type 2. Intuitively one might think that one of the vaccine types
is better than the other, such that only a pure strategy can be optimal. However, in
this section we prove and explain that the opposite is true.
To investigate when hybrid strategies can be optimal, we take the efficacy per
dollar of type 2 as fixed and vary the time at which these vaccines become available.
We start with τ2 high, such that it is best to spend the entire budget on vaccines
of type 1. By advancing the availability of type 2, we will reach a point at which
these vaccines are so attractive, that it is no longer optimal to spend the entire
budget on vaccines of type 1. The following theorem shows under which condition
this happens. To derive this condition, we make use of Theorem 5.1 which provides
a useful characterization of the hybrid strategy.
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the switching curve. In the white area strategy 1 results
in the lowest final size and is therefore the best and in the dark area this holds for
strategy 2.
Theorem 5.3. Consider the pure strategy where all vaccines are of type 1. It is
better to shift  vaccines to type 2, with  > 0 small, under the following condition:
ϕ2
ϕ1
>
[s1(τv1 )−G(f1, τ1)] /s1(τv1 )
[s1(τ2)−G(f1, τ1)] /s1(τ2) , (5.7)
where s1(τv1 ) denotes the proportion of people susceptible just after vaccination at
time τ1.
By spending some of the budget on vaccines of type 1 and some on vaccines of type
2, the population can benefit from the advantages of both vaccine types. The early
vaccination with type 1 reduces the initial growth in infections and with the high
efficacy per dollar of type 2 many people can achieve immunity due to vaccination.
Such a hybrid strategy is only beneficial if the epidemic is still ongoing when the
vaccines of type 2 become available and if the efficacy per dollar of type 2 is high
enough. This can also be seen if we analyze the condition in Theorem 5.3. The term
on the right-hand side represents the proportion of the total number of infections
after τ1 that occurs while waiting for the vaccines of type 2, i.e., in the interval
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[τ1, τ2]. This proportion is an indication of the additional infections experienced if
the decision maker decides to wait for vaccines of type 2. It is beneficial to wait if
the gain in efficacy per dollar, captured by the ratio ϕ2ϕ1 , outweighs the additional
infections during this waiting time.
If the vaccines of type 2 become available when the epidemic has almost died out,
then almost all infections have already taken place in the interval [τ1, τ2] and the
higher efficacy per dollar of type 2 does not compensate for the late availability. On
the other hand, if the epidemic is still ongoing and infections are increasing when
type 2 becomes available, only a small part of the infections has already taken place
while waiting for type 2 and it is worth waiting for this better vaccine.
One could argue that if the decision maker should shift  vaccines from type 1 to
type 2, why not spend the entire budget on vaccines of type 2? There are two main
reasons why this would not result in a good strategy. Firstly, the vaccines of type 2
are available at a later point in time. By using only these vaccines, the epidemic can
spread freely until τ2, which might cause a lot of infections. The second reason is
related to the high efficacy per dollar of the vaccines of type 2 through which many
people can be effectively vaccinated. This seems to be advantageous, but it might
also mean that the epidemic can easily be controlled with less vaccines. Spending
the entire budget on vaccines of type 2 results in vaccinated people who would not
have become infected in the first place. These vaccines are not effectively used and
it is better to use part of the budget for reducing the initial growth by vaccinating
some people at τ1, such that the epidemic can be controlled at τ2 by spending the
remaining budget on vaccines of type 2. The following two lemmas formally describe
the relation between pure and hybrid strategies:
Lemma 5.2. At the indifference curve, when the two pure strategies are equally good,
the hybrid strategy is strictly better and results in a lower final size.
Lemma 5.3. If the two pure strategies are equally good for vaccines of type 2 that
become available at time T , then there exists a T ∗ > T such that it is optimal to shift
 vaccines to type 2 when the vaccines of type 2 become available at time T ∗.
The interpretation of Lemma 5.3 is that while advancing the availability of type
2, you will first reach the point where it is optimal to shift a little bit of the budget to
type 2 before you reach the switching curve. Thus, even if the pure strategy with only
5.4 Analytical results 177
type 2 is worse than the pure strategy with only type 1, it can be beneficial to use
vaccines of type 2 in a hybrid strategy. Lemma 5.2 confirms that the hybrid strategy
is optimal around the switching curve. The structure described by these two lemmas
is also illustrated in Figure 5.4, which is determined with enumeration. We observe
that the solid switching curve lies in the dashed region where hybrid strategies are
optimal. The parameters for this figure are the same as in Section 5.4.2.
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Figure 5.4: This figure illustrates the optimal strategy. In the white area strategy
1 results in the lowest final size and is therefore the best and in the dark area this
holds for strategy 2. The dashed area between the two dashed lines is a sketch of the
region in which a hybrid strategy is optimal. The solid curve represents the switching
curve from Figure 5.3.
We observe the following in Figure 5.4. If pure strategy 1 is optimal for some τ2,
it is also optimal when the vaccines of type 2 are available even later. Delaying the
availability of type 2 results in even more infections while waiting for this type which
are not outweighed by the gain in efficacy per dollar. Analogously, pure strategy 2
remains optimal if τ2 is reduced. The reduced waiting time results in less infections,
so the gain in efficacy per dollar will surely compensate that. Next to that, if τ2 is
smaller there are still more people susceptible when the vaccines of type 2 become
available, such that more vaccines are needed to control the epidemic at τ2. This
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implies that there is no incentive to reduce the vaccination fraction at τ2 by shifting
some vaccines to type 1. We also see that by increasing ϕ2 we can move from a region
where pure strategy 2 is optimal to a region where the hybrid strategy is optimal.
For these higher values of ϕ2, pure strategy 2 is no longer optimal, because the type
2 vaccines became so efficacious that spending the entire budget on these vaccines
would lead to vaccinating people who would not have become infected in the first
place.
Finally, the figure shows that the dashed area lies around the solid switching curve.
Thus, the decision maker should consider spending the budget on both vaccine types
when the two types are equally attractive. Clearly, if one vaccine type avoids much
more infections than the other, this type should be used. But if the two types are
comparable, our results show that it is suboptimal to arbitrarily choose one of the
types. By dividing the budget and investing in both types, even more people can be
saved from infection.
As a final part of this section, we analyze the effects of an increasing budget in
Figure 5.5. The figure shows that for small budgets, the optimal strategy is to order
only the vaccines with the highest efficacy per dollar. In those cases the budget
is insufficient to control the epidemic, so it is best to effectively vaccinate as many
people as possible. However, when the budget increases, it becomes beneficial to
use a hybrid strategy. For a sufficiently large budget the epidemic can already be
controlled at τ1 and the optimal strategy is to use only the vaccines of type 1.
Figure 5.5: Optimal division of the budget over the two vaccine types with the
following characteristics: τ1 = 0, ϕ1 = 0.4, τ2 = 90 and ϕ2 = 0.7.
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The results in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.2 are derived for a homogeneous population.
In the discussion in Section 5.6, we discuss how our results are expected to carry over
to heterogeneous populations, for example populations with multiple age groups.
5.4.3 Two vaccination campaigns
In this section, we present one more result that follows from Theorem 5.1. This result
is an extension of our results on pure strategies in Section 5.4.2. Instead of consid-
ering vaccines that are all allocated at once, we consider vaccines that are allocated
in a vaccination campaign consisting of multiple vaccination moments. There are
multiple reasons why a single vaccination moment might not be possible. Logistical
considerations may play a role, which render it practically infeasible to allocate all
vaccines at the same time (e.g., Rachaniotis et al. 2012, Ramirez-Nafarrate et al.
2015). Next to that, the production of vaccine is a complex process, amongst others
characterized by random yields (cf., Adida et al. 2013, Eskandarzadeh et al. 2016).
Together with capacity constraints, this can result in production processes or tech-
nologies that produce vaccines in batches, such that the vaccines become available
over time. In this section, we extend some of our results to the case of vaccination
campaigns.
Let us consider two vaccination campaigns which differ in the efficacy per dollar
of the used vaccine and in the time at which the campaign starts. These differences
are for example attributed to different production technologies. Denote by ϕi and
τi respectively the efficacy per dollar of the vaccine and time at which the campaign
starts for i = 1, 2. Assume that during the vaccination campaign a total budget of B
is spent over n vaccination moments, such that B/n dollar is spent each time. The
time in between two vaccination moments is T for both campaigns, which implies
that the j-th vaccination moment takes place at time τi + (j − 1)T for campaign i.
Let sij denote the proportion of susceptible people at the j-th vaccination moment
in the campaign i. The two vaccination campaigns result in the same final size if the
following condition is satisfied, where G(ϕ1, τ1) denotes the herd effect of campaign
1:
1− (ϕ2 − ϕ1)B
NG(ϕ1, τ1)
−
n∏
j=1
(
s1j
s2j
)(
nNs2j − ϕ2B
nNs1j − ϕ1B
)
= 0 (5.8)
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If the left-hand side is positive (negative), strategy 1 is better (worse). The derivation
of this condition can be found in Appendix 5.D.3 and makes use of Theorem 5.1. Note
that condition 5.8 implicitly defines the relation between τ2 and ϕ2, as s2j for all j
depend on τ2. We can compute this relation through numerical analysis. Figure 5.6
illustrates the relation for the parameters ϕ1 = 0.5, τ1 = 0 n = 4, T = 30 and
B = 0.2N . As expected, we see that campaign 2 is better than campaign 1 if either
campaign 2 does not start too late, or if the corresponding vaccines have a high
efficacy. Again, we see that for τ2 above a certain threshold, around 80 in this case,
vaccines of campaign 2 are too late to be optimal. Since a campaign with multiple
moments is already some kind of hybrid strategy in itself, we do not consider partially
investing in two campaigns.
Figure 5.6: The switching curve for the two vaccination campaigns. In the white
area campaign 1 is optimal and in the dark area campaign 2. The initial state and
disease parameters are the same as in Figure 5.3.
If a vaccination campaign is used instead of instantaneous mass vaccination, then
preferences for the vaccine types can change. For example, the advantage of an
early aspecific vaccine type might disappear if it is distributed through a lengthy
vaccination campaign.
5.5 Numerical experiments
In this section, we perform some numerical experiments. Our analytical results in
Section 5.4 show theoretically that hybrid strategies can outperform pure strategies
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for two vaccine types. The objective of our numerical experiments in this section is
twofold: firstly, we want to know how many infections can actually be saved by using
a hybrid strategy and secondly we investigate whether it is beneficial to use a hybrid
strategy with more than two vaccine types.
We use data on an influenza outbreak and influenza vaccines from Matrajt et al.
(2015). The parameters for the outbreak are as follows: N = 106, i0 = 10−6, s0 =
1 − i0, β = 0.35 and γ = 0.25. They do not consider prices of the vaccines and
assume that there are enough vaccines to vaccinate half of the population. In terms
of our model we let the price be p dollar per dose of vaccine for all vaccine types
and use a budget of B = pN/2. Matrajt et al. (2015) study vaccines that have an
effect on susceptibility, infectiousness and on the symptoms in case of infection. In
our analysis, we only consider the effect on susceptibility. Matrajt et al. (2015) study
vaccines that become available 0, 45, 60, 75 or 90 days after the start of the outbreak
and that have an efficacy in the range of 0.4-0.66. Likewise, we analyze the following
seven vaccine types, assuming that p = 1:
Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
τj 0 45 60 60 75 75 90
ϕj 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
We study all subsets of three vaccine types in which no vaccine type(s) is/are
dominated by others. This means that we do not consider those subsets which
include two vaccine types that have the same time at which the vaccines become
available or the same efficacy per dollar. For example, if a decision maker has to
choose between vaccines of type 4 and 5, she will always prefer the vaccines of type 4
because they are available earlier and have the same efficacy per dollar. Analogously,
type 6 will always be preferred if one has to choose between type 5 and 6, because
both vaccine types are available at the same time, but type 6 has a higher efficacy
per dollar. Taking these considerations into account, we find 14 subsets consisting
of three vaccine types each. For these subsets we analyze the best pure strategy, the
best hybrid strategy with at most 2 types and the best hybrid strategy with at most 3
types. Note that the pure strategies are also included in the hybrid strategies. For the
hybrid strategies we use enumeration and a stepsize of 1000 = 10−3N vaccines. The
results are reported in Table 5.1. In this table, the final size for the pure strategies is
reported as a population fraction. For the hybrid strategies the relative performance
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compared to the best pure strategy is presented. Recall that our goal is to minimize
the final size. Hence, if the reported value in the table is below 100, it means that
the hybrid strategy is better and results in a lower final size than the pure strategy.
Pure strategy Hybrid with at most Hybrid with at most
two types three types∗
Types 1, 2, 4 0.0140 (0, 0, 500) 100 (0, 0, 500) 100
Types 1, 2, 5 0.0387 (0, 0, 500) 88.63 (69, 0, 431) 88.63
Types 1, 2, 6 0.0207 (0, 0, 500) 55.56 (147, 0, 353) 55.56
Types 1, 2, 7 0.0666 (0, 0, 500) 39.19 (186, 0, 314) 39.19
Types 1, 3, 5 0.0387 (0, 0, 500) 88.63 (69, 0, 431) 88.63
Types 1, 3, 6 0.0207 (0, 0, 500) 55.56 (147, 0, 353) 55.56
Types 1, 3, 7 0.0666 (0, 0, 500) 39.19 (186, 0, 314) 39.19
Types 1, 4, 6 0.0140 (0, 500, 0) 82.14 (147, 0, 353) 82.14
Types 1, 4, 7 0.0140 (0, 500, 0) 100 (0, 500, 0) 100
Types 1, 5, 7 0.0387 (0, 500, 0) 67.44 (186, 0, 314) 67.44
Types 2, 4, 6 0.0140 (0, 500, 0) 97.86 (0, 425, 75) 97.86
Types 2, 4, 7 0.0140 (0, 500, 0) 100 (0, 500, 0) 100
Types 2, 5, 7 0.0387 (0, 500, 0) 74.16 (282, 0, 218) 74.16
Types 3, 5, 7 0.0387 (0, 500, 0) 100 (0, 500, 0) 100
Table 5.1: Table with the final sizes achieved with the different vaccination strate-
gies. In brackets the optimal allocation over the three considered types with a step
size 103 doses of vaccine. ∗ the allocations for hybrid strategies with at most two and
at most three vaccine types are the same.
We start with discussing the column on hybrid strategies with at most two vaccine
types in Table 5.1. The results show that in most cases a hybrid strategy is preferred.
We see that the hybrid strategy often combines the earliest available vaccine with the
vaccine that has the highest efficacy per dose. By using a hybrid strategy the final
size can be reduced with even more than 60% for vaccine types 1,2,7 and 1,3,7. Only
for a few vaccine type combinations the final size of the best hybrid strategy is the
same as the final size of the best pure strategy, which implies that the pure strategy
is optimal in those cases. We conclude from Table 5.1 that using a hybrid strategy
can result in a substantially lower final size and is therefore worth investigating.
The second goal of this section is to investigate hybrid strategies with more than
two vaccine types. Interestingly, if we analyze Table 5.1 and compare hybrid strate-
gies with at most two types with hybrid strategies with at most three vaccine types,
the final sizes are the same for all subsets of vaccine types. The additional freedom
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that is introduced by allowing to divide the budget over three vaccine types does not
result in further reductions of the final size. Additional experiments not reported
here have also supported the conclusion that hybrid strategies with more than two
vaccine types typically give no or very little additional benefits
In this section, we do not analyze hybrid strategies with more than three vaccine
types. Nevertheless we can draw conclusions for those situations. Consider a hybrid
vaccination strategy with n vaccine types. By applying Theorem 5.1 to types 3, ..., n
and summarizing them in one moment, the strategy with n vaccine types is equivalent
to a vaccination strategy with three vaccine types. In our numerical results we do
not find situations where a hybrid vaccination strategy with three vaccine types is
better than a hybrid strategy with at most two vaccine types. It is therefore unlikely
that hybrid strategies with more than three vaccine types are optimal.
Hence, we can conclude this section as follows. Consider a decision maker that
can choose between multiple vaccines types. Based on our results decision makers
can expect significant benefits by considering hybrid strategies with two types of
vaccine. However, hybrid strategies that invest in more than two vaccine types are
expected to provide little to no additional benefit and the decision maker does not
have to investigate those hybrid strategies.
5.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss modelling assumptions, the generality of our results and
possible directions for future research.
The results in this chapter are established under some assumptions. We model
vaccination as an immediate transition of people from the susceptible compartment
to the removed compartment. This assumption could be relaxed to studying the case
where vaccination takes more time, which can be modelled as a vaccination campaign
(cf., Section 5.4.3). In our analysis we assume that the vaccine efficacy is known for
every vaccine type. Further research is needed to extend the analysis to environments
where efficacy is uncertain, e.g., situations where the delayed availability is caused
by a vaccine development phase with unknown outcome. Furthermore, we base our
analysis on the SIR model, but show in Appendix 5.C how some results extend
to the more general SInR model. In the SIR model we consider a homogeneous
population. Alternatively, a model for a heterogeneous population could be used, for
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example a population that is subdivided in multiple age groups (e.g., Medlock et al.
2009, Teytelman and Larson 2012). In a heterogeneous population the final size is the
result of an optimization problem that is used to determine which allocation over the
age groups is best. We conjecture that a switching curve result similar to Theorem 5.2
can be derived in the case of a heterogeneous population, i.e., that there exists a curve
separating the region where a pure type 1 strategy is optimal from the region where
a pure type 2 strategy is optimal. Making the vaccines of type 2 more attractive by
increasing their efficacy, reducing their price or by advancing their availability will
reduce the final size, as the original allocation is still feasible. Another interesting
research direction is incorporating high-risk and high-transmission groups (e.g., Samii
et al. 2012, Lee et al. 2015b).
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we study the trade-off between the timing of vaccination and the ef-
fectiveness of the response. This trade-off plays a role in several vaccination problems
of which three examples are discussed in the introduction. We focus on a problem
with an early aspecific vaccine and a late specific vaccine. We derive an analytical
expression for the switching curve separating the region where the early aspecific
vaccine is preferred from the region where the late specific vaccine is preferred. We
demonstrate that it is not always optimal to spend the entire budget on one of the
two vaccine types, but that a hybrid strategy can reduce the final size with more
than 50%.
The derived insights are useful for decision makers. We show the importance of
the trade-off between timing and efficacy and the effects on controlling the epidemic.
Early vaccination is able to reduce the initial increase in infections, but a vaccine with
a higher efficacy per dollar can achieve higher immunity levels in the population such
that the epidemic can be controlled quickly. When the epidemic can already be
controlled with the early aspecific vaccine, the decision maker should use only this
vaccine. But when this is not possible, either only the specific later vaccine should be
used or a hybrid strategy should be considered. By applying a hybrid strategy, the
target population benefits from both a quick response and a efficacious vaccine. Such
a solution can also be helpful for decision makers who balance between the public
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pressure to respond quickly and the aim to spend the budget on the best possible
vaccine.
Extant literature mentions some practical considerations for using hybrid strate-
gies. E.g., starting production earlier for some influenza strains allows to have suffi-
cient time to produce vaccines against these strains, while buying time to learn more
about the other strains; and allowing higher vaccine dosages for health care workers
protects them from getting infected by patients. In this chapter, we give an important
motivation for hybrid strategies even in the absence of such practical considerations.
We show that a hybrid strategy may in many cases make more efficient use of re-
sources than any pure strategy, due to the nonlinear dynamics of an epidemic. This
chapter thus provides an additional and more generally applicable motivation for the
use of hybrid strategies which supersedes the practical arguments used in literature
or in the US national pandemic response plan. Our results encourage to study hy-
brid vaccination strategies in any application where the trade-off between timing and
efficacy plays a role, even if a direct practical necessity is missing.
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Appendix
5.A SIR model
In this chapter, we use the final size to compare the severity of different vaccination
strategies. In Section 5.3.3, we show that the herd effect, denoted by the function
G(f , τ), is an important determinant in the final size. The herd effect is defined as
the final fraction of people susceptible after a vaccination strategy characterized by
vaccination fractions f and times τ . More precisely, for fj ∈ [0, ϕjsj(τ)]
G(f , τ) = lim
t→∞ s(t), (5.9)
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with s(t) evolving according to (5.1) for t > τn. In this appendix, we present and
analyze an alternative formulation of the herd effect, which forms the basis of the
structural analysis of the herd effect.
Based on the differential equations of the SIR model, we derive an implicit ex-
pression for the herd effect. From (5.1) the following equation follows, which presents
the relation between i(t) and s(t) at any time t (Hethcote 1976):
i(t) = −s(t) + log(s(t))
σ
+ s0 + i0 − log(s0)
σ
⇔ s(t) = s0 exp{−σ(s0 + i0 − s(t)− i(t))}
(5.10)
Above relation characterizes the state of the system at any point in time, but prior to
vaccination. In Theorem 5.1 we show that for any vaccination strategy with multiple
vaccination moments, there is a single-moment strategy resulting in the same final
size. In this single-moment strategy a fraction fT of the population is vaccinated at
time τT . In the remainder of this section we will use the parameters of the single-
moment vaccination strategy to analyze G(f , τ).
Upon vaccination at time τT the state of the system changes from state (s(τT ), i(τT ))
to state (s(τT )− fT , i(τT )). Hence, the state (s(τT )− fT , i(τT )) directly after vac-
cination can be seen as a new initial state, where i(τT ) can be obtained from (5.10).
Since limt→∞ i(t) = 0, the function G(f , τ) can be derived from (5.10) by setting
i(t) = 0 and thus is the unique solution to:
0 = −G(f , τ) + log(G(f , τ))
σ
+ s(τT )− fT + i(τT )− log(s(τ
T )− fT )
σ
⇔ 0 = −G(f , τ) + log(G(f , τ))
σ
+ s0 + i0 − 1
σ
log
(
s0
(
1− f
T
s(τT )
))
− fT
(5.11)
Above equation holds for all i0 > 0. Denote by Z(f , τ) the final size according to
(5.3). Rewriting (5.11) gives the following:
G(f , τ) = s0
(
1− f
T
s(τT )
)
exp{−σZ(f , τ)} (5.12)
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Observe that (5.11) and (5.12) are implicit definitions of the herd effect. Alterna-
tively, we can derive a definition based on the Lambert W function (Corless et al.
1996, Ma and Earn 2006). This definition can be used to calculate the herd effect:
G(f , τ) = −1
σ
W
[
−s0
(
1− f
T
s(τT )
)
exp{−σ(s0 + i0 − fT )}
]
(5.13)
An early response is always better than a later response, as shown in the following
lemma:
Lemma 5.A.1. For fixed fT , the herd effect G(f , τ) is increasing in s(τT ) and the
finals size Z(f , τ) is decreasing in s(τT ).
Proof. See Section 3.4.5 in Chapter 3.
5.B Multiple vaccination moments
In this Appendix, we prove Theorem 5.1. Thereto we first present two supporting
results: a result on the dynamics of an epidemic in Lemma 5.B.1 and a technical
result in Lemma 5.B.2.
Recall that we have n moments of vaccination, respectively at time τ1, τ2, ..., τn.
The vaccination fractions at these moments are denoted by f1, ..., fn and s(τj) denotes
the fraction of susceptible people just prior to vaccination at time τj for j = 1, ..., n.
For notional convenience we add two vaccination moments at τ0 = 0 and τn+1 = +∞
at which no vaccination takes place, such that f0 = fn+1 = 0. The following theorem
shows that in between two vaccination moments this system follows the time course
of a system without vaccination and with a different initial state.
Lemma 5.B.1. For all k = 1, ..., n we consider the following two systems, that both
follow the dynamics of the SIR model. Note that (i) is a system with vaccination
and (ii) a system without vaccination:
(i) let (s(t), i(t)) denote the state at time t of the system with initial state (s(0), i(0))
= (s0, i0) when a fraction fj of the susceptible people is vaccinated at time τj
for j = 1, ..., k.
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(ii) let sk(t) and ik(t) denote the state at time t of a system without vaccination and
with initial state sk(0) = sk0 := s0 ·
∏k
j=1
[(
1− fjs(τj)
)
exp{σfj}
]
and ik(0) =
ik0 := s0 + i0 − sk0 .
The time course of system (i) on the interval t ∈ (τk, τk+1) is the same as the time
course of system (ii) on the shifted interval [t∗k, t∗k + τk+1 − τk] for some t∗k. More
precisely, sk(t+ t∗k − τk) = s(t) and ik(t+ t∗k − τk) = i(t) for τk < t < τk+1.
Proof. This theorem will be proven by induction. We start with proving that it holds
for k = 1. Consider system (i) and note that the relation between i(τ1) and s(τ1)
just prior to vaccination at time τ1 can be described by (5.10) as follows:
i(τ1) = −s(τ1) + log(s(τ1))
σ
+ s0 + i0 − log(s0)
σ
(5.14)
On the interval t ∈ [τ1, τ2) we can see system (i) as a system that starts at time τ1
with initial state [(s(τ1)− f1), i(τ1)]. We can use (5.10) again to derive the relation
between i(t) and s(t) for t ∈ [τ1, τ2):
i(t) = −s(t) + log(s(t))
σ
+ s(τ1)− f1 + i(τ1)− log(s(τ1)− f1)
σ
⇔ i(t) = −s(t) + log(s(t))
σ
+ s0 + i0 − f1 − 1
σ
log
(
1− f1
s(τ1)
)
− log(s0)
σ
⇔ s(t) = s(0)
(
1− f1
s(τ1)
)
exp {σf1} exp {−σ[s0 + i0 − s(t)− i(t)]}
(5.15)
In the second line of above derivation we substitute s(τ1) and i(τ1) from (5.14) and
in the third line we take the exponent. We can verify with (5.10) that the states
(s(t), i(t)) for t ∈ [τ1, τ2) that satisfy (5.15) are also part of the time course of system
(ii) for k = 1 by substituting in (5.10) the following initial state for system (ii):
s1(0) = s10 := s0 ·
(
1− fjs(τ1)
)
exp{σf1} and s10 + i10 := s0 + i0. Let t∗1 denote the
time at which system (ii) is in the state (s(τ1)− f1, i(τ1)). Such time t∗1 must exist,
because the state (s(τ1) − f1, i(τ1)) is part of the time course of system (ii). Then
the time course of system (i) on the interval (τ1, τ2) is equivalent to that of system
(ii) on the interval (t∗1, t∗1 + τ2 − τ1). This completes the base case of the proof by
induction.
We perform the inductive step and assume that the theorem holds for k. In that
case we can determine the state of systems (i) and (ii) at time τk+1 with (5.10) as
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follows, using that sk0 + ik0 = s0 + i0 per definition:
sk(τk+1 + t∗k − τk) = sk0 exp
{−σ[sk0 + ik0 − sk(τk+1 + t∗k − τk)− ik(τk+1 + t∗k − τk)]}
by induction⇐⇒ s(τk+1) = sk0 exp
{−σ[sk0 + ik0 − s(τk+1)− i(τk+1)]}
(5.16)
= s0
k∏
j=1
[(
1− fj
s(τj)
)
exp{σfj}
]
exp {−σ[s0 + i0 − s(τk+1)− i(τk+1)]}
We now prove that above relation implies that the theorem also holds for k + 1.
Thereto, we analyse system (i) for t ∈ (τk+1, τk+2). We make use of (5.10) and take
the state at time τk+1 just after vaccination, (s(τk+1 − fk+1, i(τk+1)), as the initial
state. Then the following holds for t ∈ (τk+1, τk+2):
s(t) = (s(τk+1)− fk+1) exp {−σ[s(τk+1)− fk+1 + i(τk+1)− s(t)− i(t)]}
= s0
k+1∏
j=1
[(
1− fj
s(τj)
)
exp{σfj}
]
exp {−σ[s0 + i0 − s(t)− i(t)]}
(5.17)
In the second step we use (5.16) to substitute s(τk+1) and i(τk+1). We can again
verify with (5.10) that the states (s(t), i(t)) for t ∈ (τk+1, τk+2) that satisfy (5.17)
are part of the time course of system (ii) for k + 1, as before for the case k = 1. Let
t∗k+1 denote the time at which system (ii) is in the state (s(τk+1) − fk+1, i(τk+1)),
then the time course of system (i) on the interval (τk+1, τk+2) is equivalent to that
of system (ii) on the interval (t∗k+1, t∗k+1 + τk+2 − τk+1). This completes the proof of
this theorem.
Lemma 5.B.2. The following relation holds for all n ≥ 1, where we define∏j−1k=1(1−
xk) = 1 for j = 1:
1−
n∏
j=1
(1− xj) =
n∑
j=1
xj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− xk)
Proof. Proof by induction. The lemma clearly holds for n = 1 : 1 − (1 − x1) = x1.
The inductive step: suppose the lemma holds for n = 1, ..., L, then it also holds for
L+ 1.
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1−
L+1∏
j=1
(1− xj) = 1− (1− xL+1)
L∏
j=1
(1− xj)
= 1−
1− L∑
j=1
xj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− fk)
+ xL+1 L∏
j=1
(1− xj)
=
L+1∑
j=1
xj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− xk)
Theorem 5.1. We consider an initial state denoted by (s0, i0) and use the SIR
model to evaluate the epidemic. A hybrid vaccination strategy (i) with n vaccination
moments at times τ1, ..., τn and corresponding vaccination fractions f1, ..., fn results
in the same final size as a single moment vaccination strategy (ii) with one vaccina-
tion moment at time τT and a vaccination fraction fT =
∑n
j=1 fj if and only if τT
satisfies the following condition:
1− f
T
s(ii)(τT )
=
∏
j∈J
(
1− fj
s(i)(τj)
)
(5.5)
There is always exactly one τT ∈ [τ1, τn] satisfying (5.5).
Proof. Note that strategy (i) and (ii) allocate in total the same amount of vaccines,
because fT =
∑n
j=1 fj . Hence, to show that the final sizes for both strategies are
the same, it suffices to show that both strategies result in the same herd effect, i.e.
limt→+∞ s(t) is equal for these two systems.
Denote by s1(∞) and s2(∞) the final fraction of people susceptible in system (i)
and (ii) respectively. Note that for t→ +∞ the fraction of infected individuals goes
to zero. From Lemma 5.B.1 and the fact that i1(∞) = 0 we derive that s1(∞) follows
from the following expression:
s1(∞) = s0
n∏
j=1
[(
1− fj
s(τj)
)
exp{σfj}
]
exp
{
−β
γ
[s0 + i0 − s1(∞)]
}
(5.18)
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In case of a single vaccination moment we can use the final line of (5.15):
s2(∞) = s(0)
(
1− f
T
s(τT )
)
exp
{
σfT
}
exp
{
−β
γ
[s0 + i0 − s2(∞)]
}
(5.19)
For fT =
∑n
i=1 fi and
fT
s(τT ) = 1 −
∏n
i=1
(
1− f1s(τi)
)
it holds that (5.18) and (5.19)
are equal to each other, which implies that s1(∞) = s2(∞). With the equal herd
effects and the same amount of effectively allocated vaccines, the final sizes of the
two strategies are equal.
It remains to show that τT ∈ [τ1, τn]. We prove this in the following two steps:
(i) we show that s1(τn) < s(τT ) < s(τ1) and (ii) we show that τ1 < τT < τn.
(i) Observe that s1(τj) < s1(τj−1) − fj−1 for j = 2, ..., n, which also implies that
s1(τj) < s1(τ1)
∏j−1
k=1
(
1− fks1(τk)
)
for j = 2, ..., n. We can derive the following,
using Lemma 5.B.2:
fT
s(τT ) = 1−
n∏
j=1
(
1− fj
s1(τj)
)
=
n∑
j=1
fj
s1(τj)
j−1∏
k=1
(
1− fk
s1(τk)
)
>
1
s1(τ1)
n∑
j=1
fj =
fT
s1(τ1)
Above relation implies that s(τT ) < s1(τ1). Analogously, we can prove that
s(τT ) > s1(τn), by noting that s1(τj) > s1(τn) 1∏n−1
k=j
(
1− fk
s1(τk)
) . This implies
the following:
fT
s(τT ) =
n∑
j=1
fj
s1(τj)
j−1∏
k=1
(
1− fk
s1(τk)
)
<
(
1− fT
s(τT )
)
s1(τn)
n∑
j=1
fj =
(
1− f
T
s(τT )
)
fT
s1(τn)
<
fT
s1(τn)
We thus proved that s1(τn) < s(τT ) < s1(τ1).
(ii) Given that s(t) is decreasing over time, s(τT ) < s1(τ1) implies that τT > τ1.
Furthermore, by Lemma 5.B.1 strategies (i) and (ii) are equivalent for time
t > τn. This implies that τT < τn and hence, τT ∈ [τ1, τn].
This completes the proof of this theorem.
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5.C Generality of Theorem 5.1
One of the extensions to the standard SIR compartmental model, is the SInR model
with n different consecutive infectious stages. Let s(t) and r(t) denote the fraction
of people respectively susceptible and removed at time t. The fractions of people
infected in every state are given by ik(t) for k = 1, ..., n. Interpretation dictates
that s(t) +
∑n
k=1 ik(t) + r(t) = 1 for all t. Let βk and γk denote respectively the
transmission rate and recovery rate in infectious stage k. The differential equations
for the SInR model are:
ds
dt
= −s
n∑
k=1
βkik
di1
dt
= s
n∑
k=1
βkik − γ1i1
dik
dt
= γk−1ik−1 − γkik k = 2, ..., n
dr
dt
= γnin
(5.20)
Hyman et al. (1999) prove that R0 =
∑n
k=1
βk
γk
for this model, with R0 denoting the
basic reproduction ratio.
In (5.10) we present a relation between s(t) and i(t). A similar relation can be
derived for the SInR model (See Appendix 3.C):
log(s(t))− log(s(0)) = σ
[
s(t) +
n∑
k=1
ik(t)
]
− σ
[
s(0) +
n∑
k=1
ik(0)
]
−
n∑
k=1
βk
γk
[
n∑
m=k+1
im(t)− im(0)
] (5.21)
Using (5.21) we can derive that the result of Theorem 5.1 also holds for the
SInR model. The proof is identical, we only need to use an adjusted version of
Lemma 5.B.1. Next, we show how the result of this latter theorem carries over to
the more general SInR epidemic model.
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Lemma 5.C.1. For all k = 1, ...,m we consider the following two systems, that both
follow the dynamics of the SInR model. Note that (i) is a system with vaccination
and (ii) a system without vaccination:
(i) let (s(t), i1(t), ..., in(t)) for t ∈ (τk, τk+1) denote the state at time t of the sys-
tem with (s(0), i1(0), ..., in(0)) as initial state for which a fraction fj of the
susceptible people is vaccinated at time τj for j = 1, ..., k.
(ii) let (sk(t), ik1(t), ..., ikn(t)) correspond to a system without vaccination with sk(0) =
s0 ·
∏k
j=1
[(
1− fjs(τj)
)
exp{σfj}
]
, ik1(0) = s(0) + i1(0)− sk0 and ikl (0) = il(0) for
l = 2, ..., n.
The time course of system (i) on the interval t ∈ (τk, τk+1) is the same as time course
of system (ii) on the shifted interval [t∗, t∗ + τk+1 − τk] for some t∗. More precisely,
sk(t) = s(t+ t∗ − τk) and ikl (t) = il(t+ t∗ − τk) for l = 1, ..., n and τk < t < τk+1.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.1, now only using the relation
between s(t) and i1(t), ..., in(t) from (5.21) instead of the relation for the SIR model
(5.10).
5.D Analytical results
5.D.1 Pure strategies
In this section, we derive the switching curve which is presented in Theorem 5.2. To
prove this theorem, we propose a function that can be used to compare the two pure
vaccination strategies. In the supporting result of Lemma 5.D.1 we show how this
function can be used to determine which strategy is best, i.e., which strategy results
in the lowest final size. We define this function H(f1, f2, s1, s2) as follows:
H(f1, f2, s1, s2) =
(
f2
s2
− f1
s1
)
G(f1, τ1) +
(
1− f1
s1
)
[f1 − f2] ,
with G(f1, τ1) denoting the herd effect for strategy 1. The following result can be
derived:
Lemma 5.D.1. The sign of the function H(f1, f2, s1, s2) determines which strategy
is best: if the function value equals zero, the two strategies are equally good and if the
function value is positive (negative) strategy 1 is better (worse).
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Proof. We prove this theorem in the following three steps:
(i) Strategy 1 and 2 are equally good if and only if H(f1, f2, s1, s2) = 0,
(ii) Strategy 1 is better than strategy 2 if and only if H(f1, f2, s1, s2) > 0,
(iii) Strategy 2 is better than strategy 1 if and only if H(f1, f2, s1, s2) < 0.
The proof is as follows:
(i)
Z(f1, τ1)− Z(f2, τ2) = 0
⇔ G(f1, τ1) + f1 −G(f2, τ2)− f2 = 0 substitute (5.3)
⇔ s0
(
f2
s2
− f1
s1
)
exp{−σZ(f1, τ1)}+ f1 − f2 = 0 substitute (5.12) and
use Z(f1, τ1) = Z(f2, τ2)
⇔
(
f2
s2
− f1
s1
)
G(f1, τ1) +
(
1− f1
s1
)
[f1 − f2] = 0 substitute (5.12)
(ii) Observe that the condition H(f1, f2, s1, s2) = 0 can equivalently be formulated
as:
s2 =
s1f2G(f1, τ1)
f1G(f1, τ1) + (s1 − f1)(f2 − f1)
By Lemma 5.A.1 we know that the final size Z(f, τ) is monotonically decreasing
in s(τ). Hence, if s2 is slightly lower than the expression above, then Z(f2, τ2) >
Z(f1, τ1).
s2 <
s1f2G(f1, τ1)
f1G(f1, τ1) + (s1 − f1)(f2 − f1) ⇔ H(f1, f2, s1, s2) > 0
(iii) Analogous to (ii).
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Theorem 5.2. The pure strategies 1 and 2 result in the same final size under the
following condition:
s2(τ2) =
s1(τ1)ϕ2G(f1, τ1)
ϕ1G(f1, τ1) +
(
s1(τ1)− Bϕ1N
)
(ϕ2 − ϕ1)
(5.6)
If s2(τ2) is smaller (larger) than the right-hand side in above expression, then strategy
2 is worse (better).
Proof. The results follows directly from Lemma 5.D.1.
Corollary 5.4. The value for τ2 that satisfies (5.6) is increasing in ϕ2.
Proof. We proof this result by taking the derivative of the switching curve (5.6) with
respect to ϕ2:
∂
∂ϕ2
s2(τ2) =
s1(τ1)ϕ1G(f1, τ1)
[
G(f1, τ1)−
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1N
)]
[
ϕ1G(f1, τ1) +
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1N
)
(ϕ2 − ϕ1)
]2
Above expression is negative, if G(f1, τ1) <
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1N
)
which means that the
final fraction of people susceptible is smaller than the fraction of people susceptible
just after vaccination. This holds, because the proportion of people susceptible is
decreasing over time. Hence, s2(τ2) is decreasing in ϕ2. By the same argument this
means that the value for τ2 that satisfies (5.6) is increasing in ϕ2. This completes
the proof.
5.D.2 The hybrid strategy
In this section, we analyze the hybrid strategy that consists of an early aspecific
vaccine and a late specific vaccine. We respectively denote by strategy 1 and 2 the
two pure strategies for the considered vaccine types. We start this section with The-
orem 5.3 in which we derive under which condition the hybrid strategy outperforms
strategy 1. We know that strategy 1 and 2 are equally good at the switching curve.
Hence, if the condition derived in Theorem 5.3 holds at the switching curve, then
the hybrid strategy is better than both pure strategies at the switching curve. We
show in Lemma 5.2 that this is indeed the case. Before we prove this lemma, we first
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present two auxiliary results on the dynamics of the SIR model in Lemma 5.D.2 and
Lemma 5.D.3.
In this section, we use the following notation: strategy 3 denotes the hybrid
strategy with V1 vaccines of type 1 and V − V1 vaccines of type 2, with V1 ∈ (0, V ).
In Table 5.2 we summarize the three strategies, and formulate the hybrid strategy in
terms of a pure strategy by applying Theorem 5.1. We denote by si(t) the proportion
of people susceptible at time t in strategy i = 1, 2, 3.
Strategy f at τ1 f at τ2 fi si
1 V ϕ1N 0 f1 =
V ϕ1
N s1 = s1(τ1)
2 0 V ϕ2N f2 =
V ϕ2
N s2 = s2(τ2)
3 V1ϕ1N
(V−V1)ϕ2
N f3 =
V1ϕ1+(V−V1)ϕ2
N s3 =
f3
V1ϕ1
Ns1(τ1)
+
(
1−V1ϕ1Ns1
)(
(V−V1)ϕ2
Ns3(τ2)
)
Table 5.2: This table describes the three vaccination strategies. The last two
columns with fi, si characterize the vaccination strategy by Theorem 5.1 with only
one vaccination moment and the same final size.
Theorem 5.3. Consider the pure strategy where all vaccines are of type 1. It is
better to shift  vaccines to type 2, with  > 0 small, under the following condition:
ϕ2
ϕ1
>
[s1(τv1 )−G(f1, τ1)] /s1(τv1 )
[s1(τ2)−G(f1, τ1)] /s1(τ2) , (5.7)
where s1(τv1 ) denotes the proportion of people susceptible just after vaccination at
time τ1.
Proof. In this proof, we compare strategy 1 and strategy 3 of Table 5.2. These
strategies are identical, and therefore equally good, in case V1 = V . By Lemma 5.D.1
the following condition holds if these strategies are equally good:
H(f1, f3, s1, s3) =
(
f3
s3
− f1
s1
)
G(f1, τ1) +
(
1− f1
s1
)
[f1 − f3] = 0
We evaluate the derivative of H(f1, f3, s1, s3) with respect to V1 at the point V1 = V .
If this derivative is positive, then decreasing V1 results in a decrease ofH(f1, f3, s1, s3),
rendering it negative and implying that ∃ > 0 such that strategy 3 with V1 = V − 
is better than strategy 1 by Lemma 5.D.1.
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We now investigate this derivative with respect to V1. Note that V1 only plays a
role in strategy 3, such that s1, f1 and G1(f1, τ1) are not affected by changes in V1.
We use the following notation: s′3(t) = ∂∂V1 s3(t).
∂
∂V1
H(f1, f3, s1, s3)
= ∂
∂V1
{(
f3
s3
− f1
s1
)
G(f1, τ1) +
(
1− f1
s1
)
[f1 − f3]
}
= G(f1, τ1)
∂
∂V1
f3
s3
−
(
1− f1
s1
)
∂
∂V1
f3
= G(f1, τ1)
∂
∂V1
(
V1ϕ1
Ns1
+
(
1− V1ϕ1
Ns1
)( (V − V1)ϕ2
Ns3(τ2)
))
−
(
1− f1
s1
)
∂
∂V1
V1ϕ1 + (V − V1)ϕ2
N
= G(f1, τ1)
((
1− V1ϕ1
Ns1
)( (V − V1)ϕ2Ns′3(τ2)−Ns3(τ2)ϕ2
N2s3(τ2)2
)
+ ϕ1
Ns1
(
1− (V − V1)ϕ2
Ns3(τ2)
))
−
(
1− f1
s1
)
ϕ1 − ϕ2
N
We now evaluate the condition ∂∂V1H(f1, f3, s1, s3)|V1=V > 0 by substituting V1 = V
in above expression. For V1 = V strategy 1 and 3 are identical, which implies that
s3(τ2) = s1(τ2).
∂
∂V1
H(f1, f3, s1, s3) > 0
⇔ G(f1, τ1)
(
ϕ1
Ns1
+
(
1− V ϕ1
Ns1
)( −ϕ2
Ns1(τ2)
))
−
(
1− V ϕ1
Ns1
)
ϕ1 − ϕ2
N
> 0
⇔ G(f1, τ1)
N2s1(τ2)s1
(ϕ1Ns1(τ2)− ϕ2 (Ns1 − V ϕ1))−
(
1− V ϕ1
Ns1
)
ϕ1 − ϕ2
N
> 0
Let s1(τv1 ) denote the proportion of people susceptible directly after vaccination, i.e.,
s1(τv1 ) =
(
s1 − V ϕ1N
)
. We substitute this expression and obtain the following:
G(f1, τ1) (ϕ1s1(τ2)− ϕ2s1(τv1 ))− s1(τ2)s1(τv1 )(ϕ1 − ϕ2) > 0
⇔ [s1(τ
v
1 )−G(f1, τ1)] /s1(τv1 )
[s1(τ2)−G(f1, τ1)] /s1(τ2) <
ϕ2
ϕ1
This completes the proof of this theorem.
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Lemma 5.D.2. Consider two systems sj(t) and ij(t) for j = 1, 2 and assume that
they both follow the dynamics of the deterministic SIR model. If s1(0) = (1−f1)s2(0)
and i1(0) = i2(0), then s1(t) > (1− f1)s2(t) for all t > 0.
Proof. We proof this lemma as follows:
• At time 0 it holds that i1(0) = i2(0) and s1(0) = (1− f1)s2(0).
• As long as s1(t) < s2(t) we can show that also i1(t) < i2(t) and that s1(t) >
(1− f1)s2(t).
• When s1(t) ≥ s2(t) the lemma clearly holds.
• By Lemma 5.D.3 the curves s1(t) and s2(t) intersect at most once. This proves
the lemma for all t > 0.
It suffices to prove the claim in the second bullet point. We start with s1(0) =
(1 − f)s2(0) and i1(0) = i2(0). Since s1(0) < s2(0) this implies that ∂∂t i1 < ∂∂t i2.
Hence, as long as s1(t) < s2(t) we also have that i1(t) < i2(t).
We prove the lemma by induction, using the following inductive step: if s1(t) ≥
(1− f1)s2(t) and i1(t) < i2(t), then s1(t+ ) > (1− f1)s2(t+ ). We prove this step
using the differential equations:
(1− f1)s2(t+ ) = (1− f1)s2(t)[1− βi2(t)]
≤ s1(t)[1− βi2(t)]
< s1(t)[1− βi1(t)]
= s1(t+ )
Since the requirements for the inductive step are satisfied at t = , the proof of the
lemma is completed.
Lemma 5.D.3. Consider two different initial states (sj0, i
j
0) for j = 1, 2 and as-
sume that sj(t) and ij(t) follow the dynamics of the deterministic SIR model. Then
s1(t) = s2(t) for at most one t ∈ [0,∞). i.e., the curves for the proportion of people
susceptible intersect at most once.
Proof. Define the function H(x) = −x+ 1σ log(x). Then the following can be derived
from (5.10):
i(t) = H(s(t)) + i0 −H(s0)
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When the curves for the proportion of people susceptible intersect, it holds that
s1(t) = s2(t) and hence:
i1(t)− i2(t) = i10 − i20 +H(s20)−H(s10) (5.22)
Observe that the right-hand side of above equation is a constant that only depends
on the initial state. When two curves intersect, the derivative of the one must be
larger than the other. Using the differential equations we find that:
∂
∂t
s2(t)− ∂
∂t
s1(t) = −βi2(t)s2(t) + βi1(t)s1(t) = βs1(t) (i1(t)− i2(t))
By contradiction assume that s1(t) and s2(t) intersect at both t1 and t2, with t1 < t2
W.l.o.g. let s10 > s20, such that s1(t) > s2(t) for t ∈ [0, t1) and t > t2 and s1(t) < s2(t)
for t ∈ (t1, t2). Then at t1 the following must hold:
∂
∂t
s2(t)
∣∣∣∣
t=t1
− ∂
∂t
s1(t)
∣∣∣∣
t=t1
> 0⇔ i1(t1)− i2(t1) > 0
If above condition is satisfied, the constant at the right-hand side of (5.22) must be
positive. Now consider the intersection at t2, where we need the following:
∂
∂t
s2(t)
∣∣∣∣
t=t2
− ∂
∂t
s1(t)
∣∣∣∣
t=t2
< 0⇔ i1(t2)− i2(t2) < 0
This condition can only be satisfied if the right-hand side of (5.22) is negative. Since
this right-hand side is a constant, it cannot be positive and negative at the same time.
Hence, it is not possible to have two intersections. We arrive at a contradiction and
conclude that the curves s1(t) and s2(t) can intersect at most once, which completes
the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 5.5. At the indifference curve, when the two pure strategies are equally good,
the hybrid strategy is strictly better and results in a lower final size.
Proof. The outline of the proof is as follows:
• We use Lemma 5.D.1 to find an expression for G(f1, τ1) making use of the fact
that the two pure strategies, strategy 1 and 2, are equally good.
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• This expression for G(f1, τ1) is substituted in the condition of Theorem 5.3 and
we show that the resulting expression is positive.
By Lemma 5.D.1 the following condition holds if strategy 1 and 2 are equally good:(
f2
s2
− f1
s1
)
G(f1, τ1) +
(
1− f1
s1
)
(f1 − f2) = 0
⇔ V
N
[
ϕ2
s2(τ2)
− ϕ1
s1(τ1)
]
G(f1, τ1) +
V
N
(
1− V ϕ1
s1(τ1)N
)
(ϕ1 − ϕ2) = 0
⇔ G(f1, τ1) = s2(τ2)(Ns1(τ1)− V ϕ1)(ϕ2 − ϕ1)
N(s1(τ1)ϕ2 − s2(τ2)ϕ1)
We insert above expression for G(f1, τ1) the second to last condition of Theorem 5.3
to show that the hybrid strategy is better.
s1(τ2)
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1
N
)
(ϕ2 − ϕ1) +G1(f1, τ1)
[
ϕ1s1(τ2)− ϕ2
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1
N
)]
> 0
⇔ s1(τ2) +
s2(τ2)
[
ϕ1s1(τ2)− ϕ2
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1N
)]
(s1(τ1)ϕ2 − s2(τ2)ϕ1) > 0
⇔ s1(τ2)(s1(τ1)ϕ2 − s2(τ2)ϕ1) + s2(τ2)
[
ϕ1s1(τ2)− ϕ2
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1
N
)]
> 0
⇔ s1(τ2)− s2(τ2)
(
1− V ϕ1
Ns1(τ1)
)
> 0
In the second step we substitute the expression for G(f1, τ1). To show that above
condition holds, we apply Lemma 5.D.2 and note that until τ1 the two epidemics
follow the same time course. Hence, the hybrid strategy with V1 = V −  is better
than the pure strategies. This completes the proof of this theorem.
Lemma 5.6. If the two pure strategies are equally good for vaccines of type 2 that
become available at time T , then there exists a T ∗ > T such that it is optimal to shift
 vaccines to type 2 when the vaccines of type 2 become available at time T ∗.
Proof. Observe that T and T ∗ are respectively characterized by (5.6) and (5.7). In
both expressions the time is implicitly characterized via s2(T ) or s1(T ∗). In condi-
tion (5.7) we used the following notation s1(τv1 ) is the proportion of people susceptible
just after vaccination at time τ1. i.e., s1(τv1 ) =
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1N
)
. Substituting this
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expression in (5.7) and rewriting gives the following:
s1(T ∗) =
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1N
)
ϕ2G(f1, τ1)
ϕ1G(f1, τ1) +
(
s1(τ1)− V ϕ1N
)
(ϕ2 − ϕ1)
= s2(T )
(
1− V ϕ1
Ns1(τ1)
)
(5.23)
The second equation is derived from (5.6). Note that s1(τv1 ) = s1(τ1)
(
1− V ϕ1s1(τ1)N
)
and s2(τ1) = s1(τ1). By Lemma 5.D.2 at time T the following holds:
s1(T ) > s2(T )
(
1− V ϕ1
Ns1(τ1)
)
.
Since the proportion of people susceptible is decreasing over time, this implies that
T < T ∗, which completes the proof.
5.D.3 Two vaccination campaigns
In Section 5.4.3, we describe two technologies that can be used for the production
of vaccines for a vaccination campaign. The resulting vaccination campaigns have
each n vaccination moments. To analyze the campaigns and the corresponding final
sizes, we apply the result of Lemma 5.B.1. Using the notation of that theorem, we
have that fTi = ϕiBN and 1 − f
T
i
si(τTi )
=
∏n
j=1
(
1−
ϕiB
nN
si
j
)
for i = 1, 2. We make use
of expression (5.6) to derive the switching curve that compares two single-moment
vaccination strategies. We use that f ij =
ϕjB
nN for i = 1, ..., n.
s2(τT2 ) =
ϕ2G(ϕ1, τ1)
(ϕ2 − ϕ1)
∏n
j=1
(
1− f
1
j
s1
j
)
+
[
1−∏n
j=1
(
1− f
1
j
s1
j
)]
G(ϕ1, τ1)NB
⇔
n∏
j=1
(
1− f
2
j
s2j
)
=
[
1− (ϕ2 − ϕ1)B
NG(ϕ1, τ1)
] n∏
j=1
(
1− f
1
j
s1j
)
⇔
n∏
j=1
(
s1j
s2j
)(
s2j − ϕ2BnN
s1j − ϕ1BnN
)
= 1− (ϕ2 − ϕ1)B
NG(ϕ1, τ1)
In the second step, we substitute the expression for s2(τT2 ). The derivation above
leads to condition (5.8), which is presented in Section 5.4.3.

Chapter 6
Summary and conclusions
This dissertation focuses on the allocation of scarce health resources to fight infectious
disease outbreaks. In particular, we look at vaccination, which is a very effective way
to reduce the number of infections. Our extensive literature review in Chapter 2
shows which decision problems play a role in the vaccine supply chain. Chapters 3 -
5 focus on a specific part of the vaccine supply chain, namely vaccine allocation. In
these chapters, we analyze three vaccine allocation problems. Our results show the
benefits of using an analytical optimization perspective: we provide new insights into
complex decision problems that increase understanding of the nonlinear dynamics of
infectious diseases and their effect on optimal solutions. In doing so, we aim to help
decision makers and contribute to the debate on good vaccine allocations.
In Chapter 2 we conducted a literature review in the Operations Research/Opera-
tions Management field on decision problems related to the vaccine supply chain. We
structured this literature by proposing a supply chain framework. We defined the fol-
lowing four components in the vaccine supply chain: product, production, allocation
and distribution. The vaccine supply chain has some unique characteristics, includ-
ing high uncertainty in supply and demand and asymmetry between the involved
parties. We emphasized the importance of further research on sudden outbreaks and
the supply chain in developing countries. Our review shows the valuable contribu-
tion that the OR/OM community has already made to solving logistical problems in
vaccination and highlights promising directions for future research. These research
directions include incorporating technological developments that affect the decision
204 Summary and conclusions
problems in the vaccine supply chain and integrating the consecutive stages of the
supply chain in the analysis to achieve overall improvement.
In Chapter 3, we analyze the optimal allocation of a vaccine stockpile in order to
maximize the health benefit, where we define health benefit as the total number of
people who escape infection. We find that vaccination can have a secondary effect
in addition to the primary one, which surprisingly causes a second dose of vaccine
in a population to have a bigger effect than the first. Based on this result we show
that there is a unique vaccination fraction that results in the highest health benefit
per dose of vaccine and we introduce the term dose-optimal for this fraction. We
characterize the solution of the vaccine allocation problem and we show the crucial
importance of the dose-optimal vaccination fraction. A single dose of vaccine may
be a drop in the ocean, but multiple doses together can save a population. From
this perspective, it may therefore be attractive to select a subset of populations to
which the vaccines are allocated. By focusing on a limited number of populations, the
available vaccine stockpile is used more efficiently than by allocating pro rata across
all populations. In practice, unequitable allocations are currently often applied when
vaccines are divided over age groups, not over different regions. Our analysis provides
a theoretical explanation for the efficiency of a geographical allocation and thereby
contributes to the understanding of vaccine allocation.
Chapter 4 studies the impact of vaccination on the effective reproduction ratio,
Rf , and the herd effect. The effective reproduction ratio is related to the initial
growth rate of infections. A compartmental model for disease progression is used to
model the outbreak and we prove that a vaccine allocation maximizes the overall herd
effect if and only if Rf = 1. In Chapter 4, we formulate two optimization problems:
finding a vaccine allocation that minimizes the number of vaccines needed to attain
Rf = 1 and finding a vaccine allocation that maximizes the herd effect. We show
that these two problems are equivalent and established a connection between two
seemingly unrelated parts of literature. Based on this equivalence result, we propose
solution methods. In two special cases the optimal solution can be characterized
completely. For separable mixing, we provide an optimal greedy algorithm and for
two populations we derive an explicit solution. For the general case, an efficient
solution approach is presented based on Perron-Frobenius theory. We illustrate this
solution approach in a case study in which we compare our optimal allocation to
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allocation heuristics proposed in literature. The results show that the herd effect can
be increased by 9 to 26% by using the vaccine allocations we derived. Equivalently,
using our optimal allocation, we are able to significantly reduce the required vaccine
stockpile to attain Rf = 1.
In Chapter 5 we study the trade-off between the timing of vaccination and the
effectiveness of the response. This trade-off plays a role in several vaccination prob-
lems, of which three examples are discussed in the introduction of the chapter. We
focus on a problem with an early aspecific vaccine and a late specific vaccine. We
demonstrate that it is not always optimal to spend the entire budget on one of the
two vaccine types, but that a decision maker should consider using a hybrid strategy.
By using a hybrid strategy, which divides the budget over the two vaccine types,
the final size can be reduced by more than 50%. The derived insights are useful for
decision makers who balance between the public pressure to respond quickly and the
aim to spend the budget on the best possible vaccine. Extant literature mentions
some practical considerations for using hybrid strategies. In Chapter 5 we provide an
additional and more generally applicable motivation for the use of hybrid strategies,
which supersedes the practical arguments used in literature or in the US national
pandemic response plan.
In this dissertation, we use optimization methods to find solutions to complex
decision problems. Our results show that this approach yields insights into the
structure of the solutions that could not be obtained numerically. For example,
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 we show that the nonlinearities in epidemics render a
geographic approach and a hybrid vaccination strategy, respectively, to be efficient.
Interestingly, until now in literature such strategies were mainly motivated by prac-
tical considerations. E.g., a geographic approach was advocated in situations with
a large asymmetry between the regions. Hybrid strategies were mentioned in the
production of influenza vaccine, where starting production earlier for some influenza
strains allows sufficient time to produce vaccines against these strains while buying
time to learn more about the other strains. In this dissertation, we give an important
motivation for geographic and hybrid strategies, even in the absence of such practical
considerations.
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Vaccine allocation has an ethical dimension, unlike many other resource alloca-
tion problems where equity does not play a role. Equitable vaccine allocations are
preferred, particularly within a country. The results in this dissertation show that
optimality and equity are often far apart. For example, in Chapter 3 we show that
prioritizing based on geography potentially reduces infections significantly. And in
Chapter 4, we show that for a population divided into age groups, it is better to
vaccinate some age groups completely and leave others unvaccinated. Prioritizing
based on age groups is generally more accepted than distinguishing between groups
of people based on geography. But even for age groups, the policy that we describe as
optimal need not be the best policy if we also take equity considerations into account.
Nevertheless, the results derived in this dissertation can be a valuable contribution
to the ethical debate on finding good vaccine allocations. Our optimal allocations
can be used as a benchmark to determine the effects on the final size of an epidemic
if a suboptimal policy is selected that is motivated by fairness. In addition, policy
makers can use strategies in which they balance between efficiency and equity. The
simple models and analytical insights in this dissertation provide a valuable starting
point for analyzing the efficiency of such strategies.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Door de eeuwen heen hebben infectieziekten miljoenen doden veroorzaakt. Verschil-
lende uitbraken van de pest kostten de levens van velen en ook griepepidemieën eisten
hun slachtoffers. Vandaag de dag komen zulke immense aantallen van slachtoffers ge-
lukkig nauwelijks meer voor en sommige ziekten zijn zelfs geëlimineerd. Niettemin
kunnen uitbraken van een nieuw griepvirus of van ziekten als SARS, MERS of Ebola
op de loer liggen, zoals we ook recent nog hebben gezien. Onderzoek naar de pre-
ventie van een epidemie, maar ook naar de juiste handelswijze in het geval van een
uitbraak, heeft daarom hoge prioriteit. Een medische of epidemiologische insteek ligt
hierin het meest voor de hand. Tegelijk komen er ook allerlei logistieke problemen
om de hoek kijken (zie Hoofdstuk 2). Moeten er bijvoorbeeld voorraden aangelegd
worden van vaccins? Zo ja, hoe groot moeten die voorraden zijn en waar moeten ze
opgeslagen liggen? Wanneer de middelen beperkt zijn, brengt dat allocatieproble-
men met zich mee: hoe kunnen de beschikbare gezondheidswerkers, medicijnen en
vaccins het beste worden ingezet? Het zijn precies deze vragen waarbij de kennis en
technieken van besliskunde van grote betekenis kunnen zijn.
Eén van de meest effectieve manieren om een uitbraak van een infectieziekte te
voorkomen, is door mensen te vaccineren. Vaccinatie leidt ertoe dat iemand (veel)
minder vatbaar is voor de ziekte. Wanneer een deel van de bevolking is gevaccineerd,
treden er dus minder besmettingen op. Hierdoor kan een infectieziekte zich minder
snel verspreiden en wordt een uitbraak voorkomen of ingedamd. Echter, niet voor
alle infectieziekten bestaat er een vaccin. Als er wel een vaccin is, is de beschikbare
hoeveelheid bij een onverwachte uitbraak zelden toereikend om de gehele bevolking te
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vaccineren. Dit brengt een allocatieprobleem met zich mee: hoe kunnen de beschik-
bare vaccins het best verdeeld worden? Wij bestuderen deze allocatie van vaccins
over verschillende groepen in een totale bevolking. Deze bevolkingsgroepen noemen
we populaties. Voorbeelden van populaties zijn verschillende steden en dorpen, maar
ook de verschillende leeftijdsgroepen kunnen als populaties worden beschouwd.
In de literatuur is het vaccinatieallocatie probleem uitvoerig onderzocht. Veelal
wordt met gedetailleerde simulatiemodellen bepaald wat het effect is van een vac-
cinatieallocatie. Verschillende allocaties worden vervolgens vergeleken en men trekt
conclusies over de beste allocatie. Deze aanpak gebaseerd op scenario analyse is wel-
iswaar informatief, maar resulteert niet in een duidelijk verklaring waarom bepaalde
allocaties beter zijn dan andere. Dit levert vooral problemen op, aangezien de alloca-
ties die goed blijken te zijn vaak tegenintuïtief en oneerlijk zijn (Keeling and Shattock
2012). Wij stellen daarom voor dit probleem vanuit de optimalisatie te benaderen en
analytische methoden te gebruiken om inzichten te krijgen in de structuur van het
probleem.
Om verschillende vaccinatieallocaties met elkaar te kunnen vergelijken, bekijken
wij in ons onderzoek het effect van vaccinatie. Vaccinatie leidt tot een bepaald ni-
veau van immuniteit, waardoor een gevaccineerd individu een kleinere kans heeft om
geïnfecteerd te worden. Hierdoor zijn de gevaccineerde individuen beter beschermd,
wat we het directe effect van vaccinatie noemen. Daarnaast heeft vaccinatie ook een
indirect effect dat te maken heeft met het begrip groepsimmuniteit. Door vaccina-
tie wordt het niet-gevaccineerde deel van de bevolking omringd door gevaccineerde
mensen die deels immuun zijn. Mensen die zelf niet gevaccineerd zijn, komen dus
minder snel in aanraking met besmette mensen en hebben daardoor zelf ook een la-
gere kans op besmetting. Dit mechanisme noemen we groepsimmuniteit, wat wordt
geïllustreerd in Figuur 6.1. Door vaccinatie worden dus twee groepen mensen be-
schermd tegen de infectieziekte: allereerst zij die zelf zijn gevaccineerd en daarnaast
ook diegenen die indirect baat hebben bij de groepsimmuniteit.
Een effectieve vaccinatieallocatie maakt zo goed mogelijk gebruik van het indi-
recte effect. Op die manier krijg je het meeste waar voor je geld. In Hoofdstuk 3
zoeken we daarom naar die vaccinatieallocatie die het indirecte effect maximaliseert.
Daarbij nemen we aan dat we een beperkte hoeveelheid vaccins tot onze beschikking
hebben. Om dit indirecte effect te kwantificeren maken we gebruik van het bekende
epidemiologische SIR model. Uit dit model leiden we een impliciete functie af voor
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Figuur 6.1: Als een kritieke fractie van de bevolking immuun is voor een besmette-
lijke ziekte, zijn de meeste mensen in die bevolking beschermd. Dit verschijnsel heet
‘groepsimmuniteit’ en is geïllustreerd in de onderste van de drie afbeeldingen. [Bron:
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)]
het indirecte effect van vaccinatie. Een grondige analyse van deze impliciete functie
levert een aantal interessante inzichten op. Zo kunnen we bijvoorbeeld aantonen dat
er een unieke vaccinatiefractie is die resulteert in het grootste gemiddelde indirecte
effect per vaccin. Deze vaccinatiefractie noemen we daarom de ‘dosis-optimale vacci-
natiefractie’. De dosis-optimale vaccinatiefractie speelt een cruciale rol in de optimale
allocatie. We kunnen deze optimale allocatie in grote lijnen als volgt karakteriseren:
kies een aantal populaties en verdeel alle vaccins hierover zodanig dat de vaccinatie-
fractie in ieder van de gekozen populaties zo dicht mogelijk ligt bij de dosis-optimale
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vaccinatiefractie van die populatie. Dit resulteert echter wel in allocaties die mogelijk
de ene populatie hogere prioriteit geven dan de andere. Dit kan als volgt worden ver-
klaard. Een kleine hoeveelheid vaccins is in een grote populatie wellicht een druppel
op de gloeiende plaat. Dezelfde hoeveelheid kan echter in een kleine populatie het
verschil maken tussen het explosief groeien en het direct uitdoven van een uitbraak.
Hierdoor is het eerlijk verdelen van de vaccins over alle populaties in sommige ge-
vallen een slecht idee, aangezien er dan in geen enkele populatie daadwerkelijk iets
bereikt kan worden.
Waar we in Hoofdstuk 3 zijn uitgegaan van een beperkte hoeveelheid vaccins
om daarmee een zo goed mogelijk resultaat te bereiken, keren we in Hoofdstuk 4
de vraag om: Hoeveel vaccines zijn er minimaal nodig om te voorkomen dat een
uitbraak explosief kan groeien? Door op een slimme manier de vaccins te verdelen
over de leeftijdsgroepen laten we zien dat we veel minder vaccins nodig hebben dan
andere verdelingen die in de literatuur zijn voorgesteld. Het blijkt vooral belangrijk
te zijn om die leeftijdsgroepen te vaccineren die een grote bijdrage leveren aan de
verspreiding van de ziekte. Voor de Nederlandse bevolking zijn dit met name de
leeftijdsgroepen 6-12, 13-19 en 20-39. Mensen in die leeftijdsgroepen hebben rela-
tief veel contacten op school of werk en kunnen daarom veel nieuwe ziektegevallen
veroorzaken. Door hen te vaccineren kan verspreiding voorkomen worden, waardoor
ook de kwetsbare groepen als jonge kinderen en ouderen beschermd zijn.
Tot nu toe hebben we gekeken naar beslissingsproblemen met één vaccinatiemo-
ment. In Hoofdstuk 5 bekijken we wat een goede strategie is als je op meerdere
momenten zou kunnen vaccineren om de verspreiding van een bepaalde infectieziekte
tegen te gaan. Om precies te zijn, bestuderen we twee vaccin types: het eerste type
is snel beschikbaar, maar is niet zo effectief voor de infectieziekte die we bekijken.
Het tweede type daarentegen is toegespitst op de betreffende ziekte en dus effectie-
ver, maar komt pas later beschikbaar. We laten zien wanneer een beleidsmaker zou
moeten investeren in welk type om ervoor te zorgen dat er zo min mogelijk mensen
ziek worden. Verrassenderwijs laten onze resultaten zien dat het vaak een goed idee
is om in beide vaccin types te investeren en het beschikbare budget over de twee
types te verdelen. Hierdoor heb je op korte termijn een vaccin beschikbaar waarmee
je direct een explosief groeiende uitbraak kunt voorkomen. Met de vaccins die later
komen, kunnen dan vervolgens veel mensen effectief worden gevaccineerd.
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De optimale oplossingen van de beslissingsproblemen rond vaccinatie die wij be-
kijken, zijn soms uiterst oneerlijk. Sommige populaties of leeftijdsgroepen krijgen wel
vaccins, terwijl andere populaties of leeftijdsgroepen volledig ongevaccineerd blijven.
Ook in eerder onderzoek, waarbij simulatiemodellen of numerieke analyses gebruikt
zijn, kwamen dergelijke oneerlijke resultaten naar voren. Echter, vanuit zulke niet-
analytische aanpakken is het lastig deze resultaten uit te leggen. De analytische
benadering in ons onderzoek leidt tot nieuwe inzichten, waaardoor we kunnen uitleg-
gen hoe de oneerlijke, maar optimale allocaties tot stand komen.
In de praktijk spelen eerlijkheidsoverwegingen een belangrijke rol bij het opstel-
len van een vaccinatieallocatie. Het daarom niet mogelijk, of zelfs niet wenselijk,
onze optimale allocaties direct te implementeren. Verschillende studies constateren
hetzelfde probleem: optimaal en eerlijk liggen soms ver uit elkaar. Eén van de op-
lossingen die hiervoor wordt aangedragen is om de beschikbare hoeveelheid vaccins
te splitsen in twee delen. Het eerste deel kan dan op een eerlijke manier verdeeld
worden, terwijl het tweede deel gebruikt kan worden om een zo goed mogelijk resul-
taat te bereiken. Het onderzoek dat wij gedaan hebben, richt zich op deze tweede
allocatie. Wij hopen dat onze analytische resultaten, die leiden tot meer inzicht in de
effecten van vaccinatie, waardevol zijn in het opstellen van vaccinatieprogramma’s.
Bovendien laat ons onderzoek zien dat er, naast de klassieke logistieke problemen
in de gezondheidszorg, zeker andere interessante terreinen zijn waar besliskunde en
optimalisatie van toegevoegde waarde kunnen zijn.
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Vaccination is one of the most effective ways to prevent an outbreak of an infectious disease. It results in 
immunity for the vaccinated individuals, but also reduces the infection pressure for unvaccinated people. 
In the past years, the Operations Research/Operations Management community has shown a growing 
interest in the logistical aspects of vaccination. 
In this dissertation, we structure the literature on vaccine logics. Using a supply chain perspective, we 
identify the following four components in the vaccine supply chain: product, production, allocation and 
distribution. For each of the components, we describe the decision problems and we identify future 
research directions. In the remainder of this dissertation, we analyze three decision problems in the field of 
vaccine allocation: the allocation of a limited vaccine stockpile to fight a sudden outbreak, the allocation 
of prepandemic vaccines in an age-structured population and the allocation of a limited budget over 
multiple vaccine types. We use mathematical optimization to find solutions to these complex allocation 
problems.
We contribute by providing insights into the structure of the solutions that could not be obtained 
numerically. Our results show that optimality and equity are often far apart. Policy makers therefore need 
strategies in which they balance between efficiency and equity. The simple models and analytical insights 
in this dissertation provide a valuable starting point for analyzing such strategies.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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